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Abstract
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the de facto means for securing commu-
nications on the World Wide Web. Originally developed by Netscape Communications,
the protocol came under the auspices of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in
the mid 1990s and today serves millions, if not billions, of users on a daily basis. The
ubiquitous nature of the protocol has, especially in recent years, made the protocol an
attractive target for security researchers. Since the release of TLS 1.2 in 2008, the protocol
has suffered many high-profile, and increasingly practical, attacks. Coupled with pressure
to improve the protocol’s efficiency, this deluge of identified weaknesses prompted the IETF
to develop a new version of the protocol, namely TLS 1.3.
In the development of the new version of the protocol, the IETF TLS Working Group has
adopted an “analysis-prior-to-deployment” design philosophy. This is in sharp contrast to
all previous versions of the protocol. We present an account of the TLS standardisation
narrative, commenting on the differences between the reactive development process for
TLS 1.2 and below, and the more proactive design process for TLS 1.3. As part of this
account, we present work that falls on both sides of this design transition. We contribute
to the large body of work highlighting weaknesses in TLS 1.2 and below by presenting
two classes of attacks against the RC4 stream cipher when used in TLS. Our attacks
exploit statistical biases in the RC4 keystream to recover TLS-protected user passwords
and cookies. Next we present a symbolic analysis of the TLS 1.3 draft specification, using
the Tamarin prover, to show that TLS 1.3 meets the desired goals of authenticated key
exchange, thus contributing to a concerted effort by the TLS community to ensure the
protocol’s robustness prior to its official release.
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In this chapter we provide an overview of this thesis. We discuss the motivation for our
work and present the overall structure of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the de facto means for securing commu-
nications on the World Wide Web. Initially released as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) by
Netscape Communications in 1995, the protocol has been subject to a number of version
upgrades over the course of its 23-year lifespan. Rebranded as TLS when it fell under the
auspices of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in the mid-nineties, the protocol
has been incrementally modified and extended with the release of TLS 1.0 [48] in 1999,
TLS 1.1 [49] in 2006, and TLS 1.2 [50] in 2008. Since then, TLS has received increasing
amounts of attention from the security research community. Dozens of research papers
on TLS have been published [8, 10,11,16,18,19,26,29,31,33,34,37,40,42,56,67,68,71,77,
80,83,84,87,90,96,105,108,111,114,117,121,148,149,151], containing both positive and
negative results for the protocol. What began as a trickle of papers has, in the last five
years or so, become a flood. Arguably, the major triggers for this skyrocketing in interest
from the research community were the TLS Renegotiation flaw of Ray and Dispensa in
2009,1 and the BEAST2 [57] and CRIME3 [58] attacks in 2011 and 2012.
1This flaw was rediscovered by Martin Rex as part of a discussion on the TLS WG mailing list in
November of 2009. Ray and Dispensa discovered the problem in August of the same year. No formal
reference for the attack exists but a description can be found at http://www.educatedguesswork.org/
2009/11/understanding_the_tls_renegoti.html.
2Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS
3Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy
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1.1 Motivation
The many weaknesses identified in TLS 1.2 and below, as well as increasing pressure to
improve the protocol’s efficiency (by reducing its latency in establishing an initial secure
connection), prompted the IETF to start drafting the next version of the protocol, TLS
1.3, in the Spring of 2014. Unlike the development process employed for earlier versions,
the TLS Working Group (WG) has adopted an “analysis-prior-to-deployment” design
philosophy, making a concerted effort to engage the research community in an attempt to
catch and remedy any weaknesses before the protocol is finalised.
Given the critical nature of TLS, the recent shift in the IETF’s design methodology for TLS
1.3, and TLS 1.3 now reaching the end of the standardisation process, we think it pertinent
that the TLS standardisation story be told. Prior to the standardisation of TLS 1.3, the
TLS WG conformed to a reactive standardisation process – attacks would be announced
and the WG would respond to these attacks by either updating the next version of the
protocol or by releasing patches for the TLS standard. A number of factors contributed to
the adoption of such a standardisation process: protocol analysis tools were not mature
enough at the time of design, the research community’s involvement in the standardisation
process was minimal, and until the first wave of attacks in 2009-2012, attacks on TLS
were not considered to be of enough practical importance to warrant making changes with
urgency. In contrast, the TLS 1.3 standardisation process has been highly proactive. The
availability of more mature analysis tools, the threat of practical attacks, the presence of
an engaged research community, and a far more open dialogue with that community have,
we contend, enabled this shift in the TLS standardisation process.
In this thesis we present work that falls on both sides of this process shift. We describe
two attacks against TLS 1.2 and below, thus contributing to the post-2011 TLS attack era
and further highlighting the need for a new version of the protocol. Our attacks exploit
weaknesses in the RC4 keystream to recover plaintext protected by RC4 in TLS. The first
class of attacks extends the attack ideas of AlFardan et al. [10] to recover user passwords,
the pre-eminent means of user authentication on the Web. While the attacks in [10] break
RC4 when used in TLS in an academic sense, they are far from being practical. For instance,
the authors’ preferred method for recovering secure cookies requires around 234 encryptions
of the target cookie. We enhance the statistical techniques of [10] and exploit specific
features of the password setting to produce attacks that are of greater practical significance,
showing that good-to-excellent password recovery rates can be achieved using 224 − 228
ciphertexts. We demonstrate our attacks against the real-world protocol BasicAuth and
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help to render the use of RC4 in TLS indefensible.
Our second class of attacks exploits the Mantin biases [101] to recover plaintexts from
RC4-encrypted traffic. Our basic attack targets two unknown bytes of plaintext that
are located close to sequences of known bytes of plaintext, a situation which commonly
arises when RC4 is used in TLS. We go beyond the plaintext recovery attack to develop a
statistical framework that enables us to make predictions about the attack performance
and its variants. This framework relies on results from order statistics, a well-established
field of statistical investigation that, prior to our work, does not appear to have been used
extensively in cryptanalysis. Using standard dynamic programming techniques, we extend
our basic attack to recover longer plaintexts and show that TLS-protected HTTP cookies
can successfully be recovered using 231 ciphertexts, a result which again improves on the
attacks described in [10].
We note here that usage of RC4 has dropped rapidly due to the high-profile nature of our
attacks, and those by others [10,148], coupled with the deprecation of RC4 by the IETF in
2015, and the decision by major vendors to disable RC4 in their browsers.4
As mentioned, we also include work that concerns TLS 1.3, specifically work that contributes
to building confidence in the new protocol’s design and catching flaws in a timely fashion.
We present an analysis of revision 10 (henceforth referred to as draft-10) of the TLS 1.3
specification using the Tamarin prover, a state-of-the-art symbolic analysis tool designed
for the automated inspection of security protocols. Our work shows that draft-10 meets
the desired goals of authenticated key exchange and provides the first supporting evidence
for the security of complex protocol mode interactions in TLS 1.3, thereby ruling out attacks
which exploit the interaction of several handshake modes, such as the Renegotiation and
the Triple Handshake [29] attacks against TLS 1.2 and below. Our draft-10 analysis also
highlights an attack against the post-handshake client authentication feature as proposed
for inclusion in draft-11 of the specification. The attack was reported to the TLS WG and
informed the next revision of the specification, adding valuable insight into the protocol’s
design.
The TLS 1.3 specification has been a rapidly moving target, with large changes being
effectuated on a fairly regular basis. This has often rendered much of the analysis work
4See, for example, http://www.infoworld.com/article/2979527/security/google-mozilla-
microsoft-browsers-dump-rc4-encryption.html.
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‘out-of-date’ within the space of a few months as substantial changes to the specification
effectively result in a new protocol, requiring a new wave of analysis. Building on our
draft-10 work, we contribute to what is hopefully the near-final wave of analysis of TLS
1.3 before its official release, analysing draft-21 of the specification using the Tamarin
prover. The many differences between draft-10 and draft-21 make for a very different
TLS 1.3 protocol, specifically from a symbolic perspective. As a Tamarin model aims to
consider the interaction of all possible handshake modes and variants, changes to these
modes as well as the inclusion of new post-handshake features, results in a very different
set of mode combinations to be considered when proving security properties. Hence, our
work on draft-21 presents a substantially different model to that of draft-10, and takes
a far more fine-grained and flexible approach to modelling TLS 1.3. Our draft-21 analysis
reveals an unexpected behaviour in the protocol which has the ability to inhibit strong
authentication guarantees in some implementations of the protocol.
The standardisation process for TLS 1.3 has arguably been successful, with several research
works [14, 27,32, 45–47,54,55,61, 61,85,91, 95] influencing the design of the protocol. The
amount of communication between those who implement TLS and those who analyse TLS
has probably never been greater. The results presented in this thesis reinforce the need
for a new version of TLS, and highlight the value of the more proactive design process
employed by the IETF by exposing several flaws in TLS 1.3 before the protocol is finalised.
1.2 Thesis Structure
This thesis is made up of four parts. Chapters 2 and 3 constitute the remainder of Part I,
Motivation and Background.
Chapter 2. This chapter provides detail concerning the TLS protocol. We describe
the general structure of the protocol, introducing its relevant sub-protocols and security
properties. We cover the pertinent technical details of TLS 1.2 and below, and TLS 1.3,
remarking on the differences between the various protocol versions. We introduce all
necessary details concerning the old and new handshake modes of TLS and briefly cover
TLS key derivation.
We note that, where necessary, all other chapter-specific preliminaries are introduced in
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the relevant chapters.
Chapter 3. In this chapter we explore the TLS standardisation process, examining factors
which may have contributed to the different standardisation cycles employed for TLS 1.2
and below, and TLS 1.3, respectively. We comment on the tools available for analysis,
the levels of academic involvement, and the incentives driving the agents involved in the
standardisation process.
Part II of this thesis, namely Attacking TLS 1.2 and Below, covers our work on the
earlier versions of TLS and contains Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 4. In this chapter we introduce our password recovery attacks against RC4 in
TLS. We describe the RC4 algorithm, discuss the relevant single- and double-byte keystream
biases, and provide further background on password distributions. We present a formal
Bayesian analysis that combines a priori password distribution with keystream distribution
statistics to produce a posteriori password likelihoods, yielding a procedure which is
statistically optimal (if the password distribution is known exactly). We demonstrate
the effectiveness of our attacks via extensive simulations and present a proof-of-concept
implementation against a widely-used application that makes use of passwords over TLS,
namely BasicAuth.
Chapter 5. This chapter covers attacks against RC4 that exploit the Mantin biases –
patterns of the form ABSAB that occur in the RC4 keystream with higher probability
than expected for a random sequence (A and B are byte values, and S is an arbitrary
byte string of some length G). We develop a statistical framework for exploiting these
biases which leads to an algorithm that recovers adjacent pairs of unknown plaintext bytes,
under the assumption that the target plaintext bytes are in the neighbourhood of known
plaintext bytes, a valid assumption in an attack against TLS. Our analysis enables us
to make predictions about the number of ciphertexts needed to reliably recover target
plaintext bytes by using results from order statistics. We extend the algorithm to recover
longer sequences of plaintext bytes, as would be needed to attack 16-byte cookies protected
by TLS. We rely on the beam-search and list Viterbi algorithms to achieve this and report
on a large range of attack simulations, focussing on a 16-byte target plaintext.
In Part III, Verifying TLS 1.3, we present our results on TLS 1.3. These are laid out in
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Chapters 6 and 7.
Chapter 6. This chapter covers our symbolic analysis of the TLS 1.3 draft specification
using the Tamarin prover. We introduce the symbolic setting and cover the necessary
Tamarin fundamentals. We formally model draft-10 of the specification and encode
the desired security properties, as laid out in the draft, using the Tamarin specification
language. We use a mixture of automated inspection and manual interaction with the
tool to analyse these properties. We also extend this model to include the post-handshake
authentication mechanism as suggested for draft-11. Our results represent some of the
first supporting evidence of the security of several handshake mode interactions in TLS 1.3.
Chapter 7. In this chapter we model and analyse draft-21 of the TLS 1.3 specification,
reforming our draft-10 model and incorporating the changes made to the specification
since draft-10. Our work on draft-21 reinforces the security of several handshake mode
interactions in TLS 1.3 for a near-final version of the protocol.
Finally, in Part IV, Concluding Remarks, we end with Chapter 8.
Chapter 8. In this chapter we conclude and briefly mention avenues for future work.
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This chapter provides detail concerning the TLS protocol. We describe the general structure
of the protocol, introducing its relevant sub-protocols and security properties. We cover the
pertinent technical details of TLS 1.2 and below, and TLS 1.3, remarking on the differences
between the various protocol versions. We introduce all necessary details concerning the old
and new handshake modes of TLS, and briefly cover TLS key derivation.
2.1 The TLS Protocol
TLS is a network protocol designed to provide security services for protocols running at
the application layer. TLS runs over transport layer protocols, as depicted in Figure 2.1.
Specifically, TLS runs over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [124], a reliable
network protocol that ensures in-order delivery of network packets in the face of accidental
deletion and re-ordering.1 The primary goal of TLS is to facilitate the establishment of a
secure channel between two communicating entities, namely the client and the server.
1The Datagram Transport Security Layer (DTLS) protocol [130,131], which is based on TLS, is designed
to run over transport protocols which are not necessarily reliable, such as the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) [125].
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Data Link
Network [IP]
Transport [TCP]
TLS
Application
Figure 2.1: Conceptual positioning of TLS within the TCP/IP protocol architecture
model [43]. Network layers are represented in red. Network protocols are depicted in blue.
The TLS protocol is made up of a number of sub-protocols, the two most important being
the Handshake Protocol and the Record Protocol. The Handshake Protocol negotiates all
cryptographically relevant parameters (including the TLS version, the authentication and
key exchange method, and what subsequent symmetric key algorithms will be used). It
authenticates one (or both) of the communicating entities, and establishes the keys for the
symmetric algorithms that will be used in the Record Protocol to protect application data.
For instance, if a client and a server agree on the TLS RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256 cipher
suite during a TLS 1.2 handshake, then the server will provide an RSA certificate to be used
for key exchange and entity authentication purposes. In this example, the Record Protocol
will then make use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) mode for the encryption of application data, and the hash function SHA-2562 will
be used in the Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm to provide
message authentication.
TLS also includes another sub-protocol, namely, the Alert Protocol. This protocol triggers
when errors occur within the operation of the other two sub-protocols. It will provide alert
messages to the application layer, indicating the severity of the alert. Fatal alerts will result
in immediate termination of a TLS connection. Warning alerts are informational and do
not necessarily result in connection termination. We do not say much more about this
2From the Secure Hash Function 2, or SHA-2, family of hash functions.
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protocol in the remainder of this chapter given that it is not a focus of the work contained
in this thesis.
The TLS Handshake Protocol is intended to negotiate cryptographic keys via the mechanism
of Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). This means that not only are symmetric keys
securely established by the client and the server but also that there are guarantees regarding
the claimed identities of the communicating peers. The keys established in the Handshake
Protocol are then used by the Record Protocol to provide critical security guarantees,
including confidentiality and integrity of application data. TLS is intended to provide these
guarantees in the presence of an active network attacker,3 i.e., an attacker that can capture,
modify, delete, replay, and otherwise tamper with messages sent over the communication
channel. We say more about the desired security properties of TLS in the sections to
follow.
2.2 TLS 1.2 and Below
We now describe the structure of TLS 1.2 (and below – the logical structure of these
versions is similar), covering the various handshake modes, the Record Protocol, and the
intended security goals and properties.
2.2.1 The Handshake Protocol
TLS 1.2 [50] has three types of handshakes, including an initial handshake to set up the
TLS session, a renegotiation handshake to update the session’s cryptographic parameters,
and a resumption handshake for repeated handshakes within the session. We discuss these
handshake types now:
Initial Handshake. The message flows for an initial TLS 1.2 handshake are depicted in
Figure 2.2.4 Messages marked with an asterisk are optional or situation-dependent and
braces of the type “[. . .]” indicate encryption with the application traffic keys. The client and
3We note that throughout this thesis we use the terms ‘attacker’ and ‘adversary’ interchangeably.
4Our TLS-specific ladder diagrams closely follow the message flows and naming conventions as laid out
in the TLS specifications. We include descriptions of the necessary cryptographic parameters in the textual
descriptions of the diagrams.
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the server exchange ClientHello and ServerHello messages in order to agree on a cipher
suite and to exchange nonce values. The communicating entities also exchange cryptographic
parameters (ServerKeyExchange, ClientKeyExchange) that allow for the derivation of
the pre-master secret. Certificates and the corresponding verification information
(Certificate, CertificateVerify) are sent for the purposes of entity authentication. A
master secret is derived from the nonce values and the pre-master secret, and in turn
used in the derivation of the application traffic keys to be employed by the Record Protocol.
The Finished message comprises a Message Authentication Code (MAC) over the entire
handshake, ensuring that the client and the server share an identical view of the handshake
and that an active attacker has not altered any of the handshake messages.
C S
ClientHello
ServerHello, Certificate*, ServerKeyExchange*,
CertificateRequest*, ServerHelloDone
Certificate*, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify*,
ChangeCipherSpec, [Finished]
ChangeCipherSpec, [Finished]
[Application data]
Figure 2.2: TLS 1.2 initial handshake
The Handshake Protocol runs over the Record Protocol, initially with null encryption and
MAC algorithms. The ChangeCipherSpec messages signal the intent to start using newly
negotiated cryptographic algorithms and keys; these messages are not considered part of
the handshake but instead are the messages of a peer protocol, the ChangeCipherSpec
protocol. As the Finished messages come after the ChangeCipherSpec messages, they are
protected using the application data traffic keys derived in the handshake. These messages,
then, are the first to be protected as part of the Record Protocol. They are followed by
application data messages, now protected by the Record Protocol.
TLS 1.2 allows for static RSA [135] key exchange, static Diffie-Hellman key exchange [51],
as well as ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In the case of an RSA key exchange,
the client will select a pre-master secret value and encrypt it with the server’s RSA
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public key, received in the server’s Certificate message. This will form the client’s
ClientKeyExchange message. In the case of (ephemeral) Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the
client and the server will exchange Diffie-Hellman key shares in the ClientKeyExchange
and SeverKeyExchange messages, respectively.
Renegotiation. The cryptographic parameters established in the initial handshake
constitute a TLS session. A session can be updated via a renegotiation handshake. This
is a full handshake that runs under the protection of an already established TLS session.
This mechanism allows cryptographic parameters to be changed (for example, upgraded),
or client authentication to be demanded by a server (in the event that it was not requested
previously).
Session Resumption. In order to avoid the expensive public key operations in repeated
handshakes, TLS 1.2 also offers a lightweight resumption handshake in which a new master
secret is derived from the old pre-master secret and new nonces, thus forcing fresh
application data keys. Each such resumption handshake leads to a new TLS connection
within the existing session; many connections can exist in parallel for each session. A TLS
1.2 resumption handshake is depicted in Figure 2.3.
C S
ClientHello
ServerHello, ChangeCipherSpec, [Finished]
ChangeCipherSpec, [Finished]
[Application data]
Figure 2.3: TLS 1.2 resumption handshake
Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs), in this case symmetric keys established out-of-band prior to
communication, are allowed to be used in TLS 1.2 and below for authentication purposes.
Their use is described in TLS extensions RFC 4279 [59] and RFC 5487 [17]. They are
intended to avoid the use of expensive public key operations.
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2.2.2 The Record Protocol
The Record Protocol provides a secure channel for transmission of application data (as
well as Handshake Protocol and Alert messages). In TLS 1.0 and 1.1, it uses a MAC-
then-Encode-then-Encrypt (MEE) construction, with the MAC algorithm being HMAC
instantiated with a range of hash functions and the encryption algorithm being instantiated
with CBC-mode of a block cipher or the RC4 stream cipher. Sequence numbers are
included in the cryptographic processing, creating a stateful secure channel in which
replays, deletions and re-orderings of TLS records can be detected. TLS 1.2 added support
for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) schemes, with AES in Galois
Counter Mode (AES-GCM) being an increasingly popular option [138].
Our work in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis describe attacks on the RC4 stream cipher
when used in TLS 1.2 and below. We cover details concerning the operation of this cipher
in TLS in Chapter 4.
2.2.3 Security Properties
The TLS 1.2 Handshake Protocol is responsible for establishing the symmetric session keys
that will be used as part of the Record Protocol to provide confidentiality and integrity
for application data messages. The Handshake Protocol also (optionally) authenticates
communicating peers whilst establishing these keys. The stated goals and security properties
of TLS 1.2 are discussed in the Security Analysis section of the TLS 1.2 specification,
namely, Appendix F. According to this appendix, the Handshake Protocol should satisfy
the following TLS security properties:
1. Secrecy of Session Keys. Upon completion of the handshake, the client and the
server should have established a set of session keys which are known to the client
and the server only.
2. Peer (Entity) Authentication. In the case of unilateral authentication, upon
completion of the handshake, if a client C believes it is communicating with a server S,
then it is indeed S who is in the server role. An analogous property for the server also
holds in the case of mutual authentication, i.e., the server has a guarantee regarding
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the identity of the client. Both forms of authentication are optional. It is also possible
that neither party authenticates. In this handshake variant, Diffie-Hellman is used as
the method of key exchange but, as noted in the specification, it is subject to the
well-known Man-In-The-Midde (MITM) attack in which an active attacker exploits
the lack of entity authentication to establish distinct session keys with the client
and the server, respectively, with the honest parties being oblivious to the MITM’s
presence.
3. Integrity of Handshake Messages. An active attacker should not be able to
successfully tamper with the handshake messages, potentially causing the client and
the server to adopt weak cipher suites.
Appendix D of the specification also addresses denial of service attacks as well as version
rollback attacks. Denial of service attacks against TLS are possible owing to the reliance
on the underlying TCP protocol. The opening up of a large number of TCP connections,
carrying TLS protocol messages, could overwhelm a server with TLS cryptographic com-
putations, and manipulation of the TCP protocol itself can also cause the termination
of TLS connections. TLS does not claim to be able to thwart this class of attacks. In
terms of version rollback attacks, the specification includes a countermeasure involving the
alteration of RSA encryption padding but this solution is not secure against all attackers
(further details can be found [50]).
The Record Protocol should satisfy the following desired property:
4. Protection of Application Data. This property is comprised of two sub-properties:
(i) Confidentiality of Application Data. Application data exchanged between a
client and a server should be known only to the client and the server.
(ii) Integrity of Application Data. The unauthorised manipulation of application
data exchanged between a client and a server should be detectable.
Showing that the Record Protocol confidentiality property is not achieved when RC4 is
used as the Record Protocol encryption algorithm in TLS 1.2 and below is the focus of our
work in Chapters 4 and 5.
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We note here that TLS versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 are all currently in use, with TLS 1.2
being the most popular for servers at the time of writing (according to SSL Pulse5).
2.3 TLS 1.3
Owing to the many attacks against TLS 1.2 and below, as well as pressure to improve
the protocols efficiency, since the Spring of 2014 the IETF has been working on the next
version of the protocol, TLS 1.3. In a large structural departure form TLS 1.2, the main
design goals of TLS 1.3 include [146]:
(i) encrypting as much of the handshake as possible,
(ii) re-evaluating the handshake contents,
(iii) reducing handshake latency – introducing a one Round-Trip Time (1-RTT) exchange
for full handshakes and a zero Round-Trip Time (0-RTT) mechanism for repeated
handshakes, and,
(iv) updating the record protection mechanisms.
We now discuss how TLS 1.3 meets these four requirements:
Handshake Encryption. The motivation behind handshake encryption is to reduce
the amount of observable data to both passive and active adversaries [146]. In contrast
to TLS 1.2, which only provides communicating entities with session keys to protect
application data, TLS 1.3 provides for the establishment of additional session keys to be
used for handshake encryption purposes. Handshake encryption begins immediately after
the handshake keys have been negotiated via a Diffie-Hellman exchange.
Handshake Contents. As will be discussed in the following section, the handshake
structure has been reworked for efficiency purposes. An additional server message has
been included to accommodate the event of a parameter mismatch, and compression of
application data has been removed. Static Diffie-Hellman and RSA have been removed
in favour of the Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)-supporting Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
5Available at https://www.ssllabs.com/ssl-pulse/.
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(DHE) and Elliptic Curve Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key exchange modes.6 RSA
certificates are still being used for entity authentication purposes in both the DHE and
ECDHE modes. Server-side signatures have been mandated in all handshake modes.
Handshake Latency. The TLS 1.2 handshake required a two Round-Trip Time (2-RTT)
exchange prior to communicating entities being able to transmit application data. The
handshake has been reworked in TLS 1.3 to require just 1-RTT if no parameter mismatches
occur.
TLS 1.3 also includes a 0-RTT option in which the client is able to send application data
as part of its first flight of messages, offering a clear efficiency advantage over TLS 1.2.
Additionally, the pre-existing mechanism for PSKs has been extended to cover session
resumption. This mode also requires a single round trip, and less computation than a
full handshake. We describe its details when discussing PSKs and session resumption in
Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
Record Protection Mechanisms. The earlier versions of TLS used the MAC-then-
Encrypt generic composition scheme as a record protection mechanism. This scheme is
not secure in general [22], and while it is still used today in TLS 1.2, there was a proposal
to replace it by the Encrypt-Then-MAC paradigm (in RFC 7366 [74]). Similarly, when
Krawczyk [89] announced the OPTLS protocol on the TLS mailing list, a protocol intended
to serve as a theoretical basis for TLS 1.3, he stated it would use Encrypt-then-MAC for
record protection. Ultimately, the TLS WG decided that TLS 1.3 would avoid generic
composition schemes and only use block ciphers that can operate in AEAD modes [106].
All non-AEAD ciphers have thus been removed in TLS 1.3.
At the time of writing, TLS 1.3 has been through twenty-six draft iterations. In the sections
to follow we discuss two of these drafts, including the protocol details necessary for the
understanding of the work presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
6Academic works often refer to Perfect Forward Secrecy using lowing case letters. Where suitable, we
adopt this convention.
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2.4 TLS 1.3 draft-10
We now discuss draft-10 of the TLS 1.3 protocol, covering the draft’s Handshake Protocol,
its Record Protocol and its claimed security goals and properties.
2.4.1 The Handshake Protocol
Some of the most significant changes in TLS 1.3 are due to the newly introduced handshake
mechanisms. Here we provide a brief overview of these different handshake modes, starting
with a description of the regular, initial handshake.
Initial (EC)DHE Handshake. The solid message flows in Figure 2.4 represent this
handshake. Again, messages marked with an asterisk are optional or situation-dependent,
and the CertificateRequest, Certificate and CertificateVerify protocol messages
followed by an asterisk can be omitted if only unilateral (server) authentication is required.
Braces of the type { } indicate encryption under the handshake traffic keys, whereas braces
of the type [ ] indicate encryption under the application traffic keys.
C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
HelloRetryRequest
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare,
{EncryptedExtensions}, {ServerConfiguration*},
{Certificate}, {CertificateRequest*},
{CertificateVerify}, {Finished}
{Certificate*}, {CertificateVerify*}, {Finished}
[Application data]
Figure 2.4: draft-10 (EC)DHE handshake
A client sends a server an offer of cryptographic parameters, including a client nonce, that
are later used to establish session keys (ClientHello). It also sends freshly generated
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Diffie-Hellman key shares along with the associated set of groups (ClientKeyShare). The
server responds with its choice of cryptographic parameters, including a server nonce and
a selected group from among those offered by the client (ServerHello). The server also
sends its own freshly generated Diffie-Hellman key share (ServerKeyShare), extensions not
used for key establishment (EncryptedExtensions) and an optional semi-static (EC)DH
key share to be used in later handshakes (ServerConfiguration). Also included in the
server’s first flight are its public key certificate for authentication purposes (Certificate),
an optional request for the client’s certificate in the case that mutual authentication
is desired (CertificateRequest), and a signature on all messages exchanged thus far
(CertificateVerify). The server’s Finished message comprises a MAC over the entire
handshake using a handshake key derived from the Diffie-Hellman key shares. Finally, if
the client received a request for authentication, the client either sends its own certificate
(Certificate) and a signature on the whole handshake thus far (CertificateVerify),
or a blank certificate representing no authentication. As in the server’s case, the client’s
Finished is a MAC over the entire handshake using a handshake key derived from the
Diffie Hellman key shares. The purpose of the Finished messages is to provide integrity
of the handshake.
If the client does not supply an appropriate key share in its first flight (it may sug-
gest groups that are unacceptable to the server, for instance), the server transmits a
HelloRetryRequest message in order to entice the client to change its key share offer.
Upon receipt of this message, the client should send a newly generated key share. These
messages are indicated as dashed arrows in Figure 2.4. If no common parameters can be
agreed upon, the server will send a handshake failure or insufficient security alert
and the session will be aborted.
0-RTT. Following the initial handshake in which the server provides the client with a
semi-static (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman share, the client is able to use this share to
generate a shared key which it then uses to encrypt early data. Figure 2.5 depicts the
draft-10 0-RTT handshake. The client’s EarlyDataIndication value signals a 0-RTT
handshake, which the server can choose to ignore (the server would then not process the
early data and a 1-RTT handshake would ensue). Braces of the type ( ) indicate encryption
under the early traffic keys derived from the server’s semi-static key share and the client’s
ephemeral key share.
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C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare, EarlyDataIndication,
(EncryptedExtensions), (Certificate*),
(Certificate Verify*), (ApplicationData)
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare, EarlyDataIndication,
{EncryptedExtensions}, {ServerConfiguration*},
{Certificate}, {CertificateRequest*},
{CertificateVerify}, {Finished}
{Finished}
[Application data]
Figure 2.5: draft-10 0-RTT handshake
PSKs and Session Resumption. TLS 1.3 effectively merges the PSK and session
resumption functionalities of TLS 1.2 into a single handshake mode. There are two possible
sources of PSKs: new session tickets (NSTs) and out-of-band mechanisms. While the
former are specified in draft-10, the latter are not entirely clarified with regards to their
intended implementation or assumed security properties (this becomes more explicit in
later drafts). Figure 2.6 depicts a PSK handshake following an initial handshake. Note
that a new session ticket is sent by the server directly after receiving the client’s Finished
message in the initial handshake.
In this PSK resumption handshake, the client sends a key share in its first flight to allow
for the server to decline resumption and fall back to the full (EC)DHE handshake. The
PreSharedKeyExtension value indicates the identity of the PSK to be used in the exchange.
We note that a PSK handshake need not only take the form of a resumption handshake; if a
client and a server share an existing secret, a PSK handshake may be an initial handshake.
PSKs may also be used in conjunction with an (EC)DHE exchange so as to provide forward
secrecy; the corresponding mode is called PSK-DHE.
Key Derivation. In contrast to TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 employs the use of handshake traffic
keys as well as application traffic keys. This keying material is derived from two secrets,
namely the ephemeral secret (es) and the static secret (ss). In the 1-RTT (EC)DHE
handshake, es and ss are identical with the secret being derived from the ephemeral client
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C S
Initial handshake (see Figure 2.4)
[NewSessionTicket]
[Application data]
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare, PreSharedKeyExtension
ServerHello, PreSharedKeyExtension,
{EncryptedExtensions}, {Finished}
{Finished}
[Application data]
Figure 2.6: draft-10 PSK resumption handshake (after an initial handshake)
and server key shares. In a PSK handshake, these two values are again identical and take
on the value of the PSK. In PSK-DHE mode, es is derived from the ephemeral client and
server key shares and ss is the PSK. In a 0-RTT handshake, es is again derived from the
ephemeral client and server key shares and ss is computed using the server’s semi-static
key share and the client’s ephemeral key share.
The secrets described above are used as inputs to a HMAC-based Key Derivation Fucntion
(HKDF) [86,88] in order to derive a master secret ms. This secret, in turn, is used in HKDF
computations to derive a resumption secret rs, an exporter secret exs, and application
data keys. Handshake traffic keys are derived from es, and early traffic keys, as well as the
finished secret fs, are derived from ss. These secrets and keys are derived according to
the schematic presented in Figure 2.7.
Another input to HKDF computations is the handshake hash. This consists of a hash of
all the handshake messages, including all client and server messages, up to the present time
but excluding the Finished messages. The final value of the handshake hash is called the
session hash. As such, the session keys established are cryptographically bound to both
of the shared secrets negotiated, and rely on both parties having a matching view of the
handshake transcript.
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ephemeral
secret
static
secret
xES xSS
master
secret
handshake
traffic keys
exporter
secret
resumption
secret
application
traffic keys
finished
secret
early
traffic keys
Figure 2.7: Key computation hierarchy for draft-10. Key computation secrets are
represented in blue and traffic keys are depicted in red. xES and xSS are HKDF outputs
derived using the ephemeral secret and the static secret, respectively. Exporter secrets are
created for application layer protocols wishing to leverage TLS keying material for their
own purposes, outside of the already provided TLS functionality, as per RFC 5705 [126].
Image adapted from [134].
2.4.2 The Record Protocol
Using keys established in the Handshake Protocol, the TLS 1.3 Record Protocol is respon-
sible for providing confidentiality and integrity of application data messages. It operates
on fragments (manageable blocks) of messages, protecting these fragments via the use of
AEAD mechanisms. As stated in Section 2.3, the list of supported symmetric algorithms to
be used as part of the Record Protocol now only includes AEAD algorithms. Upon receipt
of protected record fragments, the Record Protocol verifies, decrypts and reassembles
application data messages for delivery to the application protocol.
2.4.3 Security Properties
The TLS Record Protocol is claimed to provide confidentiality and integrity of application
data. The TLS Handshake Protocol is claimed to allow unilateral or, optionally, mutual
entity authentication, as well as establishing shared secrets that are unavailable to eaves-
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droppers and adversaries who can place themselves in the middle of the connection. The
handshake is claimed to be reliable: no adversary can modify the handshake messages
without being detected by the communicating parties.
The security properties for draft-10 are referred to in Appendix D (the security analysis
section) of the specification [127]. However, we note that this appendix contains the
disclaimer “Todo: Entire security analysis needs a rewrite”. As we will see in the next
section, this appendix did indeed get rewritten in subsequent drafts. The security properties
that the Handshake Protocol is required to satisfy (inferred from Appendix D) include the
following:
1. Secrecy of Session Keys. Upon completion of the handshake, the client and the
server should have established a set of session keys which are known to the client
and the server only.
2. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). In the case of compromise of either party’s
long-term key material, sessions completed before the compromise should remain
secure. This property is not claimed to hold in the PSK-only handshake mode, nor
in the 0-RTT handshake mode.
In a PSK-only handshake, if compromised, the PSK could be used to decrypt all
messages previously protected by the PSK. In the 0-RTT case, the client is the only
party to have provided freshness, therefore early data messages may be replayed. In
addition, the security of the early data depends on the semi-static (elliptic curve)
Diffie-Hellman share, which may have a considerable validity period, and therefore
a large attack window. For these reasons, early data cannot be considered to be
forward secure.
3. Peer (Entity) Authentication. In the case of unilateral authentication, upon
completion of the handshake, if a client C believes it is communicating with a server S,
then it is indeed S who is in the server role. An analogous property for the server also
holds in the mutual authentication case. Authentication of the server is mandatory
in all handshake modes. Mutual authentication, i.e., additional authentication of the
client, is optional.
4. Integrity of Handshake Messages. An active attacker should not be able to
successfully tamper with the handshake messages, potentially causing the client and
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the server to adopt weak cipher suites.
The above properties form the focus of our work in Chapter 6. Besides the required need for
the protection of application data via the Record Protocol and the properties listed above,
as in the TLS 1.2 specification, Appendix D of the draft-10 specification also addresses
denial of service attacks as well as version rollback attacks. As stated previously, TLS does
not claim to be able to thwart denial of service attacks. Defending against version rollback
attacks, i.e., attacks which force the use of previous, potentially weaker versions of TLS
(or SSL), is rolled into the Downgrade Protection property mentioned in the next section.
2.5 TLS 1.3 draft-21
In comparison to draft-10 of the TLS 1.3 protocol, draft-21 [128] incorporates an altered
0-RTT handshake mode, a revised key schedule, and new post-handshake mechanisms, i.e.,
handshake-type mechanisms that can be executed at any time after a TLS 1.3 handshake
has been completed.
2.5.1 The Handshake Protocol
Initial (EC)DHE Handshake. In an initial (EC)DHE handshake, as depicted in
Figure 2.8, the client sends a ClientHello message containing a random nonce, i.e., a
freshly generated random value, and a list of symmetric algorithms. The client also
sends a set of Diffie-Hellman key shares and the associated groups, ClientKeyShare, and
potentially some other extensions (such as the preferred set of signature algorithms to be
used by the server, for instance).
Upon receipt of a ClientHello message, the server selects appropriate cryptographic
parameters for the connection and responds with a ServerHello message. This message
contains a server-generated random nonce, an indication of the selected parameters and
potentially some other extensions. The server also sends a ServerKeyShare message along
with an EncryptedExtensions message and optionally a CertificateRequest message.
The ServerKeyShare contains the server’s choice of group and its ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
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key share. The client and server key shares are used to compute handshake and application
traffic keys. The EncryptedExtensions message contains material that is not necessary for
determining cryptographic parameters. For instance, the draft specification lists the server
name and the maximum TLS fragment length as possible values to be sent in this message.
The CertificateRequest message indicates that the server requests client authentication
in the mutual authentication case.
The server will also send a Certificate message, containing the server’s certificate and
a CertificateVerify message, which is a digital signature over the current transcript.
These two messages allow the client to authenticate the server. The server also sends
a Finished message. This message is a MAC over the entire handshake, providing key
confirmation and binding the server’s identity to the computed traffic keys. As the server is
now in a position to establish the application data traffic keys, the server may send protected
application data at this point. However, as the client has not (yet) been authenticated,
this application data is being sent to an unauthenticated peer.
The client responds with Certificate and CertificateVerify messages, if requested,
and then sends its own Finished message. These message flows are depicted in Figure 2.8.
It can be the case that the groups sent by a client are not acceptable to the server and the
server may respond with a HelloRetryRequest message. This indicates to the client which
groups the server will accept, and provides the client with the opportunity to respond with
an appropriate key share before returning to the main handshake. The associated retry
request messages are indicated by dashed message flows in Figure 2.8.
PSKs and Session Resumption. The PSK handshake variant allows a client to use a
key established out-of-band to start a new session, or to use a new session ticket (NST)
established in a previous handshake to resume the session. In the event that a PSK has
been established, a client and a server can begin communicating without a Diffie-Hellman
exchange. This is potentially attractive for low-power environments. However, without
an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange, the connection loses perfect forward secrecy. In
a PSK handshake, the server authenticates via a PSK. By combining a PSK with a
Diffie-Hellman exchange this mode maintains perfect forward secrecy. The PSK handshake
has the intended aim of avoiding the use of expensive public-key operations and, in the
case of a resumption and use of an NST, ties the security context of the new connection
to the original connection. In draft-21, the sending of NSTs acts as a post-handshake
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C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
HelloRetryRequest
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare,
{EncryptedExtensions}, {CertificateRequest*},
{Certificate}, {CertificateVerify},
{Finished}, [Application data*]
{Certificate*}, {CertificateVerify*}, {Finished}
[Application data]
Figure 2.8: draft-21 (EC)DHE handshake
mechanism which we discuss in more detail in Section 2.5.3. As a server may reject a
resumption attempt made by a client, the specification recommends that the client supplies
an additional (EC)DHE key share with its pre-shared key (PSK) when trying to resume a
session. Figure 2.9 depicts a PSK resumption handshake.
C S
[NewSessionTicket] (at some point prior)
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare*, PreSharedKeyExtension
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare*
PreSharedKeyExtension, {EncryptedExtensions},
{Finished}, [Application data*]
{Finished}
[Application data]
Figure 2.9: draft-21 PSK resumption handshake
In contrast to draft-10 of TLS 1.3, draft-21 includes a PSK binder mechanism. A PSK
binder is a value that binds a PSK to the handshake where the PSK is offered by a client
in the PreSharedKeyExtension, and if a PSK was generated by the server in-band, to
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the handshake where it was generated. A PreSharedKeyExtension can contain multiple
binders arranged in a list, where each binder is computed as an HMAC over a hash of the
ClientHello up to but excluding the binder list.
0-RTT. A client can use a PSK to send application data in its first flight of messages,
reducing the latency of the connection. As noted in the draft-21 specification, this data is
not protected against replay attacks. If the communicating entities wish to take advantage
of the 0-RTT mechanism, they should provide their own replay protection at the application
layer. A 0-RTT handshake is depicted in Figure 2.10. The client’s early data is protected
by a PSK only, indicated by braces of the type ( ).
C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare*,
PreSharedKeyExtension, (Application data)
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare*
PreSharedKeyExtension, {EncryptedExtensions},
{Finished}, [Application data*]
{Finished}
[Application data]
Figure 2.10: draft-21 0-RTT handshake
Key Derivation. A TLS 1.3 handshake will generate a set of keys on which both the
client and the server agree. The draft-21 specification defines a key schedule which uses
the repeated application of an HKDF to combine the secret inputs with fixed labels so as
to generate a set of independent keys.
The key schedule has two secret inputs, the (EC)DHE key share and the PSK. Depending
on the handshake mode, either one or both of these will be used. The key schedule also
includes the transcript hash in the key derivation. As the transcript includes nonces, even
if the secret inputs are repeated, the generated keys are guaranteed to be independent.7
The respective key derivation secrets are derived according to the schematic presented in
Figure 2.11.
7Of course, collisions may occur with low probability
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PSK (EC)DHE
handshake
secret
master
secret
binder
secret
early
traffic keys
early
exporter secret
application
traffic keys
exporter
secret
resumption
secret
handshake
traffic keys
early
secret
Figure 2.11: Key computation hierarchy for draft-21. Key computation secrets are
represented in blue and traffic keys are depicted in red. Exporter secrets are created for
use in application layer protocols as previously described, and the binder secrets are for
computation of PSK binder values.
2.5.2 The Record Protocol
In comparison to draft-10, the operation of the Record Protocol has remained largely
unchanged. The Record Protocol section in draft-21 is, however, more precise and
explicitly discusses record boundary details. As this is an implementation concern, we do
not consider it in our modelling of the protocol in Chapter 7.
2.5.3 Post-Handshake Mechanisms
The TLS 1.3 draft-21 specification describes three post-handshake mechanisms:
New Session Ticket (NST). After a successful handshake, the server can issue an NST
at any time. These tickets specify a binding to a PSK (derived from the resumption
master secret) which can be used in subsequent handshakes. This differs to the draft-10
specification in which NSTs can only be sent immediately after an initial (EC)DHE
handshake.
42
2.5 TLS 1.3 draft-21
Post-Handshake Client Authentication. After a successful handshake, the server can
send a CertificateRequest message. If the client responds with an acceptable certificate
(and the accompanying digital signature), then the server might authenticate the client.
However, because the specification allows certificates to be rejected ‘silently’, the client
cannot be sure of its authentication status in general. We discuss this behaviour in greater
detail in Chapter 7.
Key Update. After a successful handshake, either party can request an application data
key update. As the read and write keys for application data are independent, either party
can immediately update their write key after requesting a key update. Current application
data keys are used as inputs to an HKDF function to create the new application data keys.
2.5.4 Security Properties
The TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol negotiates cryptographic keys which are then used by
the Record Protocol to provide critical security guarantees, including confidentiality and
integrity of messages. As stated in the sections above, TLS 1.3 makes use of independent
keys to protect handshake messages and application data messages. Protection of the
handshake messages starts with the server’s EncryptedExtensions message, and in the
majority of handshake modes, protection of application data messages occurs after the
transmission of the server and client Finished messages, respectively. In draft-21, in the
case of a zero round trip time (0-RTT) handshake, any application data in the client’s first
flight of messages is protected with a PSK.
The TLS 1.3 draft-21 specification [128, Appendix E.1] lists eight properties that the
Handshake Protocol is required to satisfy:
1. Establishing Identical Session Keys. Upon completion of the handshake, the
client and the server should have established a set of session keys on which they both
agree.
2. Secrecy of Session Keys. Upon completion of the handshake, the client and the
server should have established a set of session keys which are known to the client
and the server only.
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3. Peer (Entity) Authentication. In the unilateral case, upon completion of the
handshake, if a client C believes it is communicating with a server S, then it is indeed
S who is executing the server role. An analogous property for the server also holds
in the mutual authentication case. Authentication of the server is mandatory and
mutual authentication is optional.
4. Uniqueness of Session Keys. Each run of the protocol should produce distinct,
independent session keys.
5. Downgrade Protection. An active attacker should not be able to force the client
and the server to employ weak cipher suites, or older versions of the TLS protocol.
6. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). In the case of compromise of either party’s
long-term key material, sessions completed before the compromise should remain
secure. This property is not claimed to hold in the PSK key exchange mode.
7. Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resistance. Should an attacker com-
promise the long-term key material of party A, the attacker should not be able to use
this key material to impersonate an uncompromised party in communication with A.
8. Protection of Endpoint Identities. The identity of the server cannot be revealed
by a passive attacker that observes the handshake, and the identity of the client
cannot be revealed even by an active attacker that is capable of tampering with the
communication.
As stated previously, 0-RTT mechanisms allow for replay of early data across sessions. The
draft-21 specification recommends addressing this at the application layer. We model
and discuss more fully the properties described above in Chapter 7 of this thesis. The
draft-21 specification refers to RFC 3552 [129] for an informal description of the TLS 1.3
threat model. This model assumes a Dolev-Yao adversary [53] – an adversary that can
perform MITM attacks by being able to replay, insert, delete, and modify messages at will.
We discuss this model, as well as our enhancements to it, in Chapter 7.
The material presented in this chapter informs the chapters to follow. Chapter 3 draws on
both the TLS 1.2 (and below) and TLS 1.3 information to discuss the different standardis-
ation procedures followed for TLS 1.2 and below, and TLS 1.3, respectively. Chapters 4
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and 5 are informed by the material on TLS 1.2 and below, and Chapters 6 and 7 make use
of the material provided on TLS 1.3
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Reactive and Proactive Standardisation
of TLS
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In this chapter we explore the TLS standardisation process, examining factors which may
have contributed to the different standardisation cycles employed for TLS 1.2 and below
and TLS 1.3, respectively. We comment on the tools available for analysis, the levels of
academic involvement, and the incentives driving the agents involved in the standardisation
process.
3.1 Post-Deployment Analysis
The standardisation process for TLS 1.2 and below can arguably be described as reactive.
Following the announcement of attacks against the protocol, the TLS WG has responded
by either making the necessary changes to the next version of the standard or by releasing
interim recommendations or extensions. This conforms to what we will term the design-
release-break-patch cycle of standards development. In what follows, we outline this
development process as it pertains to TLS, highlighting high-profile attacks against the
protocol and the IETF’s responses to these attacks. We note that we provide just enough
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technical detail concerning these attacks so as to effectively examine the IETF’s reactions.
This chapter is not intended to give a full technical account of each of the attacks mentioned;
the applicable references are provided for interested readers.
We note that each TLS version builds on the previous version, incorporating changes where
necessary. All TLS versions up to and including TLS 1.2 are currently in use, with clients
and servers often supporting more than one version. At the time of writing, almost 85% of
sites probed in the SSL Pulse1 survey support TLS 1.1, with support of TLS 1.0 and TLS
1.2 both being in the region of 90%.2
3.1.1 Design, Release, Break, Patch
The TLS standard officially sprang to life with a decision by the IETF to standardise a
version of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol3 in 1996. The growing need to support
e-commerce and hence the growing deployment of the SSL protocol prompted the IETF
to this course of action. At this stage, two versions of SSL existed in the public domain,
namely SSLv2 and SSLv3 [66]. SSLv2 had a number of weaknesses, in particular offering
no defence against downgrade attacks. It was finally deprecated by the IETF in [147],
published in 2011.
In 1998, Bleichenbacher published an attack on RSA when encryption used the PKCS
#14 encoding scheme [81], affecting SSLv3 [37]. The attack targets the RSA-encrypted
pre-master secret sent from client to server (see Section 2.2.1) by using the distinctive
server-generated PKCS #1-padding error message as an oracle. Successive, adaptive calls
to this oracle allow an attacker to narrow in on the value of the pre-master secret, and once
this is obtained, the attacker is able to derive the symmetric keys used in the connection.
The TLS 1.0 standard [48] briefly addresses this attack in a two-paragraph note that
describes the following countermeasure: a server that receives an incorrectly formatted
RSA block should use a pre-generated, random 48-byte value as the pre-master secret
instead, thereby eliminating the oracle. The Bleichenbacher attack has been re-enabled (in
1SSL Pulse serves as a global dashboard, monitoring between 135,000 and 150,000 SSL- and TLS-enabled
websites. Websites are monitored over time and are selected based on the Alexa list of the most popular
websites worldwide. The dashboard is available at https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/.
2Support statistics for February 2018. Retrieved from https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-
pulse/.
3Designed by Netscape Communications in the 1990s.
4The first family of Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS).
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various forms) in several works [78,83,108], the most recent case being DROWN [16], a
cross-protocol attack targeting all versions of TLS running on servers that also support
SSLv2. Surprisingly, a large number of servers still support this legacy version of the
protocol.5
Following the release of TLS 1.0 [48], the first significant attack against TLS appears to be
Vaudenay’s padding oracle attack [42,149]. This attack exploits the specific Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) mode padding format used by TLS in its MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt
(MEE) construction in the Record Protocol. The TLS WG initially responded to the attack
by adding a countermeasure to the attack in the TLS 1.1 specification [49]. This was
intended to equalise the running time of the reverse of the MEE processing – decryption,
decoding, MAC verification (DDM). This knowingly left a small timing channel, but it was
not believed to be exploitable. A decade later, in 2013, AlFardan and Paterson [11], in their
Lucky 13 attack, showed that in fact it was exploitable in a sophisticated timing attack.
Notably, the definitive patch against this attack required roughly 500 lines of new code in
the OpenSSL implementation, illustrating the difficulty of making the DDM operations
constant time. Moreover, several follow-up papers [9,12,13] have shown that variants of
the attack are still mountable in certain circumstances or for certain implementations.
Following the release of TLS 1.2 [50] in 2008, we see more of a “patch” process being
adopted by the TLS WG. During this time, we see an explosion of attacks against TLS.
We discuss some of these attacks next.
In 2009 Ray, Dispensa and Rex more or less simultaneously discovered the TLS Rene-
gotiation attack against the TLS handshake. By exploiting the lack of a cryptographic
binding between an attacker’s initial handshake and a subsequent renegotiation handshake
between an honest client and an honest server, the attacker is able to convince the server
to interpret traffic – both the attacker-injected traffic and the honest client’s traffic – as
coming from the honest client. The WG’s response to this attack was the announcement of
a mandatory TLS extension [132] applicable to all versions of TLS. The extension proposed
including the respective Finished messages in the client and server renegotiation Hello
messages, thus creating a binding between the two handshakes. Unfortunately, the Triple
Handshake attack of Bhargavan et al. [29] resurrected the Renegotiation attack by cleverly
5Approximately 3.5% of the roughly 150k servers surveyed by SSL Pulse still support SSLv2. Support
statistic for February 2018. Retrieved from https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/.
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exploiting the interaction of various TLS resumption and renegotiation handshakes. The
attack completely breaks client authentication in TLS 1.2 and below.
In 2011 Duong and Rizzo announced the BEAST6 attack [57]. The attack affects the TLS
1.0 Record Protocol and makes use of the chained-IV vulnerability in CBC mode observed
by Moller [109] and Bard [19], though it has its roots in an observation of Rogaway [136]
from as early as 1995. BEAST exploits the fact that in TLS 1.0, the final ciphertext block
of a CBC-encrypted record becomes the IV for the next record to be encrypted. This
enables an attacker with a chosen plaintext capability to recover low entropy plaintexts.
The main significance of the BEAST attack is the clever use of malicious JavaScript running
in a victim’s browser to realise the low entropy, chosen plaintext requirement and thereby
mount an HTTP session cookie recovery attack against TLS. However, it should be noted
that the attack required a zero-day vulnerability7 in the browser in order to obtain the
required fine control over chosen plaintexts. The malicious JavaScript techniques were
leveraged a year later by the same authors in the CRIME8 attack (see [139] for a useful
description of the attack). Unlike BEAST, however, CRIME exploits the compression
side-channel inherent to all versions of TLS, a vulnerability noted in theoretical form by
Kelsey in 2002 [82]. Interestingly, whilst the BEAST and CRIME attacks can be seen
as having triggered the flood of research that followed, neither came from the academic
research community, but instead from the “hacker” community (which partly explains the
lack of formal research papers describing the attacks). Both attacks required a strong
understanding not only of the cryptographic aspects of the protocol, but also of how the
protocol is deployed in the web context.
The widespread response to CRIME was to disable TLS’s compression feature. However, this
does not completely solve the problem of compression-based attacks because compression
can also take place at the application layer and introduce similar side-channels (see the
BREACH and TIME attacks). A common response to BEAST was to switch to using
RC4 as the encryption method in the Record Protocol, since a stream cipher would not
be susceptible to the CBC vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, the RC4 keystream has long
been known to be biased [103], and these keystream biases were exploited in a number of
plaintext recovery attacks on TLS [10,40,68,113,148], leading to the IETF deprecating
RC4 in March 2015 in [122]. We say more about these attacks in Part II of this thesis.
6Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS
7Details surrounding which zero-day was used were never specified.
8Compression-Ratio Info-leak Made Easy
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Other notable attacks to follow the BEAST, CRIME and RC4 attacks include the
FREAK [26] and Logjam [8] attacks of 2015, and the SLOTH attack [34] of 2016. Both
FREAK and Logjam exploit the enduring widespread support for weak export-grade cryp-
tographic primitives. Whereas the FREAK attack affects certain TLS implementations, the
Logjam vulnerability, in contrast, is the result of a protocol flaw and targets Diffie-Hellman
key exchange in TLS. The attack requires a server to support export-grade cryptography,
and for the client to be willing to use low security Diffie-Hellman groups. An active attacker
can convince the server to provide an export-grade 512-bit group to a client that has
requested a non-export DHE cipher suite, and the client will in turn accept this weak
group as being valid for the DHE handshake. Clever use of a pre-computation phase for
state-of-the-art discrete logarithm algorithms in [8] allowed for the quick computation of
individual connections’ secrets. An early intimation of these types of cross-cipher-suite
attacks can be found in the work of Wagner and Schneier [151] as early as 1996. The
warning from this paper seems to have been either forgotten or ignored in subsequent
developments of TLS. Moreover, from version 1.1 onwards, export-grade cipher suites were
not supported by the TLS standards. However, as already noted, almost all servers do
support TLS 1.0 and so become vulnerable to this class of attack.
The change in TLS 1.2 from supporting the MD5/SHA-1 hash function combination to
supporting single hash functions for digital signatures meant that stronger hash functions,
such as SHA-256, could be used but alas, so could weaker hash functions, such as MD5.
Wang and Yu [152] described collision attacks against MD5 in 2005; the SLOTH attack [34]
exploits this weakness to break client authentication in TLS 1.2 when MD5-based signatures
are employed. The attacks presented are near-practical and falsify the belief of some
practitioners that only second-preimage resistance is required of the hash functions used
for TLS signatures.
We have described, at a high-level, a number of the most prominent attacks on TLS and
the TLS WG’s responses to these attacks. We now turn to examining whether or not
these attacks were adequately addressed, and indeed, to what extent they could have been
addressed by the standardisation process.
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3.1.2 Fixes, Constraints and Time Lags
The TLS 1.2 specification provides the following cautionary note with regards to the
Bleichenbacher attack:
"a TLS server MUST NOT generate an alert if processing an RSA-encrypted
premaster secret message fails, or the version number is not as expected.
Instead, it MUST continue the handshake with a randomly generated pre-
master secret. It may be useful to log the real cause of failure for
troubleshooting purposes; however, care must be taken to avoid leaking
the information to an attacker (through, e.g., timing, log files, or
other channels.)"
Upon first glance, the countermeasure appears adequate. However, as pointed out by Jager
et al. [78], the discovery of new side-channels and the development of more sophisticated
analysis techniques allow for the implementation of Bleichenbacher-style attacks even
though the vulnerability was thought to be successfully patched. The attacks by Meyer et
al. [108] on implementations of TLS serve as an example of this. One course of action open
to the TLS WG was to remove the use of the PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding scheme in favour of
the PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding scheme (implementing OAEP padding) [79]. This would have
been more secure against the Bleichenbacher attack and all envisionable variants. However,
as is explained in the TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 RFCs, in order to maintain compatibility
with earlier TLS versions, this replacement was not made. We presume that the desire to
maintain backwards compatibility and confidence in the ad hoc countermeasure trumped
the evidently better security available from the use of PKCS#1 v2.1.9
A very similar situation pertains to padding oracle attacks and Lucky 13: an implementation
patch was put in place in TLS 1.1 and 1.2, but shown to be inadequate by the Lucky 13
attack [11]. With hindsight, it would have been less effort overall, and less damaging to the
reputation of the protocol, to reform the MEE construction used in TLS at an earlier stage,
replacing it with a modern design fully supported by theoretical analysis (notwithstanding
the positive results of [87], whose limitations were pointed out in [117]). A repeated pattern
in the development of TLS 1.2 and below is that the TLS community (a larger group of
9We note that Manager published an attack on PKCS#1 v2.1 in 2001 [100], however, his work included
improvements to address the weaknesses uncovered, and by the release of TLS 1.1 in 2006, precautions
against this attack had been incorporated into the PKCS#1 v2.1 standard.
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individuals and organisations than the TLS WG) seem to need to see concrete working
attacks before addressing a potential vulnerability or adopting an intrinsically more secure
solution, rather than applying a patch to each specific vulnerability.
In the case of attacks that exploit the existence of primitives or mechanisms that have long
been known to exhibit weaknesses, the simple (but naive) solution is to simply consider
removing a primitive or mechanism as soon as it is shown to be weak. However, this
might not be straightforward given implementation and interoperability constraints. In
the case of FREAK and Logjam, the standardisation process cannot be faulted: the weak
export cipher suites were removed from TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 and these attacks exist as
a result of poor implementation choices by practitioners. Similar remarks apply to the
IV-chaining vulnerability, which while already known in 1995, was introduced to TLS 1.0
in 1999, but then removed in TLS 1.1 in 2006. Unfortunately, deployed versions of TLS did
not move so quickly, with widespread support for TLS 1.0 in servers even today. On the
other hand, all modern browsers will now prefer TLS 1.2 and Authenticated Encryption
with Associated Data (AEAD) cipher suites in an initial handshake attempt, thanks to
the long line of attacks on TLS’s CBC mode and RC4 options. In the case of SLOTH,
however, the issue might not be as clear-cut. MD5-based signature schemes should not
have been re-introduced in the TLS 1.2 RFC. And RC4 has a very long track-record of
weaknesses stretching back more than 15 years, meaning that its phasing out from TLS
could arguably have been initiated much sooner than it was, instead of waiting for the
attacks to become a threat. In many cases, particularly where hardware support for AES
is available, AES-GCM could have served as a better choice for encryption.
With the many research papers professing the security of the TLS Handshake Protocol
[31,71,77,90], the existence of attacks exploiting the interaction of various TLS handshakes
may have come as a surprise to the TLS community. However, even here, there were
early signs that things were amiss with the 1996 cross-cipher-suite attack of Wagner and
Schneier [151]. Perhaps the lack of a practical attack in that paper and in later papers
such as [105] led to a more relaxed attitude being adopted by the TLS WG here. The
subtle interaction of different TLS handshakes was never fully considered in any analysis of
TLS prior to the Triple Handshake attack of 2014 [29]. It is therefore not surprising that
attacks of this form would have slipped through the standardisation process. Yet it should
be remembered that the Triple Handshake attack is a resurrection of the Renegotiation
attack from 2009. This is indicative of insufficiently broad or powerful analysis tools having
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been available to the TLS WG in the period intervening between the two attacks.
We argue that, in general and in view of the extreme importance of TLS, a much more
conservative approach to dealing with attacks on TLS is warranted. We do, however,
appreciate that bringing about meaningful change is challenging given (i) the large scale and
wide diversity of TLS deployment, (ii) the historical reticence of the major implementations
to code newer versions of the protocol (especially TLS 1.2), and (iii) the slowness with
which users (particularly on the server side) have tended to update their TLS versions.
3.1.3 Impact and Incentives
In the design-release-break-patch standardisation cycle, maximal reward for researchers
has come in the form of producing and promoting high impact attacks against TLS, and
engagement of the research community was largely encouraged in a retroactive fashion.
The obvious problem with this incentive model is that it leaves users of published standards
vulnerable to attack and imposes a potential patch action on the TLS WG. In the next sec-
tion we show that a shift in the standardisation cycle leaves the opportunity for researchers
to have impact (of a different kind) whilst positively benefiting the standardisation process.
3.2 Pre-Deployment Analysis
In contrast to the development of TLS 1.2 and below, the standardisation process for
TLS 1.3 has been proactive in nature. It has followed what we describe as the design-
break-fix-release cycle for standards development. Working more closely with the research
community, the TLS WG has released multiple protocol drafts and welcomed analyses of
the protocol before its final release. This design philosophy has simultaneously led to the
discovery of weaknesses and provided confidence in the WG’s design decisions. We explore
the factors that have enabled this newer process by considering the improvements in the
protocol analysis tools available, as well as the shift in design attitudes and incentives.
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3.2.1 Design, Break, Fix, Release
As stated in the previous chapter, the two broad design goals for TLS 1.3 have been (i) to
improve efficiency of the Handshake Protocol and (ii) to address the weaknesses identified
in TLS 1.2 and below. The initial challenge for the TLS WG was to go about achieving
these goals without having to invent an entirely new protocol: in addition to requiring
new code libraries, a new protocol might introduce new weaknesses. The development of
Google’s QUIC Crypto by Langley and Chang [93] in 2013, offering a zero round-trip time
(0-RTT) capability for the QUIC protocol [137], put pressure on the TLS WG to consider
ways of reducing handshake latency in TLS 1.3. And, after the flurry of attacks in the
preceding years, the protocol was due an overhaul to remove weak or broken features.
In comparison to TLS 1.2 and below, the first few drafts of TLS 1.3 (beginning with draft
00 in April 2014) incorporated changes that aimed to fortify the protocol against known
attacks, such as the removal of support for compression, as well as the removal of static
RSA and Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanisms, leaving ephemeral Diffie-Hellman as
the only method of key exchange. Troublesome record layer cipher suites, such as those
allowing for the use of CBC mode and RC4 were also removed, leaving AEAD algorithms
as the only supported algorithms for record layer protection. Handshake latency was also
reduced by the introduction of a one round-trip time (1-RTT) TLS handshake (previously
an initial handshake required two round trips before a client and a server could start
exchanging application data).
Two important changes that were introduced in the drafts up to and including draft-05
are the concept of a session hash and the removal of the renegotiation handshake. At the
time of release of draft-04, the session hash constituted a hash value of all messages in a
handshake starting with the ClientHello, up to and including the ClientKeyExchange.
The session hash is included in the key derivation process to prevent an active attacker from
synchronising the master secret across two different sessions, a trick employed in the
Triple Handshake attack [29]. The removal of renegotiation prevents renegotiation-based
attacks, the Triple Handshake attack again serving as an example of this class of attack.
In terms of analysis of TLS 1.3, Dowling et al. [54] and Kohlweiss et al. [85] published
works on draft-05, the latter set of authors using a constructive-cryptography approach
to provide security guarantees for the protocol. Their work highlights that the design
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choice in TLS 1.3 to separate out the Handshake and Record protocols helps with their
analysis, and indeed with provable security approaches in general. (Recall that in TLS 1.2
and below, the application traffic keys derived in the Handshake Protocol were used to
encrypt the Finished messages of the Handshake Protocol itself. This interaction adds
significant complexity to analyses of TLS 1.2 and below, in particular because it violates
the standard indistinguishability security goal for a key exchange protocol.)
Dowling et al. [54] used the multi-stage key exchange model of Fischlin and Gu¨nther [60]
to show that the keys output by the Handshake Protocol could be securely used in the
Record Protocol. Their work included several positive comments regarding the soundness
of the TLS 1.3 design, thereby explicitly providing useful feedback to the TLS WG.
In draft-07 we see the most radical shift away from TLS 1.2, with the cryptographic core
of the TLS handshake becoming strongly influenced by the OPTLS protocol of Krawczyk
and Wee [91], with many OPTLS elements being incorporated into the draft. OPTLS
has been expressly designed to be simple and modular, offering a 1-RTT, forward secure
TLS handshake that employs ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange. OPTLS also offers
0-RTT support as well as a pre-shared key (PSK) mode, capturing the use case in which a
client and a server enter into the protocol having previously shared a key. This particular
mode is of relevance from draft-07 onwards as the TLS 1.2-style resumption mechanism
is replaced with a mechanism that makes use of PSKs. This draft included a 0-RTT
handshake and key derivation schedule that is similar to that of OPTLS, employing the
HKDF primitive designed by Krawczyk [88]. The OPTLS designers provided a detailed
analysis of their protocol in [91], again providing the TLS WG with confidence in its design
choices.
However, it should be noted that significant changes were made in adapting OPTLS to
meet the needs of TLS. For example, OPTLS originally assumed that servers’ long term
keys would be Diffie-Hellman values, in turn supported by certificates. However, such
certificates are not widely used in practice today, potentially hindering deployment of TLS
1.3. Thus, in the “translation” of OPTLS into TLS 1.3, a two-level process was assumed,
with the server using a traditional signing key to authenticate its long-term Diffie-Hellman
value. But this created yet another real-world security issue: if an attacker can gain access
to a server’s signing capability just once, then he would be able to forge a credential
enabling him to impersonate a server on a long-term basis. Thus it was decided to change
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the signature scope to also include client-supplied, session-specific information, limiting the
value of any temporary access to the signing capability. This reduces the efficiency of the
protocol, since now a fresh signature must be produced by the server in each handshake.
Notable changes in draft-08 and draft-09 of the protocol include the removal of support
for MD5-based signatures as well as the deprecation of SHA-1-based signatures, partly in
response to the SLOTH vulnerability [34] and as a result of pressure from practitioners and
researchers to remove these weak primitives, as evidenced on the TLS mailing list [69,70].
Cremers et al. [46] performed an automated analysis of TLS 1.3 using the Tamarin
prover [6]. Their model covers draft-10 and their analysis showed that this draft meets
the goals of authenticated key exchange. They used a symbolic model to analyse the
interaction of the various handshake components of draft-10. Anticipating the inclusion
of the post-handshake client authentication mechanism in the TLS 1.3 series of drafts, they
discovered a potential interaction attack which would break client authentication. Their
attack was communicated to the TLS WG, and draft-11, which officially incorporated
the post-handshake client authentication mechanism, included the necessary fix as part of
the design. This work will be described in detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
In concurrent work to [46], Li et al. [95] analysed the interaction of the various TLS 1.3
handshake modes in the computational setting using their multi-level&stage security model.
They found draft-10 to be secure in this model. The post-handshake authentication
threat was not identified in this work presumably because this mechanism was not officially
part of draft-10.
In February of 2016, just prior to the release of draft-12, the Internet Society hosted a
“TLS Ready or Not?” (TRON) workshop. The workshop showcased analyses of TLS 1.3,
both published and under development, bringing together members of the TLS Working
Group, researchers and industry professionals with the aim of testing the readiness of TLS
1.3 in its then current form. Besides the aforementioned works by Kohlwiess et al. [85],
Krawczyk and Wee [91], and Cremers et al. [46], there were several other presentations
highlighting progress in the protocol’s development, as well as the challenges still facing
the TLS WG. Dowling et al. updated their previous analysis to cover draft-10 [55],
showing the full (EC)DHE handshake to be secure in the multi-stage key exchange setting.
Bhargavan et al. introduced ProScript [32], a JavaScript variant of their verified TLS
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implementation, miTLS [3,30]. Interestingly, ProScript also allows for the extraction of
a symbolic model for use within the ProVerif protocol analysis tool [4, 35]. This work
highlighted the potential dangers of incorporating certificate-based authentication into
PSK handshakes, a potential protocol extension being considered by the TLS WG. Work
on the secure of implementation of TLS 1.3 by Berdouche et al. [25] considered how to
maintain compatibility with current TLS versions whilst protecting against downgrade
attacks, and highlighted simplifications to the protocol which could be beneficial from an
implementation point of of view.
Importantly, the TRON workshop led to discussions between the WG and the research
community regarding potential simplifications and enhancements to the protocol, informing
subsequent drafts of the protocol.
At around the same time as the TRON workshop, an analysis by the Cryptographic
protocol Evaluation towards Long-Lived Outstanding Security (CELLOS) Consortium,
using the ProVerif tool, was announced on the TLS WG mailing list [14,104]. This work
showed the initial (EC)DHE handshake of draft-11 to be secure in the symbolic setting.
Further publications of relevance to TLS 1.3 include the work on downgrade resilience by
Bhargavan et al. [28] and the work on key confirmation by Fischlin et al. [61]. The first
provides suggestions on how to strengthen downgrade security in TLS 1.3 and the second
provides assurances regarding the key confirmation mechanisms used.
A smaller ad hoc meeting informally called “TRON2” took place in May 2016. At this
meeting, the latest changes to the protocol were discussed, further formal analysis was
presented, and TLS 1.3 implementations were compared.10
Since the TRON2 meeting, more work on TLS 1.3 has been produced, including work by
Bhargavan et al. [27] on draft-18 that proposes a methodology for developing verified
symbolic and computational models of TLS 1.3 together with a high-assurance reference
implementation of the protocol. This work includes a symbolic ProVerif model, as
well as a computational CryptoVerif11 model, of draft-18, and an interoperable
implementation of TLS 1.0 through 1.3 known as RefTLS which allows for the extraction
10See https://www.mitls.org/tron2/ for details.
11An automated tool for the construction of models and the production of the corresponding proofs in
the computational setting. Available at [1].
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of symbolic ProVerif models from its statically typed JavaScript code. The authors’
symbolic and computational analyses of draft-18 of TLS 1.3 find that the protocol meets
its desired security properties, however, they explain a scenario in which an attacker is
able to mount an authenticated replay attack, i.e., a replay of an authenticated client’s
data, in the 0-RTT handshake case. The TLS 1.3 draft does not claim to prevent replays
of 0-RTT data, however, in response to the scenario presented in [27], it now includes
warnings regarding this type of attack. The work also confirmed the downgrade resistance
inherent in TLS 1.3, with respect to previous versions of TLS, and presented an important
tool for the development of TLS 1.3 implementations – a reference implementation with
support for symbolic verification.
Further progress on TLS 1.3 implementations includes the work by Delignat-Lavaud et
al. [47] which builds and verifies the first reference implementation of the TLS 1.3 Record
Protocol (as described in draft-19). Plugging their implementation into the miTLS
library [3], the authors show interoperability with the Chome and Firefox browsers.
Using their previous draft-10 analysis as a foundation, Cremers et al. developed a symbolic
model of draft-21 of the TLS 1.3 protocol using the Tamarin prover [45]. This work
shows that many of the TLS 1.3 handshake modes meet the desired properties, however,
the work also uncovers an unexpected authentication behaviour in the post-handshake
authentication setting. We discuss this work in more detail in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
Much of the work pertaining to draft-18 and beyond was presented at the “TLS 1.3:
Design, Implementation & Verification Workshop” (TLS:DIV) that was co-located with
the IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy and the Eurocrypt conferences
of 2017. This workshop again showcased the bringing together of the TLS WG and the
academic community, highlighting the collaborative nature of the TLS 1.3 design process
with an emphasis on finding and remedying flaws prior to the protocol’s official release.
3.2.2 Available Tools
Since the release of TLS 1.2 in 2008, cryptographic protocol analysis tools have developed
and matured to the extent that they can now effectively serve a proactive standardisation
process, thereby contributing to, and perhaps even enabling, a more collaborative design
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effort for TLS 1.3. Significant advances have been made across all fronts, from lower-level
primitives such as key derivation and authenticated encryption, to higher level primitives
such as authenticated key exchange and cryptographic modelling of secure channels.
An early analysis of the TLS protocol itself can be found in the work of Gajek et al. [67] in
2008. However, their analysis only covers unauthenticated key exchange. Many refinements
and advances in the area of provable security for TLS have since been made. A major
on-going challenge has been to provide accurate modelling of the protocol and to capture
the complexity of its many interacting components and modes. In 2010, Morrissey et
al. [111] also analysed the TLS Handshake Protocol. However, their work only considered
a truncated version of the protocol (with no encryption of Finished messages), assumed
that a CCA-secure encryption scheme was used for key transport (which is unrealistic
given that TLS implementations employ PKCS#1 v1.5-based RSA encryption), and relied
on the random oracle model. In 2012, Jager et al. [77] introduced the Authenticated
and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE) security model in an attempt to handle
the unfortunate mixing of key usage in the Handshake and Record protocols; they used
the ACCE model to analyse certain Diffie-Hellman-based key exchanges in TLS. Their
work built in part on a 2011 work of Paterson et al. [117], who introduced the notion of
length-hiding Authenticated Encryption, which models desired security goals of the TLS
Record Protocol.
Further important works include those by Krawczyk et al. [90] and Kohlar et al. [84]. The
former work analysed multiple, different TLS key exchange methods using a single, uniform
set of proof techniques in the ACCE setting, while the latter extended the work of Jager
et al. to show that the RSA and Diffie-Hellman handshakes can be proven secure in the
mutual authentication setting. Li et al. [96] performed a similar task for pre-shared key
cipher suites. Giesen et al. [71] explicitly consider multiple Handshake Protocol runs and
their interactions in their formal treatment of the security of TLS renegotiation, while
Dowling and Stebila [56] examined cipher suite and version negotiation in TLS. All of these
works offer techniques that have been harnessed, and extended, in the analysis of TLS 1.3,
prior to its final release. Moreover, they represent a growth in interest in the TLS protocol
from the research community, a necessary precursor to their greater involvement in the
TLS 1.3 design process.
A major step forward in the domain of program verification for TLS came with the first
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release of the miTLS reference implementation in 2013 [3, 30]. The miTLS implementation
integrates software security and computational cryptographic security approaches so as to
obtain security proofs for TLS source code. This approach aims to eliminate the reliance on
the simplifying assumptions employed by the more traditional provable security techniques
– those tend to analyse abstract and somewhat high-level models of TLS and tend to
ignore many implementation details in order to obtain tractable models (in the form of
pseudo-code) suitable for the production of hand-generated proofs; moreover, they tend
to focus on “fragments” of the TLS protocol suite rather than the entire system. Using
their approach, Bhargavan et al. provided a security analysis of the TLS 1.2 handshake as
implemented in miTLS [31]. The miTLS implementation provides a reference for the secure
implementation of TLS 1.2 and below, and interoperates with all major web browsers
and servers. Not only has the miTLS project lead to the discovery of vulnerabilities such
as the Triple Handshake attack and FREAK, but it has also left the TLS community
with tools such as FlexTLS [2] which allows for the rapid prototyping and testing of TLS
implementations. These tools have also been harnessed to assess TLS 1.3, as discussed in
the previous section.
The rise of automated protocol analysis tools such as ProVerif [4] and the Tamarin
prover [6] can also be counted as a boon for the TLS WG. The more recent Tamarin
tool, for instance, offers good support for Diffie-Hellman-based protocols and allows for
the instantiation of an unbounded number of protocol participants and sessions, making
it a good choice for the modelling and consequent symbolic analysis of TLS 1.3. Once
established, this type of model can also be easily adapted in response to protocol changes,
making this tool invaluable in an ongoing development process.
The advances in the areas of provable security, program verification and formal methods
have contributed to a development environment in which a design-break-fix-release stan-
dardisation cycle can thrive. Previously, the absence of these techniques, or the limited
experience in applying them to real-world protocols like TLS, would have limited the amount
of pre-release analysis that could have been performed, making a design-release-break-patch
standardisation cycle understandable, natural even, for TLS 1.2 and below.
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3.2.3 Impact and Incentives
In the development of TLS 1.3, the WG has taken many positive steps in aiming to protect
the protocol against the various classes of attacks mentioned in Section 3.1. Removal of
support for weak hash functions, renegotiation, and non-AEAD encryption modes, as well
as the introduction of the session hash mechanism serve as illustrative examples. The
WG has also made design choices that have eased the analysis of the protocol, such as
making a clean separation of the Handshake and Record Protocols, for instance. This is
undoubtedly a positive step by the WG to respond to the research community’s needs,
marking a shift in the WG’s design mindset. The TRON workshop also displays a desire by
the IETF to involve the research community in the design of TLS 1.3, and to incorporate
its contributions. The research community, on the other hand, has gained a much greater
awareness of the complexities of the TLS protocol and its many use cases, and has tried to
adapt its analyses accordingly. In view of the rising interest in, and focus on, TLS within
the research community over a period of years, and the attendant refinement of its analysis
tools, this community has been in a much better position to contribute to the TLS 1.3
design process than it was for former editions of the protocol.
The ability to adapt the protocol in response to potential attacks, such as those identified
by Cremers et al. [46] and Bhargavan et al. [32], makes for a stronger protocol and has
allowed the WG to implement changes pre-emptively, hopefully reducing the need to
create patches post-release. In comparison to the previous process described in Section
3.1, the design-break-fix-release standardisation cycle appears to leave the incentives for
researchers unchanged, with a number of top-tier papers being produced prior to the
protocol’s finalisation. However, it is notable that these papers provide largely positive
security results about TLS 1.3 rather than new attacks. We consider this to be as a result
of the research community’s stronger appreciation of the importance of TLS and its greater
awareness of the value in contributing to its standardisation, in comparison to former
development cycles.
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Password Recovery Attacks Against RC4
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In this chapter we introduce password recovery attacks against RC4 in TLS. We describe the
RC4 algorithm, discuss the relevant single- and double-byte keystream biases, and provide
further background on password distributions. We present a formal Bayesian analysis
that combines an a priori password distribution with keystream distribution statistics to
produce a posteriori password likelihoods, yielding a procedure which is truly optimal (if the
password distribution is known exactly). We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks via
extensive simulations and present a proof-of-concept implementation against a widely-used
application that makes use of passwords over TLS, namely BasicAuth.
4.1 Introduction
In 2013 the RC4 stream cipher suffered several blows from the academic community, as
evidenced in the works [10], [76] and [113]. The work in [10] by Al Fardan et al. specifically
targets RC4 when used in TLS, presenting two attacks aimed at recovering TLS-protected
HTTP session cookies. The first attack leverages the existence of single-byte biases in the
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early positions of the RC4 keystream, i.e., biases of the form
Pr(Zr = z) = 2−8 · (1 + ε),
where Zr denotes the r-th output byte of the RC4 keystream, z is a byte value, and ε 6= 0.
The attack exploits these biases to mount a ciphertext only attack against TLS. The attack
requires multiple, independent encryptions of the target plaintext, otherwise known as a
broadcast attack. The second attack exploits periodically occurring double-byte biases, i.e.,
biases of the form
Pr((Zr, Zr+1) = (z1, z2)) = 2−16 · (1 + ε),
where Zr and Zr+1 denote the r-th and (r + 1)-th output bytes of the RC4 keystream, z1
and z2 are byte values, and ε 6= 0. This attack also requires repeated encryptions of the
target plaintext.
Despite the existence of these attacks, SSL Pulse1 showed that, in February 2015, 74.5% of
the roughly 150,000 sites surveyed still allowed negotiation of RC4. Even worse, a January
2015 survey2 of about 400,000 of the Alexa top 1 million sites showed that 3712 of them,
or 0.79%, supported only RC4 cipher suites, and 8.75% forced the use of RC4 in TLS 1.1
and 1.2, where better ciphers (such as AES-GCM) were available. Adding to the affront,
March 2015 data from the ICSI Certificate Notary project3 showed that more than 30% of
SSL/TLS connections were still using RC4.
At the time, a major reason for RC4 remaining so popular was that while the attacks of [10]
broke RC4 in TLS in an academic sense, the attacks were far from being practical. For
example, the preferred cookie-recovery attack in [10] needs around 233 – 234 encryptions of a
16-byte, base64-encoded secure cookie to reliably recover it. The number is so high because,
with mainstream browsers and taking into account the verbosity of the HTTP protocol, the
target cookie is not located near the start of the RC4 keystream, meaning that the strong,
single-byte keystream biases in RC4 observed in [10] cannot be exploited. Rather, the
preferred attack from [10] uses the much weaker, long-term Fluhrer-McGrew double-byte
biases from [64]. This substantially increases the number of required encryptions before
the plaintext cookie can be reliably recovered, to the point where, even with highly-tuned
1Available at https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/.
2Available at https://securitypitfalls.wordpress.com/2015/02/01/january-2015-scan-results/.
3The International Computer Science Institute (ICSI) Certificate Notary project monitors live network
traffic, observing public key certificates in real time and recording the SSL/TLS cipher suites negotiated as
part of SSL/TLS handshakes.
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malicious JavaScript running in the victim’s browser generating 6 million cookie-bearing
HTTP POST requests per hour, the wall-clock time to execute the attack is on the order
of 2000 hours using the experimental setup reported in [10]; moreover the attack generates
many terabytes of network traffic. Thus the practical threat posed by the RC4 attacks
reported in [10] was arguably quite limited.
In this chapter we present attacks recovering TLS-protected passwords whose ciphertext
requirements are significantly reduced compared to those of [10]: we achieve a reduction
from 234 ciphertexts down to 226 – 228 ciphertexts. We also describe a proof-of-concept
implementation of these attacks against a specific application-layer protocol making use of
passwords, namely BasicAuth.
We revisit the statistical methods of [10], refining, extending and applying them to the
specific problem of recovering TLS-protected passwords. Our target is to reduce as much
as possible the ciphertext requirements of the original RC4 attacks from [10]. Our overall
objective when conducting this work was to bring the use of RC4 in TLS closer to the point
where it became indefensible and had to be abandoned by practitioners. Passwords served
as a good target for our attacks because they are still very widely used on the Internet
for providing user authentication, and are frequently protected using TLS to prevent
them being passively eavesdropped. It is true that major websites use secure cookies for
managing user authentication but the authentication is usually bootstrapped via password
entry. However, to build effective attacks, we needed to find and exploit systems in which
users’ passwords are automatically and repeatedly sent under the protection of TLS, so
that sufficiently many ciphertexts could be gathered for our statistical analyses.
Our contributions in this chapter are as follows:
(i) We present a formal Bayesian analysis that combines an a priori plaintext distribution
with keystream distribution statistics to produce a posteriori plaintext likelihoods.
This analysis formalises and extends the procedure followed in [10] for single-byte
attacks. There, only keystream distribution statistics were used (specifically, biases in
the individual bytes in the early portion of the RC4 keystream) and plaintexts were
assumed to be uniformly distributed, while here we also exploit (partial) knowledge
of the plaintext distribution to produce a more accurate estimate of the a posteriori
likelihoods. This yields a procedure that is optimal (in the sense of yielding a
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maximum a posteriori estimate for the plaintext) if the plaintext distribution is
known exactly. In the context of password recovery, an estimate for the a priori
plaintext distribution can be empirically formed by using data from password breaches
or by synthetically constructing password dictionaries. We will demonstrate, via
simulations, that this Bayesian approach improves performance (measured in terms
of success rate of plaintext recovery for a given number of ciphertexts) compared
to the approach in [10]. We develop two attack algorithms, the first making use
of a single-byte-based approximation for a vector of consecutive keystream bytes
(necessary for recovering a vector of consecutive plaintext bytes such as a password),
and the second making use of a double-byte based approximation for a vector of
consecutive keystream bytes. The dominant terms in the running time for both of
the resulting algorithms is O(nN) where n is the length of the target password and
N is the size of the dictionary used in the attack.
A major advantage of our new algorithms over the work in [10] is that they output
a value for the likelihood of each password candidate, enabling these to be ranked
and then tried in order against a user’s account. This fits neatly with how password
authentication often works in practice: users are given a pre-determined number of
tries before their account locks out.
(ii) We evaluate and compare our password recovery algorithms through extensive
simulations, exploring the relationships between the main parameters of our attack in
Table 4.1. Naturally, given the combinatorial explosion of possible parameter settings
(and the cost of performing simulations), we focus on comparing the performance
with all but one or two parameters or variables being fixed in each instance.
(iii) Our final contribution is to identify and apply our attacks to a specific and widely-
deployed application making use of passwords over TLS: BasicAuth. We introduce
the BasicAuth application and describe a proof-of-concept implementation of our
attacks against it, giving an indication of the practicality of our attacks.
Our attacks exhibit significant success rates with only S = 226 ciphertexts, in contrast
to the 234 ciphertexts required in [10]. This is because we are able to force the
target passwords into the first 256 bytes of plaintext, where the strong single-byte
keystream biases come into play. For example, with S = 226 ciphertexts, we would
expect to recover a length 6 BasicAuth password with a 44.5% success rate with
T = 5 tries; the rate rises to 64.4% if T = 100 tries are made. In practice, many sites
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Parameter Description
n The length in bytes of the target password.
S The number of available encryptions of the password.
r The starting position of the password in the plaintext
stream.
N The size of the password dictionary used in the attack.
T The number of tries made (meaning that our algorithm
is considered successful if it ranks the correct password
amongst the top T passwords, i.e., the T passwords
with highest likelihoods as computed by the algorithm).
algorithm choice Which of our two algorithms is used (the one computing
the keystream statistics using the product distribution
or the one using a double-byte-based approximation).
encoding Whether the passwords are base64 encoded before be-
ing transmitted, or are sent as raw ASCII/Unicode.
Table 4.1: Attack parameters
do not configure any limit on the number of BasicAuth attempts made by a client;
moreover a study [39] showed that 84% of websites surveyed allowed for up to 100
password guesses (though these sites were not necessarily using BasicAuth as their
authentication mechanism). As we will show, our result compares very favourably to
the previous attacks and to random guessing of passwords without any reference to
the ciphertexts.
However, there is a downside too: to make use of the early, single-byte biases in
RC4 keystreams, we have to repeatedly cause TLS connections to be closed and new
ones to be opened. Due to latency in the TLS Handshake Protocol, this leads to
a significant slowdown in the wall clock running time of the attack; for S = 226, a
fairly low latency of 100ms, coupled with exploiting browsers’ propensity to open
multiple parallel connections, we estimate a running time of around 300 hours for the
attack. This is still more than 6 times faster than the 2000 hours estimated in [10].
Related Work. The RC4 stream cipher has long been subject to analysis by the academic
community and has been shown to exhibit many weaknesess [63, 64, 72, 73, 99, 101, 103,
120,140]. Many of these weaknesses concern biases in the RC4 keystream, which in turn
have been exploited to recover plaintext. Within the context of TLS, besides the two
attacks by AlFardan et al. [10] against RC4 in TLS (using single-byte biases in the first
and double-byte Fluhrer-McGrew biases from [64] in the second), Isobe et al. [76] present
plaintext recovery attacks for RC4 using single-byte and double-byte biases, although their
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attacks are less effective than those of [10] and they do not explore in any great detail
the applicability of the attacks to TLS. The work by Ohigashi et al. [113] also introduces
plaintext recovery attacks against RC4 but instead makes use of the Mantin biases [101],
i.e., biases of the form
Pr ((Zr, Zr+1) = (Zr+G+2, Zr+G+3)) = 2−16
(
1 + e
(−4−8G)/256
256
)
,
where G ≥ 0 is a small integer and Zr denotes the r-th output byte of the RC4 keystream.
In concurrent work to ours, Vanhoef and Piessens [148] conducted an extensive search for
new biases in RC4 keystreams, and settled on exploiting the Mantin biases in combination
with the Fluhrer-McGrew biases to target the recovery of HTTP session cookies from TLS
sessions. This work, along with the work of Ohigashi et al., is relevant to the material
presented in the next chapter and will be discussed in more detail therein (in Section 5.1).
In further concurrent work, Mantin presented the Bar Mitzvah attack against RC4 in
TLS [102]. The attack exploits the Invariance Weakness identified by Fluhrer et al. in
2001 [63]. Exploiting this weakness allows for a partial plaintext recovery attack against
RC4 in TLS, allowing for the recovery of the least significant bits (LSBs) of up to 100 bytes
of the encrypted stream. Unfortunately, owing to the infrequent presence of the desired
weakness in the RC4 keystream, an attacker needs to observe, on average, roughly 230
TLS connections before the attack is successful. Also, the verbosity of the HTTP protocol
ensures that no data of interest to an attacker is located within the first 100 bytes of the
encrypted stream, reducing the practical threat of the attack.
We note that several other works present attacks against RC4 outside of the context of
TLS, focusing on the stream cipher’s usage in WPA [115,116,143,144,150], and the HIVE
hidden volume encryption system [119]. We are currently not aware of any other attacks
that exploit biases in the RC4 keystream to specifically target passwords when protected
by RC4 in TLS.
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4.2 Preliminaries
We now present concepts and definitions that are relevant to the understanding of the
sections to follow. We introduce Bayes’ Theorem and include a description of the RC4
algorithm, explaining its usage in TLS. We provide more detail on the single- and double-
byte biases present in the RC4 keystream, and in particular, provide details concerning
our search for double-byte biases in the early positions of the RC4 keystream. We also
provide more detail concerning user-selected passwords.
4.2.1 Bayes’ Theorem
Named after Reverend Thomas Bayes in tribute to his foundational work on the theory of
probability [21], simply put, Bayes’ Theorem states that
Pr(A|B) = Pr(B|A) · Pr(A)
Pr(B) ,
where A and B are events, i.e., sets of outcomes of experiments to which probabilities are
assigned, and Pr(B) 6= 0. Pr(A|B) is the likelihood of A occurring given that B is true
(a conditional probability). Pr(B|A) is the likelihood of B occurring given that A is true.
Pr(A) and Pr(B) represent the probabilities of A and B occurring independently of each
other (known as marginal probabilities). We use this notion in our statistical attacks on
stream cipher encrypted plaintexts in Section 4.3.1.
4.2.2 The RC4 Algorithm
Originally a proprietary stream cipher designed by Ron Rivest in 1987, RC4 is remarkably
fast when implemented in software and has a very simple description. Details of the cipher
were leaked in 1994 and the cipher has been subject to public analysis and study ever since.
RC4 allows for variable-length key sizes, anywhere from 40 to 256 bits, and consists of two
algorithms, namely, a key scheduling algorithm (KSA) and a pseudo-random generation
algorithm (PRGA). The KSA takes as input an l-byte key and produces the initial internal
state st0 = (i, j,S) for the PRGA; S is the canonical representation of a permutation of
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Algorithm 1: RC4 key scheduling (KSA)
input : key K of l bytes
output : initial internal state st0
begin
for i = 0 to 255 do
S[i]← i
j ← 0
for i = 0 to 255 do
j ← j + S[i] +K[i mod l]
swap(S[i],S[j])
i, j ← 0
st0 ← (i, j,S)
return st0
Algorithm 2: RC4 keystream generator (PRGA)
input : internal state str
output : keystream byte Zr+1 updated internal state str+1
begin
parse (i, j,S)← str
i← i+ 1
j ← j + S[i]
swap(S[i],S[j])
Zr+1 ← S[S[i] + S[j]]
str+1 ← (i, j,S)
return (Zr+1, str+1)
the numbers from 0 to 255 where the permutation is a function of the l-byte key, and i and
j are indices for S. The KSA is specified in Algorithm 1 where K represents the l-byte key
array and S the 256-byte state array. Given the internal state str, the PRGA will generate
a keystream byte Zr+1 and updated state str+1 as specified in Algorithm 2.
4.2.3 Single-byte Biases in the RC4 Keystream
RC4 has several cryptographic weaknesses, notably the existence of various biases in the
RC4 keystream, see for example [10,73,101,103]. Large single-byte biases are prominent
in the early positions of the RC4 keystream. Mantin and Shamir [103] observed the
first of these biases, in Z2 (the second byte of the RC4 keystream), and showed how to
exploit it in what they termed a broadcast attack, wherein the same plaintext is repeatedly
encrypted under different keys. AlFardan et al. [10] performed large-scale computations to
estimate these early biases, using 245 keystreams to compute the single-byte keystream
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distributions in the first 256 output positions. They also provided a statistical approach to
recovering plaintext bytes in the broadcast attack scenario, and explored its exploitation in
TLS. Much of the new bias behaviour they observed was subsequently explained in [140].
Unfortunately, from an attacker’s perspective, the single-byte biases die away very quickly
beyond position 256 in the RC4 keystream. This means that they can only be used in
attacks to extract plaintext bytes which are found close to the start of plaintext streams.
This was a significant complicating factor in the attacks of [10], where, because of the
behaviour of HTTP in modern browsers, the target HTTP secure cookies are not so located.
4.2.4 Double-byte Biases in the RC4 Keystream
Fluhrer and McGrew [64] showed that there are biases in adjacent bytes in RC4 keystreams,
and that these so-called double-byte biases are persistent throughout the keystream. The
presence of these long-term biases (and the absence of any other similarly-sized double-byte
biases) was confirmed computationally in [10]. AlFardan et al. [10] also exploited these
biases in their double-byte attack to recover HTTP secure cookies.
Owing to the fact that we wish to exploit double-byte biases in early portions of the RC4
keystream and because the analysis of [64] assumes the RC4 permutation S is uniformly
random (which is not the case for early keystream bytes), we carried out extensive
computations to estimate the initial double-byte keystream distributions: we used roughly
4800 core-days of computation to generate 244 RC4 keystreams for random 128-bit RC4
keys (as used in TLS); we used these keystreams to estimate the double-byte keystream
distributions for RC4 in the first 512 positions.
While the gross behaviour that we observed is dominated by products of the known
single-byte biases in the first 256 positions and by the Fluhrer-McGrew biases in the
later positions, we did observe some new and interesting double-byte biases. In Figure
4.1, for instance, the influence of the single-byte key-length-dependent bias [72], and the
single-byte r-bias [10] are evident. The former can be observed as the strong vertical line
at Z16 = 0xEO, while the latter can be seen as the lines at Z16 = 0x10 and Z17 = 0x11.
The faint diagonal line appears to be a new double-byte bias (that is not accounted for as
a product of single-byte biases). It appears in many early positions. For example, it is at
least twice as strong as that arising in the product distribution for at least 64 of the 256
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Figure 4.1: Measured biases for RC4 keystream byte pair (Z16, Z17). The colouring scheme
encodes the strength of the bias, i.e., the deviation from the expected probability of 1/216,
scaled by a factor of 222, capped at a maximum of 1.
possible byte values from positions (Z3, Z4) up to positions (Z110, Z111). It then gradually
disappears but reappears at around positions (Z192, Z193) (albeit as a positive bias) and
persists up to positions (Z257, Z258) (changing sign again at (Z255, Z256)).
The presence of horizontal and vertical lines in Figure 4.1 and the absence of other strong
biases, which is typical for the early positions, indicates that the adjacent bytes behave
largely independently of each other. In other words, there are very few strong conditional
biases in the first 256 positions of the RC4 keystream. For later positions in the keystream,
Figure 4.2 depicts what is typical in terms of bias behaviour: the presence of Fluhrer-
McGrew biases only. These are visible in Figure 4.2 at (Z384, Z385)= (0x00, 0x01) and
(0x81, 0xFF) for example.
Finally, of particular interest is the distribution of (Z1, Z2). Figure 4.3a shows the raw
distribution for this position pair, while Figure 4.3b shows the residual biases when
the product distribution of Z1 and Z2 is removed. Note that the raw distribution is
predominantly negatively biased; this is because of the effect of the large Mantin-Shamir
positive bias towards 0x00 in position Z2, and the compensating negative single byte biases
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Figure 4.2: Measured biases for RC4 keystream byte pair (Z384, Z385). The colouring
scheme encodes the strength of the bias, i.e., the deviation from the expected probability
of 1/216, scaled by a factor of 224, capped at a maximum of 1.
for all other values of Z2. Note also the two diagonal lines in Figure 4.3b. The “positive”
(blue-coloured) diagonal here represents a negative bias in (Z1, Z2) for all byte pairs (z, z)
where z ∈ B \ {0x00} where B denotes the set of bytes {0x0x00, . . . , 0x0xFF}; this bias is
also evident in the raw distribution in Figure 4.3a. The “negative diagonal” in Figure 4.3b
shows that there is a systematic difference between the raw double-byte distribution and
the product distribution. It manifests itself as a white-coloured negative diagonal in the
raw double-byte distribution shown in Figure 4.3a; thus, in the raw distribution, it forms a
structured set of unbiased pairs against a largely negatively-biased background.
The only other previously known bias of this nature in this portion of the keystream is due
to Isobe et al. [76], who showed that:
Pr(Z1 = 0x00 ∧ Z2 = 0x00) = 2−16 · (1 + 20.996).
This bias is also evident in Figure 4.3. By contrast, the new diagonal biases are negative,
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Figure 4.3: Measured biases for RC4 keystream byte pair (Z1, Z2).
sporting magnitudes in the region of 2−22. For example, we empirically observe:
Pr(Z1 = 0x14 ∧ Z2 = 0x14) = 2−16 · (1− 2−6.097).
We formally define a large double-byte bias to be one whose magnitude is at least 2−24. We
observed 103,031 such large biases in total. Note that with 244 keystreams, all such biases
are statistically significant and highly unlikely to arise from random fluctuations in our
empirical analysis. For, in each position pair (r, r + 1) we have 216 counters, one for each
possible pair (Zr, Zr+1), so, in the absence of any biases, each counter would be (roughly)
normally distributed with mean 244 · 2−16 = 228 and standard deviation σ of approximately
√
228 = 214. Then a bias of size 2−24 would lead to a counter value of around
244 · (2−16 + 2−24) = 228 + 26 · 214
which is a 64σ event. Using the standard tail bound for the normal distribution, even with
225 counters in total (across 512 positions), we would expect to see only 218 · e−2048/pi  1
such events.
We found that 643 (less than 1%) of the large biases that we observed were at least twice
the size (in absolute value) of biases resulting from the products of single-byte biases or of
the expected Fluhrer-McGrew bias in the same positions. In other words, most of the large
biases that we observed arise from the product distribution or are explained by Fluhrer
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and McGrew’s results. We also note that we did find double-byte biases in all the positions
predicted by Fluhrer and McGrew [64] starting from byte pair (Z4, Z5) onwards. This is
not surprising given that the idealised assumption concerning the internal state of the RC4
algorithm that was used in the analysis of [64] is well approximated after a few invocations
of the RC4 keystream generator. However, in many such cases, the magnitude of the bias
we observed is greater than is predicted by the Fluhrer-McGrew analysis. For example, in
byte pair (Z6, Z7) we observed
Pr(Z6 = 0x07 ∧ Z7 = 0xFF) = 2−16 · (1− 2−6.487),
whereas the corresponding specified Fluhrer-McGrew probability for this byte pair, namely
the (i+ 1, 0xFF) byte pair where i is the internal variable of the RC4 keystream generator,
is 216(1 + 2−8).
We do, however, note a transition to the regular Fluhrer-McGrew double-byte biases from
position 257 onwards. We also note the disappearance of the single-byte biases from roughly
this point onwards. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4, which shows the absolute value of the
largest single-byte bias observed in our data as a function of keystream position r.
2-22
2-21
2-20
2-19
2-18
2-17
 240  245  250  255  260  265  270  275
Bi
as
Keystream Byte Position
Figure 4.4: Absolute value of the largest single-byte bias for keystream bytes Z240 to Z272.
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4.2.5 RC4 and the TLS Record Protocol
We provide an overview of the TLS Record Protocol with RC4 selected as the method for
encryption (further details for TLS 1.2 and below are given in Chapter 2 of this thesis).
Application data to be protected by TLS, i.e, a sequence of bytes or a record R, is processed
as follows: An 8-byte sequence number SQN, a 5-byte header HDR and R are concatenated
to form the input to an HMAC function. We let T denote the resulting output of this
function. In the case of RC4 encryption, the plaintext, P = T ||R, is XORed byte-per-byte
with the RC4 keystream. In other words,
Cr = Pr ⊕ Zr,
for the rth bytes of the ciphertext, plaintext and RC4 keystream respectively (for r =
1, 2, 3 . . . ). The data that is transmitted has the form HDR||C, where C is the concatenation
of the individual ciphertext bytes.
The RC4 algorithm is initialised in the standard way at the start of each TLS connection
with a 128-bit encryption key. This key, k, is derived from the TLS master secret that is
established during the TLS Handshake Protocol; k is either established via the full TLS
Handshake Protocol or TLS session resumption. The first few bytes to be protected by
RC4 encryption is a Finished message of the TLS Handshake Protocol. We do not target
this record in our attacks since this message is not constant over multiple sessions. The
exact size of this message is important in dictating how far down the keystream our target
plaintext will be located; in turn this determines whether or not it can be recovered using
only single-byte biases. A common size is 36 bytes, but the exact size depends on the
output size of the TLS pseudo-random function (PRF) used in computing the Finished
message and of the hash function used in the HMAC algorithm in the Record Protocol.
Decryption is the reverse of the process described above. As noted in [10], any error in
decryption is treated as fatal – an error message is sent to the sender and all cryptographic
material, including the RC4 key, is disposed of. This enables an active attacker to force
the use of new encryption and MAC keys: the attacker can induce session termination,
followed by a new session being established when the next message is sent over TLS, by
simply modifying a TLS Record Protocol message. This could be used to ensure that the
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target plaintext in an attack is repeatedly sent under the protection of a fresh RC4 key.
However, this approach is relatively expensive since it involves a rerun of the full TLS
Handshake Protocol, involving multiple public key operations and, more importantly, the
latency involved in an exchange of 4 messages (2 complete round-trips) on the wire. A
better approach is to cause the TCP connection carrying the TLS traffic to close, either
by injecting sequences of FIN and ACK messages in both directions, or by injecting a RST
message in both directions. This causes the TLS connection to be terminated, but not
the TLS session (assuming the session is marked as “resumable” which is typically the
case). This behaviour is codified in [50, Section 7.2.1]. Now when the next message is sent
over TLS, a TLS session resumption instance of the Handshake Protocol is executed to
establish a fresh key for RC4. This avoids the expensive public key operations and reduces
the TLS latency to 1 round-trip before application data can be sent.
4.2.6 Passwords
Text-based passwords are arguably the dominant mechanism for authenticating users to
web-based services and computer systems. As is to be expected of user-selected secrets,
passwords do not follow uniform distributions. Various password breaches of recent years,
including the Adobe breach of 150 million records in 2013 and the RockYou leak of 32.6
million passwords in 2009, attest to this with passwords such as 123456 and password
frequently being counted amongst the most popular.4 For example, our own analysis of
the RockYou password data set confirmed this: the number of unique passwords in the
RockYou dataset is 14,344,391, meaning that (on average) each password was repeated 2.2
times, and we indeed found the most common password to be 123456 (accounting for about
0.9% of the entire data set). Our later simulations will make extensive use of the RockYou
data set as an attack dictionary. A more-fine grained analysis of this data set can be found
in [153]. We also make use of data from the Singles.org breach for generating our target
passwords. Singles.org is a now-defunct Christian dating website that was breached in
2009; religiously-inspired passwords such as jesus and angel appear with high frequency
in its 12,234 distinct entries, making its frequency distribution quite different from that of
the RockYou set.
4A comprehensive list of data breaches, including password breaches, can be found at http://www.
informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/.
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There is an extensive literature regarding the reasons for poor password selection and usage,
including [7, 62, 154, 155]. In [38], Bonneau formalised a number of different metrics for
analysing password distributions and studied a corpus of 70M Yahoo! passwords (collected
in a privacy-preserving manner). His work highlights the importance of careful validation
of password guessing attacks, in particular, the problem of estimating attack complexities
in the face of passwords that occur rarely – perhaps uniquely – in a data set, the so-called
hapax legomena problem. The approach to validation that we adopt benefits from the
analysis of [38], as explained further in Section 4.4.
4.3 Plaintext Recovery via Bayesian Analysis
Our Bayesian analysis concerns vectors of consecutive plaintext bytes, which is appropriate
given passwords as the plaintext target. This however means that the keystream distribution
statistics also need to be for vectors of consecutive keystream bytes. Such statistics do
not exist in the prior literature on RC4, except for the Fluher-McGrew biases [64] (which
supply the distributions for adjacent byte pairs far down the keystream). Fortunately, in
the early bytes of the RC4 keystream, the single-byte biases are dominant enough that a
simple product distribution can be used as a reasonable estimate for the distribution on
vectors of keystream bytes. We also show how to build a more accurate approximation to
the relevant keystream distributions using double-byte distributions. This approximation is
not only more accurate but also necessary when the target plaintext is located further down
the stream, where the single-byte biases disappear and where double-byte biases become
dominant. Indeed, our double-byte-based approximation to the keystream distribution on
vectors can be used to smoothly interpolate between the region where single-byte biases
dominate and where the double-byte biases come into play (which is exhibited as a fairly
sharp transition around position 256 in the keystream, see Figure 4.4).
In the end, what we obtain is a formal algorithm that estimates the likelihood of each
password in a dictionary based on both the a priori password distribution and the
observed ciphertexts. This formal algorithm is amenable to efficient implementation using
either the single-byte based product distribution for keystreams or the double-byte-based
approximation to the distribution on keystreams.
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We now present our formal Bayesian analysis of plaintext recovery attacks in the broadcast
setting for stream ciphers. We then apply this to the problem of extracting passwords,
specialising the formal analysis and making it implementable in practice based only on the
single-byte and double-byte keystream distributions.
4.3.1 Formal Bayesian Analysis
Suppose we have a candidate set of N plaintexts, denoted X , with the a priori probability
of an element x ∈ X being denoted px. We assume for simplicity that all the candidates
consist of byte strings of the same length, n. For example X might consist of all the
passwords of a given length n from some breach data set, and then px can be computed as
the relative frequency of x in the data set. If the frequency data is not available, then the
uniform distribution on X can be assumed.
Next, suppose that a plaintext from X is encrypted S times, each time under independent,
random keys using a stream cipher such as RC4. Suppose also that the first character of the
plaintext always occurs in the same position r in the plaintext stream in each encryption.
Let c = (cij) denote the S × n matrix of bytes in which row i, denoted c(i) for 0 ≤ i < S,
is a vector of n bytes corresponding to the values in positions r, . . . , r+ n− 1 in ciphertext
i. Let X be the random variable denoting the (unknown) value of the plaintext.
We wish to form a maximum a posteriori estimate for X, given the observed data c and
the a priori probability distribution px, that is, we wish to maximise Pr(X = x | C = c)
where C is a random variable corresponding to the matrix of ciphertext bytes.
Using Bayes’ theorem, we have
Pr(X = x | C = c) = Pr(C = c | X = x) · Pr(X = x)Pr(C = c) .
Here the term Pr(X = x) corresponds to the a priori distribution px on X . The term
Pr(C = c) is independent of the choice of x (as can be seen by writing Pr(C = c) =∑
x∈X Pr(C = c | X = x) · Pr(X = x)). Since we are only interested in maximising
Pr(X = x | C = c), we ignore this term henceforth.
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Now, since ciphertexts are formed by XORing keystreams z 5 and plaintext x, we can write
Pr(C = c | X = x) = Pr(W = w)
where w is the S × n matrix formed by XORing each row of c with the vector x and W
is a corresponding random variable. Then to maximise Pr(X = x | C = c), it suffices to
maximise the value of
Pr(X = x) · Pr(W = w)
over x ∈ X . Let w(i) denote the i-th row of the matrix w, so w(i) = c(i) ⊕ x. Then w(i)
can be thought of as a vector of keystream bytes (coming from positions r, . . . r + n− 1)
induced by the candidate x, and we can write
Pr(W = w) =
S−1∏
i=0
Pr(Z = w(i))
where, on the right-hand side of the above equation, Z denotes a random variable corre-
sponding to a vector of bytes of length n starting from position r in the keystream. We
can rewrite this as:
Pr(W = w) =
∏
z∈Bn
Pr(Z = z)Nx,z
where the product is taken over all possible byte strings of length n and Nx,z is defined as:
Nx,z = |{i : z = c(i) ⊕ x}0≤i<S |,
that is, Nx,z counts the number of occurrences of vector z in the rows of the matrix formed
by XORing each row of c with candidate x. Putting everything together, our objective is
to compute for each candidate x ∈ X the value:
Pr(X = x) ·
∏
z∈Bn
Pr(Z = z)Nx,z
and then to rank these values in order to determine the most likely candidate(s).
Notice that the expressions here involve terms Pr(Z = z) which are probabilities of oc-
currence for n consecutive bytes of keystream. Such estimates are not generally available
in the literature, and for the values of n we are interested in (corresponding to putative
5Note that we now let z denote n consecutive bytes of keystream. Previously, we used z to denote a
byte value.
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Algorithm 3: Single-byte attack
input : ci,j : 0 ≤ i < S, 0 ≤ j < n – array formed from S independent encryptions of
fixed n-byte candidate X
r – starting position of X in plaintext stream
X – collection of N candidates
px – a priori probability of candidates x ∈ X
pr+j,z (0 ≤ j < n, z ∈ B) – single-byte keystream distribution
output : {γx : x ∈ X} – set of (approximate) log likelihoods for candidates in X
begin
for j = 0 to n− 1 do
for z = 0x00 to 0xFF do
N ′z,j ← 0
for j = 0 to n− 1 do
for i = 0 to S − 1 do
N ′ci,j ,j ← N ′ci,j ,j + 1
for j = 0 to n− 1 do
for y = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for z = 0x00 to 0xFF do
Ny,z,j ← N ′z⊕y,j
Ly,j =
∑
z∈BNy,z,j log(pr+j,z),
for x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ X do
γx ← log(px) +∑n−1j=0 Lxj ,j
return {γx : x ∈ X}
password lengths), obtaining accurate estimates for them by sampling many keystreams
would be computationally prohibitive. For example, our computation for double-byte prob-
abilities discussed in Section 4.2.4 involved 244 keystreams and, with highly optimised code,
consumed roughly 4800 core-days of computation. This yields the required probabilities
only for n = 2. Moreover, the product ∏z∈Bn involves 28n terms and is not amenable to
calculation. Thus we must turn to approximate methods to make further progress.
Note also that taking n = 1 in the above analysis, we obtain exactly the same approach as
was used in the single-byte attack in [10], except that we include the a priori probabilities
Pr(X = x) whereas these were (implicitly) assumed to be uniform in [10].
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4.3.2 Using a Product Distribution
Our task is to derive simplified ways of computing the expression
Pr(X = x) ·
∏
z∈Bn
Pr(Z = z)Nx,z
and then to apply these to produce efficient algorithms for computing (approximate)
likelihoods of candidates x ∈ X .
The simplest approach is to assume that the n bytes of the keystreams can be treated
independently. For RC4, this is actually a very good approximation in the regime where
single-byte biases dominate (that is, in the first 256 positions). Thus, writing Z =
(Zr, . . . , Zr+n−1) and z = (zr, . . . , zr+n−1) (with the subscript r denoting the position of
the first keystream byte of interest), we have:
Pr(Z = z) ≈
n−1∏
j=0
Pr(Zr+j = zr+j) =
n−1∏
j=0
pr+j,z
where now the probabilities appearing on the right-hand side are single-byte keystream
probabilities, as reported in [10] for example. Then writing x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and
rearranging terms, we obtain:
∏
z∈Bn
Pr(Z = z)Nx,z ≈
n−1∏
j=0
∏
z∈B
pr+j,z
Nxj,z,j .
where Ny,z,j = |{i : z = ci,j ⊕ y}0≤i<S | counts (now for single bytes instead of length n
vectors of bytes) the number of occurrences of byte z in the column vector formed by
XORing column j of c with a candidate byte y.
Notice that, as in [10], the counters Ny,z,j for y ∈ B can all be computed efficiently by
permuting the counters N0x00,z,j , these being simply counters for the number of occurrences
of each byte value z in column j of the ciphertext matrix c.
In practice, it is more convenient to work with logarithms, converting products into sums,
so that we evaluate for each candidate x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) an expression of the form
γx := log(px) +
n−1∑
j=0
∑
z∈B
Nxj ,z,j log(pr+j,z).
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Given a large set of candidates X , we can streamline the computation by first computing
the counters Ny,z,j , then, for each possible byte value y, the value of the inner sum∑
z∈BNy,z,j log(pr+j,z), and then reusing these individual values across all the relevant
candidates x for which xj = y. This reduces the evaluation of γx for a single candidate x
to n+ 1 additions of real numbers.
The above procedure, including the various optimisations, is specified as an attack in
Algorithm 3. We refer to it as our single-byte attack because of its reliance on the single-
byte keystream probabilities pr+j,z. It outputs a collection of approximate log likelihoods
{γx : x ∈ X} for each candidate x ∈ X . These can be further processed to extract, for
example, the candidate with the highest score, or the top T candidates.
4.3.3 Double-byte-based Approximation
We continue to write Z = (Zr, . . . , Zr+n−1) and z = (zr, . . . , zr+n−1) and aim to find an
approximation for Pr(Z = z) which lends itself to efficient computation of approximate log
likelihoods as in our first algorithm. Now we rely on the double-byte keystream distribution,
writing
ps,z1,z2 := Pr((Zs, Zs+1) = (z1, z2)), s ≥ 1, k1, k2 ∈ B
for the probabilities of observing bytes (z1, z2) in the RC4 keystream in positions (s, s+ 1).
We estimated these probabilities for r in the range 1 ≤ r ≤ 511 using 244 RC4 keystreams;
for larger r, these are well approximated by the Fluhrer-McGrew biases [64] (as was verified
in [10]).
We now make the assumption that, for each j,
Pr(Zj = zj | Zj−1 = zj−1 ∧ · · · ∧ Z0 = z0)
≈ Pr(Zj = zj | Zj−1 = zj−1),
(4.1)
meaning that byte j in the keystream can be modelled as depending only on the preceding
byte and not on earlier bytes. We can write
Pr(Zj = zj | Zj−1 = zj−1) = Pr(Zj = zj ∧ Zj−1 = zj−1)Pr(Zj−1 = zj−1)
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where the numerator can then be replaced by pj−1,zj−1,zj and the denominator by pj−1,zj−1 ,
a single-byte keystream probability. Then using an inductive argument and our assumption
(4.1), we easily obtain:
Pr(Z = z) ≈
∏n−2
j=0 pr+j,zj ,zj+1∏n−2
j=1 pr+j,zj
giving an approximate expression for our desired probability in terms of single-byte and
double-byte probabilities. Notice that if we assume that the adjacent byte pairs are
independent, then we have pr+j,zj ,zj+1 = pr+j,zj · pr+j+1,zj+1 and the above expression
collapses down to the one we derived in the previous subsection.
For candidate x, we again write x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) and rearranging terms, we obtain:
∏
z∈Bn
Pr(Z = z)Nx,z ≈
∏n−2
j=0
∏
z1∈B
∏
z2∈B p
Nxj,xj+1,z1,z2,j
r+j,z1,z2∏n−2
j=1
∏
z∈B p
Nxj,z,r+j
r+j,z
.
where Ny1,y1,z1,z2,j = |{i : z1 = ci,j⊕y1∧z2 = ci,j+1⊕y2}0≤i<S | counts (now for consecutive
pairs of bytes) the number of occurrences of bytes (z1, z2) in the pair of column vectors
formed by XORing columns (j, j+1) of c with candidate bytes (y1, y2) (and where Nxj ,z,r+j
is as in our previous algorithm).
Again, the counters Ny1,y2,z1,z2,j for y1, y2 ∈ B can all be computed efficiently by permuting
the counters N0x00,0x00,z1,z2,j , these being simply counters for the number of occurrences of
pairs of byte values (z1, z2) in column j and j + 1 of the ciphertext matrix c. As before,
we work with logarithms, so that we evaluate for each candidate x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) an
expression of the form
γx := log(px) +
n−2∑
j=0
∑
z1∈B
∑
z2∈B
Nxj ,xj+1,z1,z2,j log(pr+j,z1,z2)
−
n−2∑
j=1
∑
z∈B
Nxj ,z,r+j log(pr+j,z).
With appropriate pre-computation of the terms Ny1,y2,z1,z2,j log(pr+j,z1,z2) and Ny,z,r+j
log(pr+j,z) for all y1, y2 and all y, the computation for each candidate x ∈ X can be reduced
to roughly 2n floating point additions. The pre-computation can be further reduced by
computing the terms for only those pairs (y1, y2) actually arising in some candidate in X
in positions (j, j + 1). We use this further optimisation in our implementation.
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The above procedure is specified as an attack in Algorithm 4. We refer to it as our double-
byte attack because of its reliance on the double-byte keystream probabilities ps,z1,z2 . It
again outputs a collection of approximate log likelihoods {γx : x ∈ X} for each candidate
x ∈ X , suitable for further processing such as extracting the candidate with the highest
score, or find the top T candidates. Note that for simplicity of presentation, it involves a
quintuply-nested loop to compute the values Ny1,y2,z1,z2,j ; these values should of course be
directly computed from the (n− 1) · 216 pre-computed counters N ′ci,j ,ci,j+1,j in an in-line
fashion using the formula Ny1,y2,z1,z2,j = N ′z1⊕y1,z2⊕y2,,j .
4.4 Simulation Results
We performed extensive simulations of both of our attacks, varying the different parameters
to evaluate their effects on success rates.
4.4.1 Methodology
We focus on the problem of password recovery, using the RockYou data set as an attack
dictionary and the Singles.org data set as the set of target passwords. Except where
noted, in each simulation, we performed 256 independent runs of the relevant attack. In
each attack simulation, we select a password of some fixed length n from the Singles.org
password data set according to the known a priori probability distribution for that data set,
encrypt it S times in different starting positions r using random 128-bit keys for RC4, and
then attempt to recover the password from the ciphertexts using the set of all passwords of
length n from the entire RockYou data set (14 million passwords) as our candidate set X .
We declare success if the target password is found within the top T passwords suggested by
the algorithm (according to the approximate likelihood measures γx). Our default settings,
unless otherwise stated, are n = 6 and T = 5, and we try all values for r between 1 and
256− n+ 1, where the single-byte biases dominate the behaviour of the RC4 keystreams.
Typical values of S are 2s where s ∈ {20, 22, 24, 26, 28}.
Using different data sets for the attack dictionary and the target set from which encrypted
passwords are chosen is more realistic than using a single dictionary for both purposes, not
least because in a real attack, the exact content and a priori distribution of the target set
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Algorithm 4: Double-byte attack
input : ci,j : 0 ≤ i < S, 0 ≤ j < n – array formed from S independent encryptions of
fixed n-byte candidate X
r – starting position of X in plaintext stream
X – collection of N candidates
px – a priori probability of candidates x ∈ X
pr+j,z (0 ≤ j < n, z ∈ B) – single-byte keystream distribution
pr+j,z1,z2 (0 ≤ j < n− 1, z1, z2 ∈ B) – double-byte keystream distribution
output : {γx : x ∈ X} – set of (approximate) log likelihoods for candidates in X
begin
for j = 0 to n− 2 do
for z1 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
N ′z,j ← 0
for z2 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
N ′z1,z2,j ← 0
for j = 0 to n− 2 do
for i = 0 to S − 1 do
N ′ci,j ,j ← N ′ci,j ,j + 1
N ′ci,j ,ci,j+1,j ← N ′ci,j ,ci,j+1,j + 1
for j = 1 to n− 2 do
for y = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for z = 0x00 to 0xFF do
Ny,z,j ← N ′z⊕y,j
Ly,j =
∑
z∈BNy,z,j log(pr+j,z),
for j = 0 to n− 2 do
for y1 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for y2 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for z1 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
for z2 = 0x00 to 0xFF do
Ny1,y2,z1,z2,j ← N ′z1⊕y1,z2⊕y2,,j
Ly1,y2,j =
∑
z1∈B
∑
z2∈BNy1,y2,z1,z2,j log(pr+j,z1,z2),
for x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ X do
γx ← log(px) +∑n−2j=0 Lxj ,xj+1,j −∑n−2j=1 Lxj ,j
return {γx : x ∈ X}
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Figure 4.5: Recovery rate for Singles.org passwords using RockYou data set as dictionary,
compared to recovery rate for RockYou passwords using RockYou data set as dictionary
(S = 224, n = 6, T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte attack).
would not be known. This approach also avoids the problem of hapax legomena highlighted
in [38]. However, this has the effect of limiting the success rates of our attacks to less than
100%, since there are highly likely passwords in the target set (such as jesus) that do
not occur at all, or only have very low a priori probabilities in the attack dictionary, and
conversely. Figure 4.5 compares the use of the RockYou password distribution to attack
Singles.org passwords with the less realistic use of the RockYou password distribution to
attack RockYou itself. It can be seen that, for the particular choice of attack parameters
(S = 224, n = 6, T = 5, double-byte attack), the effect on success rate is not particularly
large. However, for other attack parameters, as we will see below, we observe a maximum
success rate of around 80% for our attacks, whereas we would achieve 100% success rates if
we used RockYou against itself. The observed maximum success rate could be increased
by augmenting the attack dictionary with synthetically generated, site-specific passwords
and by removing RockYou-specific passwords from the attack dictionary. Our work did
not explore these improvements.
Many data sets are available from password breaches. We settled on using RockYou for
the attack dictionary because at the time this work was conducted, it was one of the
biggest data sets in which all passwords and their associated frequencies were available,
and because the distribution of passwords, while certainly skewed, was less skewed than
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for other data sets. We used Singles.org for the target set because the Singles.org breach
occurred later than the RockYou breach, so that the former could reasonably used as an
attack dictionary for the latter. Moreover, the Singles.org distribution being quite different
from that for RockYou makes password recovery against Singles.org using RockYou as a
dictionary more challenging for our attacks. A detailed evaluation of the extent to which
the success rates of our attacks depend on the choice of attack dictionary and target set is
left to future work.
A limitation of our approach is that we assume the password length n to be already known,
whereas in reality this may not be the case. At least four potential solutions to this
problem exist. Firstly, in specific applications, n may leak via analysis of packet lengths
or other forms of traffic analysis. Secondly we can run our attacks for the full range of
password lengths, possibly adjusting the likelihood measure γx for each password candidate
x to scale it appropriately by its length (except for the px term). A third approach is
to augment the shorter passwords with the known plaintext that typically follows them
in a specific targeted application protocol and then run our attacks for a fixed, but now
longer, n. A fourth approach applies in protocols which use known delimiters to denote the
end of a password (such as the = symbol seen at the end of base64 encodings for certain
username/password lengths); here, the idea is to adapt our general attacks to compute the
likelihood that such a delimiter appears in each possible position, and generate an estimate
for n by selecting the position for which the likelihood is highest. We leave the exploration
of these approaches to future work.
4.4.2 Results
Single-Byte Attack. We ran the attack described in Algorithm 3 with our default
parameters (n = 6, T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251) for S = 2s with s ∈ {20, 22, 24, 26, 28} and
evaluated the attack’s success rate. We used our default of 256 independent runs per
parameter set. The results are shown in Figure 4.6. We observe that:
• The performance of the attack improves markedly as S, the number of ciphertexts,
increases, but the success rate is bounded by 75%. We attribute this to the use of
one dictionary (RockYou) to recover passwords from another (Singles.org) – for the
same attack parameters, we achieved 100% success rates when using RockYou against
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Figure 4.6: Recovery rates for single-byte algorithm for S = 220, . . . , 228 (n = 6, T = 5,
1 ≤ r ≤ 251).
RockYou, for example.
• For 224 ciphertexts we see a success rate of greater than 60% for small values of
r, the position of the password in the RC4 keystream. We see a drop to below
50% for starting positions greater than 32. We note the effect of the key-length-
dependent biases on password recovery; passwords encrypted at starting positions
16`− n, 16`− n+ 1, . . . , 16`− 1, 16`, where ` = 1, 2, . . . , 6, have a higher probability
of being recovered in comparison to neighbouring starting positions.
• For 228 ciphertexts we observe a success rate of more than 75% for 1 ≤ r ≤ 120.
Double-Byte Attack. Analogously, we ran the attack of Algorithm 4 for S = 2s with
s ∈ {20, 22, 24, 26, 28} and our defaults of n = 6, T = 5. The results for these simulations
are shown in Figure 4.7. Note that:
• Again, at 224 ciphertexts the effect of key-length-dependent biases is visible.
• For 226 ciphertexts we observe a success rate that is greater than 78% for r ≤ 48.
Comparing the Single-Byte Attack with a Naive Algorithm. Figure 4.8 provides
a comparison between our single-byte algorithm with T = 1 and a naive password recovery
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Figure 4.7: Recovery rates for double-byte algorithm for S = 220, . . . , 228 (n = 6, T = 5,
1 ≤ r ≤ 251).
attack based on the methods of [10], in which the password bytes are recovered one at a
time by selecting the highest likelihood byte value in each position and declaring success if
all bytes of the password are recovered correctly. Significant improvement over the naive
attack can be observed, particularly for high values of r. For example with S = 224, the
naive algorithm essentially has a success rate of zero for every r, whereas our single-byte
algorithm has a success rate that exceeds 20% for 1 ≤ r ≤ 63. By way of comparison,
an attacker knowing the password length and using the obvious guessing strategy would
succeed with probability 4.2% with a single guess, this being the a priori probability of the
password 123456 amongst all length 6 passwords in the Singles.org dataset (and 123456
being the highest ranked password in the RockYou dictionary, so the first one that an
attacker using this strategy with the RockYou dictionary would try). As another example,
with S = 228 ciphertexts, a viable recovery rate is observed all the way up to r = 251 for
our single-byte algorithm, whereas the naive algorithm fails miserably beyond r = 160 for
even this large value of S. Note however that the naive attack can achieve a success rate of
100% for sufficiently large S, whereas our attack cannot. This is because the naive attack
directly computes a password candidate rather than evaluating the likelihood of candidates
from a list which may not contain the target password. On the other hand, our attack
trivially supports larger values of T , whereas the naive attack is not so easily modified to
enable this feature.
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Figure 4.8: Performance of our single-byte algorithm versus a naive single-byte attack
based on the methods of AlFardan et al. (labelled “old”). (n = 6, T = 1, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251.)
Comparing the Single-Byte and Double-Byte Attacks. Figure 4.9 provides a
comparison of our single-byte and double-byte attacks. With all other parameters equal,
the success rates are very similar for the initial 256 positions. The reason for this is the
absence of many strong double-byte biases that do not arise from products of the known
single-byte biases in the early positions of the RC4 keystream.
Effect of the a priori Distribution. As a means of testing the extent to which our
success rates are influenced by knowledge of the a priori probabilities of the candidate
passwords, we ran simulations in which we tried to recover passwords sampled correctly
from the Singles.org dataset but using a uniform a priori distribution for the RockYou-
based dictionary used in the attack. Figure 4.10 shows the results (S = 224, n = 6, T = 5,
double-byte attack) of these simulations, compared to the results we obtain by exploiting
the a priori probabilities in the attack. It can be seen that a significant gain is made by
using the a priori probabilities, with the uniform attack’s success rate rapidly dropping to
zero at around r = 128.
Effect of Password Length. Figure 4.11 shows the effect of increasing n, the password
length, on recovery rates, with the sub-figures showing the performance of our double-byte
attack for different numbers of ciphertexts (S = 2s with s ∈ {24, 26, 28}). Other parameters
are set to their default values. As intuition suggests, password recovery becomes more
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Figure 4.9: Recovery rate of single-byte versus double-byte algorithm for S = 220, . . . , 228
(n = 6, T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251).
difficult as the length increases. Also notable is that the ceiling on success rate of our
attack decreases with increasing n, dropping from more than 80% for n = 5 to around
50% for n = 8. This is due to the fact that only 48% of the length 8 passwords in the
Singles.org data set actually occur in the RockYou attack dictionary: our attack is doing
as well as it can in this case, and we would expect stronger performance with an attack
dictionary that is better matched to the target site.
Effect of Increasing Try Limit T . Recall that the parameter T defines the number of
password trials our attacks make. The number of permitted attempts for specific protocols
like BasicAuth is server-dependent and not mandated in the relevant specifications. Whilst
not specific to our chosen protocols, a 2010 study [39] showed that 84% of websites surveyed
allowed at least T = 100 attempts; many websites appear to actually allow T =∞. Figure
4.12 shows the effect of varying T in our double-byte algorithm for different numbers of
ciphertexts (S = 2s with s ∈ {24, 26, 28}). Other parameters are set to their default values.
It is clear that allowing large values of T boosts the success rate of the attacks.
Note however that a careful comparison must be made between our attack with parameter
T and the success rate of the obvious password guessing attack given T attempts. Such a
guessing attack does not require any ciphertexts but instead uses the a priori distribution
on passwords in the attack dictionary (RockYou) to make guesses for the target password
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Figure 4.10: Recovery rate for uniformly distributed passwords versus known a priori
distribution (S = 224, n = 6, T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte algorithm).
in descending order of probability, the success rate being determined by the a priori
probabilities of the guessed passwords in the target set (Singles.org). Clearly, our attacks
are only of value if they significantly out-perform this ciphertext-less attack.
Figure 4.13 shows the results of plotting log2(T ) against success rate α for S = 2s with
s ∈ {14, 16, . . . , 28}. The figure then illustrates the value of T necessary in our attack to
achieve a given password recovery rate α for different values of S. This measure is related
to the α-work-factor metric explored in [38] (though with the added novelty of representing
a work factor when one set of passwords is used to recover passwords from a different
set). To generate this figure, we used 1024 independent runs rather than the usual 256,
but using a fixed set of 1024 passwords sampled according to the a priori distribution for
Singles.org. This was in an attempt to improve the stability of the results (with small
numbers of ciphertexts S, the success rate becomes heavily dependent on the particular set
of passwords selected and their a priori probabilities, while we wished to have comparability
across different values of S). The success rates shown are for our double-byte attack with
n = 6 and r = 133, this specific choice of r being motivated by it being the location of
passwords for our BasicAuth attack proof-of-concept when the Chrome browser is used
(similar results are obtained for other values of r). The graph also shows the corresponding
work factor T as a function of α for the guessing attack (labeled “optimal guessing” in the
figure).
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Figure 4.11: Effect of password length on recovery rate (T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte
algorithm).
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Figure 4.13a shows that our attack far outperforms the guessing attack for larger values
of S, with a significant advantage accruing for S = 224 and above. However, as Figure
4.13b shows, the advantage over the guessing attack for smaller values of S, namely 220
and below, is not significant. This can be attributed to our attack simply not being able
to compute stable enough statistics for these small numbers of ciphertexts. In turn, this is
because the expected random fluctuations in the keystream distributions overwhelm the
small biases; in short, the signal does not sufficiently exceed the noise for these low values
of S.
Effect of Base64 Encoding. We investigated the effect of base64 encoding of passwords
on recovery rates, since many application layer protocols use such an encoding. The
encoding increases the password length, making recovery harder, but also introduces
redundancy, potentially helping the recovery process to succeed. Figure 4.14 shows our
simulation results comparing the performance of our double-byte algorithm acting on
6-character passwords and on base64 encoded versions of them. It is apparent from the
figure that the overall effect of the base64 encoding is to help our attack to succeed. In
practice, the start of the target password may not be well-aligned with the base64 encoding
process (for example, part of the last character of the username and/or a delimiter such as
“:” may be jointly encoded with part of the first character of the password). This can be
handled by building a special-purpose set of candidates X for each possibility. Handling
this requires some care when mounting a real attack against a specific protocol; a detailed
analysis is not conducted here.
Shifting Attack. It was observed in [10] and elsewhere that for 128-bit keys, RC4
keystreams exhibit particularly large “key-length-dependent” biases at positions r = 16`,
` = 1, . . . , 7, with the bias size decreasing with increasing `. These large biases boost
recovery rates, as already observed in our discussion of Figure 4.6.
In certain application protocols and attack environments (such as HTTPS) it is possible for
the adversary to incrementally pad the plaintext messages so that the unknown bytes are
always aligned with positions having large keystream biases. Our algorithm descriptions and
code are both easily modified to handle this situation, and we have conducted simulations
with the resulting shift attack.
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Figure 4.12: Effect of try limit T on recovery rate (n = 6, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte
algorithm).
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Figure 4.13: Value of T required to achieve a given password recovery rate α for S = 2s
with s ∈ {14, 16, . . . , 28} (n = 6, r = 133, double-byte algorithm).
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Figure 4.14: Recovery rate of base64 encoded password versus a “normal” password for
6-character passwords (T = 5, 1 ≤ r ≤ 251, double-byte algorithm).
Figure 4.15 shows the results for the shift version of our double-byte algorithm. In the shift
attack, the true number of ciphertexts is equal to n× S, since we now use S ciphertexts at
each of n shift positions. So a proper comparison would compare with one of our earlier
attacks using an appropriately increased value of S. Making this adjustment, it can be
seen that the success rate is significantly improved, particularly for small values of r = 16`
where the biases are biggest.
4.5 Practical Validation
We now describe a proof-of-concept implementation of our attacks against a specific
application-layer protocol running over TLS, namely BasicAuth.
4.5.1 The BasicAuth Protocol
Defined as part of the HTTP/1.0 specification [24], the Basic Access Authentication scheme
(BasicAuth) provides a means for controlling access to webpages and other protected
resources. Here we provide a high-level overview of BasicAuth and direct the reader to [24]
and [65] for further details.
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Figure 4.15: Recovery rate of shift attack versus double-byte algorithm (n = 6, T = 5,
1 ≤ r ≤ 251).
BasicAuth is a challenge-response authentication mechanism: a server will present a client
with a challenge to which the client must supply the correct response in order to gain access
to the resource being requested. In the case of BasicAuth, the challenge takes the form
of either a 401 Unauthorized response message from an origin server, or a 407 Proxy
Authentication Required response message from a proxy server. BasicAuth requires
that the client response contain legitimate user credentials – a username and password – in
order for access to be granted. Certain web browsers may display a login dialog when the
challenge is received and many browsers present users with the option of storing their user
credentials in the browser, with the credentials thereafter being automatically presented
on behalf of the user.
The client response to the challenge is of the form
Authorization: Basic base64(userid:password)
where base64(·) denotes the base64 encoding function (which maps 3 characters at a time
onto 4 characters of output). Since the username and password are sent over the network
as cleartext, BasicAuth needs to be used in conjunction with a protocol such as TLS.
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4.5.2 Attacking BasicAuth
In order to obtain a working attack against BasicAuth, we need to ensure that two
conditions are met:
• The base64-encoded password included in the BasicAuth client response can be
located sufficiently early in the plaintext stream.
• There is a method for forcing a browser to repeatedly send the BasicAuth client
response.
We observed that the first condition is met for particular browsers, including Google
Chrome 38. For example, we inspected HTTPS traffic sent from Chrome to an iChair
server.6 We observed the user’s base64-encoded password being sent with every HTTP(S)
request in the same position in the stream, namely position r = 133 (this includes 16 bytes
consumed by the client’s Finished message as well as the 20-bytes consumed by the TLS
Record Protocol MAC tag). For Mozilla Firefox 34, the value of r was the less useful 349.
For the second condition, we adopt the methods used in the BEAST, CRIME and Lucky
13 attacks on TLS, and also used in attacking RC4 in [10]: we assume that the user
visits a site www.evil.com which loads JavaScript into the user’s browser; the JavaScript
makes GET or POST requests to the target website at https://www.good.com by using
XMLHttpRequest objects (this is permitted under Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS),
a mechanism developed to allow JavaScript to make requests to a domain other than
the one from which the script originates). The base64-encoded BasicAuth password is
automatically included in each such request. In order to force the password to be repeatedly
encrypted at an early position in the RC4 keystream, we use a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attacker to break the TLS connection (by injecting sequences of TCP FIN and ACK messages
into the connection). This requires some careful timing on the part of the JavaScript and
the MITM attacker.
We built a proof-of-concept demonstration of these components to illustrate the principles.
We set up a virtual network with three virtual machines each running Ubuntu 14.04,
6At the time this work was conducted, iChair was a popular system for conference reviewing, widely
used in the cryptography research community and available from http://www.baigneres.net/ichair. It
uses BasicAuth as its user authentication mechanism.
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kernel version 3.13.0-32. On the first machine, we installed iChair. We configured the
iChair web server to use RC4 as its default TLS cipher. The second machine was running
the Chrome 38 browser and acted as the client in our attack. We installed the required
JavaScript directly on this machine rather than downloading from another site. The third
machine acted as the MITM attacker, required to intercept the TLS-protected traffic and
to tear-down the TLS connections. We used the Python tool Scapy7 to run an ARP
poisoning attack on the client and server from the MITM so as to be able to intercept
packets; with the connection hijacked we were able to force a graceful shutdown of the
connection between the client and the server after the password-bearing record had been
observed and recorded. We observed that forcing a graceful shutdown of each subsequent
connection did allow for TLS resumption (rather than leading to the need for a full TLS
Handshake run).
With this setup, the JavaScript running in the client browser sent successive HTTPS GET
requests to the iChair server every 80ms. Our choice of 80ms was motivated by the fact
that for our particular configuration, we observed a total time of around 80ms for TLS
resumption, delivery of the password-bearing record and the induced shutdown of the TCP
connection. This choice enabled us to capture 216 encrypted password-bearing records
in 1.6 hours (the somewhat greater than expected time here being due to anomalies in
network behaviour). Running at this speed, the attack was stable over a period of hours.
We note that the latency involved in our setup is much lower than would be found in a
real network in which the server may be many hops away from the client: between 500ms
and 1000ms is typical for establishing an initial TLS 1.2 (and below) connection to a
remote site, with the latency being roughly half that for session resumptions. Notably,
the cost of public key operations is not the issue, but rather the network latency involved
in the round-trips required for TCP connection establishment and then running the TLS
Handshake. However, browsers also open up multiple TLS connections in parallel when
fetching multiple resources from a site, as a means of reducing the latency perceived by
users; the maximum number of concurrent connections per server is 6 for both the Chrome
and Firefox browsers (though, we only ever saw roughly half this number in practice).
This means that, assuming a TLS resumption latency (including the client’s TCP SYN,
delivery of the password-bearing record and the final, induced TCP ACK) of 250ms and
the JavaScript is running fast enough to induce the browser to maintain 6 connections in
7Available at http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/.
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parallel, the amount of time needed to mount an attack with S = 226 would be on the
order of 776 hours. If the latency was further reduced to 100ms (because of proximity of
the server to the client), the attack execution time would be reduced to 312 hours.
Again setting n = 6 , T = 100, r = 133 and using the simulation results displayed in Figure
4.14, we would expect a success rate of 64.4% for this setup (with S = 226). For T = 5,
the corresponding success rate would be 44.5%.
We emphasise that we did not execute a complete attack on these scales, but merely
demonstrated the feasibility of the attack in our laboratory setup.
4.6 Conclusion
We have presented plaintext recovery attacks that derive from a formal Bayesian analysis
of the problem of estimating plaintext likelihoods given an a priori plaintext distribution,
suitable keystream distribution information, and a large number of encryptions of a fixed
plaintext under independent keys. We applied these ideas to the specific problem of
recovering passwords encrypted by the RC4 algorithm with 128-bit keys as used in TLS
1.2 and below, though they are of course more generally applicable – to uses of RC4 other
than in TLS, and to stream ciphers with non-uniform keystream distributions in general.
Using large-scale simulations, we have investigated the performance of these attacks under
different settings for the main parameters.
We then studied the applicability of these attacks for the application layer protocol
BasicAuth. For certain browsers and clients, user passwords were located at a favourable
point in the plaintext stream and we could induce a password to be repeatedly encrypted
under fresh, random keys. We built a proof-of-concept implementation of this attack. It
was difficult to arrange for the rate of generation of encryptions to be as high as desired
for a speedy attack. This was mainly due to the latency associated with TLS connection
establishment (even with session resumption) rather than any fundamental barrier. We
discussed scenarios in which the latency may be reduced.
Good-to-excellent password recovery success rates can be achieved using 224 – 228 ciphertexts
in our attacks. We also demonstrated that our single-byte attack for password recovery
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significantly outperforms a naive password recovery attack based on the ideas of [10]. We
observed an improvement over a guessing strategy even for low numbers (222 or 224) of
ciphertexts. In contrast to these numbers, the preferred double-byte attack of [10] required
on the order of 234 encryptions to recover a 16-byte cookie. In view of our results, we feel
justified in claiming that we significantly narrowed the gap between the feasibility results
of [10] and our goal of achieving practical attacks on RC4 in TLS. In fact, by November
2015, a few months after our research was published, usage of RC4 in TLS had dropped
to 8.3%, according to the ICSI Certificate Notary project. This accounts for a decrease
in roughly 22% of RC4 usage since the release of our work in March 2015. Of course,
other factors such as the deprecation of RC4 in TLS in February 2015 [122], as well as
publication of concurrent work, [148] and [102], also contributed to the dramatic reduction
of RC4 usage in TLS during this time. However, we would like to think that our work
played as big of a role in bringing RC4 to the point where it had to be abandoned by
practitioners. In early 2016, mainstream browsers such as Chrome and Firefox shipped
without support for RC48, and today, usage of RC4 in TLS 1.2 and below doesn’t even
feature in an independent category on the ICSI Certificate Notary project website.9 The
degree to which it contributes to the ‘other cipher suites’ category which stands at 6%
is unclear. Nevertheless, we determine it safe to conclude that usage of RC4 in TLS has
dropped significantly since the onset of our work, and in part because of it.
8Google and Mozilla announcements available at https://security.googleblog.com/2015/09/
disabling-sslv3-and-rc4.html and https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/09/11/deprecating-
the-rc4-cipher/, respectively.
9See https://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/.
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This chapter covers attacks against RC4 that exploit the Mantin biases – patterns of the
form ABSAB that occur in the RC4 keystream with higher probability than expected for
a random sequence (A and B are byte values, and S is an arbitrary byte string of some
length G). We develop a statistical framework for exploiting these biases which leads to an
algorithm that recovers adjacent pairs of unknown plaintext bytes, under the assumption
that the target plaintext bytes are in the neighbourhood of known plaintext bytes, a valid
assumption in an attack against TLS. Our analysis enables us to make predictions about the
number of ciphertexts needed to reliably recover target plaintext bytes by using results from
order statistics. We extend the algorithm to recover longer sequences of plaintext bytes, as
would be needed to attack 16-byte cookies protected TLS. We rely on the beam-search and
list Viterbi algorithms to achieve this and report on a large range of attack simulations,
focussing on a 16-byte target plaintext.
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the usage of RC4 in protocols such TLS and WPA
has come under heavy attack in recent years – see [10,68,76,113,115,116,148]. The main
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idea of these attacks is to exploit known and newly discovered biases in RC4 keystreams to
recover fixed plaintexts that are repeatedly encrypted under RC4. Such attacks can be
realised against applications using RC4, including TLS, and in particular, lead to serious
breaks in application layer protocols using TLS.
Mantin [101] showed that patterns of the form ABSAB occur in RC4 keystreams with
higher probability than expected for a random sequence. Here A and B are byte values
and S is an arbitrary byte string of some length G. Mantin’s main result can be stated as
follows: Let G ≥ 0 be a small integer and let Zr denote the r-th output byte produced by
RC4. Under the assumption that the RC4 state is a random permutation at step r, then
Pr ((Zr, Zr+1) = (Zr+G+2, Zr+G+3)) = 2−16
(
1 + e
(−4−8G)/256
256
)
.
Note that for a truly random byte string Zr, . . . , Zr+G+3, the probability that (Zr, Zr+1) =
(Zr+G+2, Zr+G+3) is equal to 2−16. The relative bias is therefore equal to e(−4−8G)/256/256,
which is about 1/256 for small G.
Mantin’s biases are particularly attractive for use in attacks on RC4 because they are (a)
relatively large, (b) numerous, and (c) persistent in RC4 keystreams. Their presence was
confirmed experimentally in [101] and [119]. Indeed, they have already been exploited in
attacks, [113], and in concurrent work to ours, [148]. In this chapter, we make a systematic
study of their use in attacking RC4 in the broadcast setting. Our main contributions can
be summarised as follows:
(i) We develop a statistical framework for exploiting the Mantin biases in plaintext
recovery attacks for the broadcast setting. We provide such a framework which
directly leads to an algorithm that recovers adjacent pairs of unknown plaintext bytes,
under the assumption (also used in [113] and [148] and valid in practice for attacks
against protocols like TLS) that the target plaintext bytes are in the neighbourhood
of known plaintext bytes.
(ii) Importantly, and in contrast with [113] and [148], our analysis enables us to make
predictions about the numbers of ciphertexts needed to reliably recover target plain-
text bytes. More precisely, our attack computes the likelihood of each possible target
plaintext byte pair, and we are able to compute the distribution of the rank of the
likelihood of the correct byte pair amongst the likelihoods of all possible pairs as
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a function of the number of ciphertexts, N , and the number of known plaintext
bytes T 1. In particular, we can compute the values of (N,T ) needed to ensure that
the median value of the rank is 1, meaning that the correct plaintext is recovered
with high probability. Our approach here is to use results from order statistics, a
well-established field of statistical investigation that does not appear to have been
applied extensively before in cryptanalysis.
(iii) Our framework extends smoothly to make predictions in practically interesting cases
where, for example, some additional information is known about the plaintexts, or
where known plaintext bytes are present on either side of the unknown bytes.
(iv) We extend the algorithm targeting just two unknown plaintext bytes to the situation
where the target is a longer sequence of unknown plaintext bytes. This is a situation
of practical interest in attacking session cookies [10] and passwords (as dicussed
in the previous chapter) that are protected by RC4 in TLS. We formally justify
using as a likelihood estimate for a longer sequence of plaintext bytes the sum of
the likelihoods of the overlapping pairs of adjacent bytes comprising that longer
sequence. As a consequence of our summation formula for likelihoods, we are able to
make use of standard methods from the literature, namely beam search and the list
Viterbi algorithm [145], to find longer plaintext candidates having high likelihoods.
The beam search algorithm is memory-efficient but does not provide any guarantees
about the quality of its outputs; the list Viterbi algorithm is memory-intensive but is
guaranteed to output a list of candidates having the L highest likelihoods, where L is
a parameter of the algorithm. In practical attacks involving cookies and passwords,
this type of guarantee is sufficient, since large numbers of candidates can be tested
for correctness.
(v) We report on a range of experiments with the beam search and list Viterbi algorithms,
evaluating their performance for different parameters, as specified in Table 5.1. For
example, using L = 216 in the list Viterbi algorithm, N = 231 ciphertexts, and 130
known plaintext bytes split either side of a 16-byte unknown plaintext, we are able
to recover the 16-byte target plaintext with a success rate of about 80%. This is
a significant improvement on the preferred attack of [10], which required around
233 – 234 ciphertexts, and our result is broadly comparable with the results obtained
1In the previous chapter we used T to denote the password rate limiting factor, i.e., the number of
password candidates attempted in our password recovery attacks. In this chapter, as stated, T denotes the
number of known plaintext bytes.
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in [148].
Parameter Description
N The number of available encryptions of the target plain-
text.
T The number of known plaintext bytes.
algorithm choice The dynamic programming algorithm selected, either
list Viterbi or beam search.
L The list size of the list Vitberbi algorithm and the
beam width of the beam search algorithm.
Table 5.1: Attack parameters
Related Work. As stated in the previous chapter, AlFardan et al. [10] presented two
attacks against RC4 in TLS, using single-byte biases in the first and double-byte Fluhrer-
McGrew biases from [64] in the second. As in our work, their second attack uses a Viterbi
algorithm (though only outputting a single plaintext candidate, so not a list Viterbi
algorithm). Their second attack requires around 234 ciphertexts to reliably recover a
16-byte target plaintext. Isobe et al. [76] also give plaintext recovery attacks for RC4 using
single-byte and double-byte biases – their attacks are less effective than those of [10] and
are not directly applied to TLS.
Ohigashi et al. [113] were the first to use the Mantin biases in plaintext recovery attacks
against RC4. They present an attack that targets a single unknown plaintext byte and that
uses multiple Mantin biases (for different values of G). Roughly speaking, the unknown
plaintext byte is aligned with the second “B” in patterns of the form ABSAB for varying
sizes of S, while the plaintext bytes in the other 3 positions are known; a count is made of
the number of times in the RC4 output a string ABSAB is suggested for each unknown
plaintext byte. In the analysis of [113], all biases are “weighted” in the same way, while,
intuitively, the weaker the bias, the less reliable the information about plaintext bytes
it provides. This overweights the known plaintext bytes that are far from the unknown,
target bytes, and leads to a statistically sub-optimal attack. Their attack also recovers
multiple plaintext bytes in a byte-by-byte fashion, meaning that if the attack goes awry,
then it tends to continue unsuccessfully. This in turn means that the success rate of the
attack decreases exponentially with the target plaintext length. Ohigashi et al. did not
provide any rigorous analysis of their attacks, relying instead on simulations to estimate
their effectiveness.
In concurrent work to ours, Vanhoef and Piessens [148] conducted an extensive search for
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new biases in RC4 keystreams and settled on using the Mantin biases in combination with
the Fluhrer-McGrew biases to target HTTP session cookies protected by TLS. Like us, they
use a likelihood-based analysis involving Mantin biases but their analysis is only formalised
for single values of G, and they simply take the products of likelihoods for different values
of G without further formal statistical justification (though this procedure can be rigorously
justified, as our work shows). They also include in their product a likelihood term arising
from the Fluhrer-McGrew biases. Given the ad hoc nature of their approach, they resort
to verification of attack performance via simulations. By contrast, we are able to provide
an analytical approach which makes predictions about the distribution of the rank of our
likelihood statistic for the correct plaintext bytes.
Vanhoef and Piessens [148] extend their attacks to the recovery of multiple plaintext bytes
using a list Viterbi algorithm, though without providing a formal justification, as we do.
Their impressive headline result is obtained using a list size L = 223 and recovers a 16-byte
plaintext with a 94% success rate using N = 9 · 227 ciphertexts, and roughly 256 known
plaintext bytes on either side of the unknown bytes. However, it should be noted that
this result applies for a restricted plaintext alphabet, which, as our analysis shows, can
significantly boost the performance of attacks. Building on the work of [10], they implement
their attack in a real network environment, showing that HTTP session cookies could be
recovered in around 75 hours. We do not carry out our attack with this level of realism but
instead content ourselves with performing extensive simulations to confirm our theoretical
analysis.
5.2 Preliminaries
Much of the preliminary material presented in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2) is relevant here,
in particular the material on Bayes’ Theorem, the RC4 algorithm, and its usage in TLS.
We now provide detail on additional notions and concepts that are necessary for the
understanding of the material presented in this chapter. We present an alternate form of
Bayes’ Theorem, introduce a result from order statistics, discuss the Mantin biases, and
expound briefly on the dynamic programming algorithms used in our attacks.
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5.2.1 Inferential Form of Bayes’ Theorem
In the previous chapter, we introduced the traditional statement of Bayes’ Theorem,
namely,
Pr(A|B) = Pr(B|A) · Pr(A)
Pr(B) ,
where A and B are events, Pr(B) 6= 0, and Pr(A|B) and Pr(B|A) are likelihoods (condi-
tional probabilities). The denominator, Pr(B), in the above expression acts as a normalising
factor for the posterior probability, Pr(A|B), and for work concerned with finding the
most likely outcome of event A given event B, the numerator works just as well as the
normalised posterior. Hence, in the context of Bayesian updating, Bayes’ Theorem can be
expressed as a statement about proportionality of the posterior probability and the Bayes
numerator:
Pr(A|B) ∝ Pr(B|A) · Pr(A).
In other words,
Posterior ∝ Likelihood × Prior.
We use this form of Bayes’ Theorem in our attacks in Section 5.3. We note that we
implicitly applied this form of Bayes’ Theorem in Chapter 4.
5.2.2 Order Statistics
Given random variables X1, . . . , Xk, the order statistics X(1), . . . , X(k) are themselves
random variables defined by sorting the realisations of X1, . . . , Xk in increasing order. Our
work makes use of the following result concerning order statistics [15]:
Result 1. Suppose X1, . . . , Xk are independent standard normal N(0, 1) random variables
and that Φ denotes the distribution function of a standard normal N(0, 1) random variable.
Then Φ(X1), . . . ,Φ(Xk) are independent uniform Uni(0, 1) random variables and the order
statistics X(1), . . . , X(k) satisfy
E
(
Φ(X(j))
)
= j
k + 1 ,
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where E denotes the expected value (in this case of the random variable Φ(X(j))).
5.2.3 The Mantin Biases
As stated in Section 5.1, in 2005 Mantin published a result showing that patterns of the
form ABSAB occur in the RC4 keystream with higher probability than expected of a
random sequence [101]. His main result is the following:
Pr ((Zr, Zr+1) = (Zr+G+2, Zr+G+3)) = 2−16
(
1 + e
(−4−8G)/256
256
)
, (5.1)
where A and B are byte values and S is an arbitrary byte string of some length G. In
the published paper containing the work presented in this chapter [40], we present results
showing that the distribution of patterns of the form ABSAB in RC4 outputs does not
conform exactly with Mantin’s analysis. However, the deviations from the predicted
behaviour are small, in the sense of affecting the probabilities of only a small proportion
of the possible patterns. Hence, in our attacks, we make use of Mantin’s result as stated
above.
5.2.4 Dynamic Programming Algorithms
Our work employs two dynamic programming algorithms, namely, the list Viterbi algorithm
and the beam search algorithm.
List Viterbi Algorithm. The list Viterbi algorithm is described in detail in [145] and
generalises the usual Viterbi algorithm. In its general form the algorithm finds the L
lowest cost state sequences through a complete trellis of some width W on some state
space, given an initial state and a final state and where each state transition in the trellis
has an associated cost. The algorithm produces a rank ordered list of the L globally best
candidates after the trellis search.
Beam Search Algorithm. The beam search algorithm is a heuristic algorithm that
explores a graph by expanding the most promising nodes within a limited set of nodes. It is
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known as a best-first search algorithm, meaning that it orders all partial solutions according
to a specified heuristic aimed at determining how close a partial (local) solution is to a
complete (global) solution. However, the algorithm only keeps the most promising partial
solutions as candidates for the next round of expansion, i.e., it keeps a predetermined
number, say L, of them. Thus it is a greedy algorithm – making the locally optimal choice
at each stage. The beam search algorithm gradually builds a search tree, at each level
expanding states (nodes) by generating all successors of the current states, sorting them
according to the specified heuristic, and then pruning them down to the L best candidates.
The beam search operation makes it memory-efficient, however, it cannot guarantee the L
globally best candidates upon completion.
We discuss the applicability of these algorithms to our work in Section 5.4.2.
5.3 Plaintext Recovery using the Mantin Biases
We present a plaintext recovery attack that exploits the Mantin biases. The attack is
derived by first posing the plaintext recovery problem as one of maximum likelihood
estimation. This enables us to also provide a concise analysis of the expected number of
ciphertexts required to successfully recover the correct plaintext (and, more generally, to
rank the correct plaintext within the top R candidates, for some chosen value of R).
We operate in the broadcast setting, so the same plaintext is assumed to be encrypted
many times under different RC4 keystream segments, in known positions. We target the
recovery of two unknown, consecutive plaintext bytes that are adjacent to a group of known
plaintext bytes. These attack assumptions (partially known plaintext and the broadcast
setting) are fully realistic when mounting attacks that target HTTP cookies when protected
by RC4 in TLS (see [10], for instance). In the following section (Section 5.4), we explain
how to extend our attack targeting two consecutive plaintext bytes so as to recover longer
strings of bytes.
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5.3.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
We consider the problem of plaintext recovery for various situations arising from RC4
encryption as a maximum likelihood problem. In comparison to the analysis presented in
the previous chapter, we adopt a far more rigorous statistical approach to the problem
of recovering plaintext bytes, largely out of necessity – harnessing the full effect of the
Mantin biases requires such rigour.
Notational Setup. Suppose p1, . . . , pT , PT+1, PT+2 are T + 2 successive plaintext bytes
which are to be encrypted a number of times under RC4 using a number of different
keystreams. We suppose that the first T plaintext bytes p1, . . . , pT are known plaintext
bytes, but that the next two plaintext bytes PT+1, PT+2 are unknown and we wish to
determine them. (Throughout we use lower-case letters for known quantities, and upper-case
for unknown quantities, which can be regarded as random variables.)
We let ci,1, . . . , ci,T , ci,T+1, ci,T+2 denote the T + 2 successive known ciphertext bytes ob-
tained by encrypting the plaintext bytes p1, . . . , pT , PT+1, PT+2 using the ith RC4 keystream
zi,1, . . . , zi,T , Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2. Thus we have that
zi,1 = p1 ⊕ ci,1, . . . , zi,T = pT ⊕ ci,T are known keystream bytes
and
Zi,T+1 = PT+1 ⊕ ci,T+1, Zi,T+2 = PT+2 ⊕ ci,T+2 are unknown keystream bytes.
Now the Mantin bias can be expressed in the following way: We first define a positive
decreasing sequence δ0, δ1, . . . , δT−2 by
δG = e(−4−8G/256)/256 = 2−8e−
1
64 e−
G
32 [G = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2].
Then, from Mantin’s result (Equation 5.1), we have:
Pr ((Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2) = (zi,T−G−1, zi,T−G)) ≈ 2−16(1 + δG).
For byte pairs (a1, a2) not in the ith RC4 keystream we have
Pr ((Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2) = (a1, a2)) ≈ 2−16 [(a1, a2) 6= (zi,1, zi,2), . . . (zi,T−1, zi,T )].
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A Likelihood Function. We now calculate the probability mass function for θ =
(PT+1, PT+2) for the ith encryption based on the above probabilities. This will lead us to a
likelihood function for θ.
By a straightforward calculation, we have:
Pr
(
(PT+1, PT+2) = (p′, p′′)
)
= Pr
(
(Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2) = (p′ ⊕ ci,T+1, p′′ ⊕ ci,T+2)
)
.
This probability is therefore different from 2−16 if, for some G, there exists a keystream
byte pair (zi,T−G−1, zi,T−G) such that
(p′ ⊕ ci,T+1, p′′ ⊕ ci,T+2) = (Zi,T+1, Zi,T+2) = (zi,T−G−1, zi,T−G)
= (pT−G−1 ⊕ ci,T−G−1, pT−G ⊕ ci,T−G),
that is to say if
(p′, p′′) = (pT−G−1 ⊕ ci,T−G−1 ⊕ ci,T+1, pT−G ⊕ ci,T−G ⊕ ci,T+2).
We now let xi,G denote the known 2-byte quantity
(pT−G−1 ⊕ ci,T−G−1 ⊕ ci,T+1, pT−G ⊕ ci,T−G ⊕ ci,T+2)
for the ith RC4 encryption, and we let xi = (xi,0, . . . , xi,T−2)T denote the vector of such
known 2-byte quantities. If we then let θ denote the value of the unknown plaintext bytes
(PT+1, PT+2), then the probability mass function of xi given the parameter θ is
f(xi; θ) ≈
 2
−16(1 + δG) xi,G = θ [G = 0, . . . , T − 2]
2−16 otherwise.
This means that the likelihood function of the parameter θ = (PT+1, PT+2) given the data
xi is given by
L(θ;xi) ≈
 2
−16(1 + δG) θ = xi,G [G = 0, . . . , T − 2]
2−16 otherwise.
Here the approximations arise from the fact that, for a given i, the equality θ = xi,G could
hold for multiple values of G, while our analysis ignores this eventuality (which is of low
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probability).
We now consider the likelihood function of the parameter θ = (PT+1, PT+2) given N such
data vectors x1, . . . , xN derived from known plaintext-ciphertext bytes. If we let
SG(θ;x) = #{xi,G = θ | i = 1, . . . , N}
be a count of the number of times the Gth component of x1, . . . , xN is equal to θ, then the
joint likelihood function satisfies
L(θ;x1, . . . , xN ) ≈ 2−16N
T−2∏
G=0
(1 + δG)SG(θ;x).
Thus if we let x denote the data x1, . . . , xN , then the log-likelihood function is given by
L(θ;x) = logL(θ;x) = −16N log 2 +
T−2∑
G=0
SG(θ;x) log(1 + δG)
≈ −16N log 2 +
T−2∑
G=0
δGSG(θ;x)
≈ δTS(θ;x)− 16N log 2,
where δ = (δ0, . . . , δT−2)T and S(θ;x) = (S0(θ;x), . . . , ST−2(θ;x))T . Thus the value of θ
which maximises
δTS(θ;x) ≈ L(θ;x) + 16N log 2
is essentially the maximum likelihood estimate θ̂ of the plaintext parameter θ = (PT+1, PT+2)
given the known data x.
5.3.2 Plaintext Recovery Attack
The preceding analysis leads immediately to an attack recovering the two unknown bytes
θ = (PT+1, PT+2) given access to N ciphertexts: for each value of θ, compute δTS(θ;x)
and output the value of θ which maximises this expression.
The attack can be implemented efficiently by processing the i-th ciphertext as it becomes
available, using it to compute the quantities xi,G and updating a (T − 1)× 216 array of
integer counters by incrementing the array in positions (G, xi,G) for each G between 0 and
T − 2. Once all N ciphertexts are processed in this way, the array contains the counts
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SG(θ;x) from which the log likelihood of each candidate θ can be computed by taking
inner products with the vector δ.
Note too that, since the attack produces log likelihood estimates for each of the 216
candidates θ, it is trivially adapted to output a ranked list of plaintext candidates in order
of descending likelihood. This feature is important for our extended attacks in the following
section.
This basic attack can be extended in several different ways (some of which can be considered
in combination):
1. To the situation where the unknown plaintext bytes are not contiguous with the
known plaintext bytes. This merely requires adjusting the above analysis to use
Mantin biases for the correct values of G (rather than starting from G = 0). Note
that because the Mantin biases decrease in strength with increasing G, the attack
will be rendered less effective.
2. To the case where known plaintext bytes are located on both sides of the unknown
plaintext bytes (possibly in a non-contiguous fashion on one or both sides). Again,
this only requires the above analysis to be adjusted to use the correct set of values
for G. Using more biases in this way results in a stronger attack.
3. To the case where one of two target plaintext bytes, PT+1 say, is already known. This
is easily done by considering only the log likelihoods of a reduced set of candidates θ
in the attack.
4. To the situation where the plaintext space is constrained in some way, for example,
where the bytes of θ are known to be ASCII characters or where base64 encoding is
used. Again, this can be done by working with a reduced set of candidates θ.
5.3.3 Distribution of the Maximum Likelihood Statistic and Attack Perfor-
mance
We now proceed to evaluate the effectiveness of the above basic attack, as a function of
the number of available ciphertexts, N , and the number of known plaintext bytes, T .
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We let θ∗ denote the true value of the plaintext parameter θ. The component SG(θ;x) has
a binomial distribution, and there are two cases depending on whether or not θ is this true
value θ∗, so we have
SG(θ∗;x) ∼ Bin(N, 2−16(1 + δG))
and SG(θ;x) ∼ Bin(N, 2−16) [θ 6= θ∗].
If we write µ = N2−16, then E(SG(θ∗;x)) = 2−16N(1 + δG) = µ(1 + δG) and E(SG(θ;x)) =
2−16N = µ for θ 6= θ∗, with Var(SG(θ;x)) ≈ 2−16N = µ for all θ (to a very good
approximation). For the values of N and hence µ = 2−16N of interest to us, these
binomial random variables are very well-approximated by normal random variables, and
we essentially have
SG(θ∗;x) ∼ N(µ(1 + δG), µ)
and SG(θ;x) ∼ N(µ, µ) [θ 6= θ∗].
Thus the vector S(θ∗;x) = (S0(θ∗;x), . . . , ST−2(θ∗;x))T corresponding to the true parame-
ter θ∗ and the vectors S(θ;x) = (S0(θ;x), . . . , ST−2(θ;x))T (for θ 6= θ∗) corresponding to
other values of the plaintext parameter have a multivariate normal distribution. Further-
more, it is reasonable to assume that the components of these vectors are independent, so
we have
S(θ∗;x) ∼ NT−1(µ(1 + δ), µIT−1)
and S(θ;x) ∼ NT−1(µ1, µIT−1) [θ 6= θ∗].
The maximum likelihood statistic is essentially determined by the distributions of δTS(θ∗;x)
and δTS(θ;x) (for θ 6= θ∗). However, these are just rank-1 linear mappings of multivariate
normal random variables and so have univariate normal distributions given by
δTS(θ∗;x) ∼ N(µ(δT1 + |δ|2), µ|δ|2)
and δTS(θ;x) ∼ N(µδT1, µ|δ|2) [θ 6= θ∗].
The above distributions suggest that it is convenient to consider the function
J(θ;x) = δ
TS(θ;x)− µ1T δ
µ
1
2 |δ|
= µ−
1
2 |δ|−1
(
δTS(θ;x)
)
− µ 12 |δ|− 12 (1T δ)
on the parameter space. It is clear that J(θ;x) is a very good approximation to an affine
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transformation of the log-likelihood function, so the value of θ which maximises J(θ;x) is
essentially the maximum likelihood estimate θ̂ of the plaintext parameter θ = (PT+1, PT+2)
given the known data x.
We note that J(θ;x) has a univariate normal distribution with unit variance in both cases
as we have
J(θ∗;x) ∼ N
(
µ
1
2 |δ|, 1
)
and J(θ;x) ∼ N (0, 1) for θ 6= θ∗.
Furthermore, we may essentially regard all of these random variables J(θ;x) as independent
since the random variables SG(θ;x) are very close to being independent.
The function J(θ;x) can be thought of as a “variance-stabilised” form of log-likelihood
function L(θ;x) of the plaintext parameter θ. Furthermore, the squared length of the
vector δ can be calculated as
|δ|2 =
T−2∑
G=0
δ2G =
e
1
32 − e 132 (3−2T )
216(e 116 − 1)
.
This means, for instance, that |δ| ≈ 0.00385 for T = 2 and |δ| ≈ 0.00930 for T = 8, with
|δ| ≈ 0.0156 for large T .
Performance of Plaintext Ranking in the Basic Attack. With the above reformu-
lation, finding the maximum likelihood estimate θ̂ by maximising the function J(θ;x) can
now be seen as essentially comparing a realisation of a normal N(µ 12 |δ|, 1) random variable
(corresponding to J(θ∗;x)) with a set R = {J(θ;x)|θ 6= θ∗} of realisations of 216−1 = 65535
independent standard normal N(0, 1) random variables. Thus the maximum likelihood
estimate θ̂ gives the true plaintext parameter θ∗ if a realisation of an N(µ 12 |δ|, 1) random
variable exceeds the maximum of the realisations of 216 − 1 independent standard normal
random variables.
This enables the probability that the maximum likelihood estimate is correct (and the basic
attack succeeds) to be evaluated as a function of N and T . However, we are able to go
further and consider the rank of the correct plaintext θ∗ in the ordered list of values J(θ;x)
(from highest to lowest) as a function of N and T , that is to evaluate the performance of
the ranking version of the plaintext recovery attack. Such an evaluation makes use of the
result concerning order statistics mentioned in Section 5.2, namely:
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Result 1. Suppose X1, . . . , Xk are independent standard normal N(0, 1) random variables
and that Φ denotes the distribution function of a standard normal N(0, 1) random variable.
Then Φ(X1), . . . ,Φ(Xk) are independent uniform Uni(0, 1) random variables and the order
statistics X(1), . . . , X(k) satisfy
E
(
Φ(X(j))
)
= j
k + 1 ,
where E denotes the expected value of the random variable Φ(X(j)).
It follows that Φ(z) is an accurate representation on a linear uniform scale between 0 and
1 of the position of a value z within X(1), . . . , X(k). Thus the random variable giving the
position (from highest to lowest) or “rank” of J(θ∗;x) with respect to the set R, and hence
the rank of θ∗, is given accurately by rounding the random variable
Rk(θ∗) = 216(1− Φ(J(θ∗;x)))
to the nearest integer.
The distribution function FRk(θ∗) of this (unrounded) rank Rk(θ∗) of θ∗ is given by
FRk(θ∗)(z) = Pr (Rk(θ∗) ≤ z) = Pr
(
216(1− Φ(J(θ∗;x))) ≤ z)
= Pr
(
J(θ∗;x) ≥ Φ−1 (1− 2−16z)) = 1− F∗ (Φ−1 (1− 2−16z)) ,
where F∗ is the distribution function of J(θ∗;x), that is to say of an N
(
µ
1
2 |δ|, 1
)
distribution.
Figure 5.1 shows the cumulative distribution function of the rank Rk(θ∗) for different
numbers of ciphertexts, N , for the specific value T = 26. It can be seen that as N
approaches 232, it becomes highly likely that the rank of θ∗ is rather small. On the other
hand, when N drops below 228, the attack does not have much advantage over random
guessing (which would produce a diagonal line on the cumulative distribution plot).
The median of Rk(θ∗), which is very close to the mean of Rk(θ∗), is the value of z satisfying
FRk(θ∗)(z) =
1
2 , that is to say
Median (Rk(θ∗)) = 216
(
1− Φ
(
F−1∗
(
1
2
)))
= 216
(
1− Φ
(
µ
1
2 |δ|
))
= 216Φ
(
−2−8N 12 |δ|
)
.
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N 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237
T = 21 28236 26390 23838 20387 15920 10628 5353 1596 174 3 1
T = 23 22081 18078 13105 7664 3024 566 25 1 1 1 1
T = 26 15735 10423 5176 1502 155 2 1 1 1 1 1
Table 5.2: Median rank of maximum likelihood estimate of plaintext parameter
Table 5.2 shows some median rankings for the value of J(θ∗;x) within the set of all such
216 values of J(θ;x). A median rank of “1” indicates that the maximum likelihood estimate
θ̂ gives the true plaintext parameter θ∗ with high probability.
Performance of Plaintext Ranking in Variant Attacks. The above analysis is easily
extended to evaluate the performance of the variant attacks described in Section 5.3.2.
For variant 1, in which the unknown plaintext bytes are not contiguous with the known
plaintext bytes, we need only replace the value of |δ| with the appropriate value computed
from the biases actually used in the attack. For variant 2, where known plaintext bytes are
located on both sides of the unknown plaintext bytes, the same is true, but this time δ
increases; the analysis is otherwise identical. For example, |δ|2 doubles when we use an
additional T known plaintext bytes pT+3, . . . , p2T+2 in concert with p1, . . . , pT . Recalling
that J(θ∗;x) has a N
(
µ
1
2 |δ|, 1
)
distribution with µ = 2−16N , it can be seen that the effect
of doubling |δ|2 by using “double-sided” biases in this way is the same as that of doubling N
in the attack; put another way, using double-sided biases reduces the number of ciphertexts
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Figure 5.1: Cumulative distribution function of the rank Rk(θ∗) for different numbers of
ciphertexts, N (T = 26).
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needed to obtain a given median ranking for the value of J(θ∗;x) by a factor of 2.
Variants 3 and 4 both concern the case where the plaintext space for the pair (PT , PT+1)
is reduced from a set of 216 candidates to some smaller set of candidates, C say. For
example, in variant 3, where one of the plaintext bytes is known, |C| = 28. This means
that our fundamental statistical problem becomes one of distinguishing a realisation of
a normal N(µ 12 |δ|, 1) random variable (corresponding to J(θ∗;x)) from a now smaller set
R = {J(θ;x)|θ ∈ C \ θ∗} of |C| − 1 realisations of independent standard normal N(0, 1)
random variables. Our previous analysis goes through as above, except that we simply
replace 216 by |C| where appropriate, resulting in
Median (Rk(θ∗)) = |C| · Φ
(
−2−8N 12 |δ|
)
.
The effect of this is to divide all the entries in Table 5.2 by 216/|C|. For example, in variant
3 where |C| = 28, we would expect a median rank of roughly 6 with N = 230 ciphertexts
and T = 26.
Note that these two effects are cumulative. For example, using double-sided biases and
assuming one byte of plaintext from the pair (PT+1, PT+2) is known has the effect of both
reducing N by a factor of 2 and dividing the median rank by 28. Then, for example, with
only N = 229 ciphertexts and T = 26 we would expect J(θ∗;x) to have a median rank of
about 6, meaning that the correct plaintext θ∗ can be expected to have a high ranking.
Experimental Validation. We carried out an experimental validation of our statistical
analysis, performing experiments with T = 26 for different numbers of ciphertexts, N ,
and computing the cumulative distribution function of the rank Rk(θ∗). The results are
shown in Figure 5.2 for N = 228, 229 and 230. Good agreement can be seen between
the experimental results and the predictions made by our statistical analysis, with the
experiments slightly outperforming the theoretical predictions in each case.
5.3.4 Incorporating Prior Information about Plaintext Bytes
Prior information about the unknown plaintext bytes is frequently available and can be
exploited (as was done in the previous chapter) to improve attacks.
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N=2^28 HEmpricialL
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Figure 5.2: Cumulative distribution function of the rank Rk(θ∗) for different numbers of
ciphertexts, N (T = 26): N = 228 (top), N = 229 (middle), N = 230 (bottom).
Prior information in our setting can be incorporated using the inferential form of Bayes
Theorem, which can be loosely expressed as
Posterior ∝ Likelihood × Prior,
or equivalently in its logarithmic form as
Log-Posterior = Log-Likelihood + Log-Prior + Constant.
If we let pi(θ) denote the prior probability of the plaintext parameter θ = (PT+1, PT+2)
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and pi(θ;x) the posterior probability of the parameter θ given the data x, then we have
log pi(θ;x) = L(θ;x) + log pi(θ) + Constant
≈ δTS(θ;x) + log pi(θ) + Constant.
This suggests that for purposes such as posterior plaintext ranking, we consider an adapta-
tion of J(θ;x) given by
Jpi(θ;x) =
δTS(θ;x) + log pi(θ)− µ1T δ
µ
1
2 |δ|
= J(θ;x) + log pi(θ)
µ
1
2 |δ|
.
We note that Jpi(θ;x) has a univariate normal distribution with unit variance as we have
Jpi(θ∗;x) ∼ N
(
µ
1
2 |δ|+ log pi(θ
∗)
µ
1
2 |δ|
, 1
)
and Jpi(θ;x) ∼ N
(
log pi(θ)
µ
1
2 |δ|
, 1
)
for θ 6= θ∗.
It is clear that when N or equivalently µ = 2−16N is small, that is roughly speaking
when µ|δ|2 << |log pi(θ)|, the mean value of the posterior scoring function is given by
E (Jpi(θ;x)) ≈ µ− 12 |δ|−1 log pi(θ) for both θ = θ∗ and θ 6= θ∗. Thus when N or µ is small,
the posterior scoring function essentially orders the plaintext parameters pi according to the
prior distribution pi; analysis of the available ciphertexts does not yield enough evidence
to “overturn” the evidence given by the prior distribution. By contrast when N or µ is
large, that is roughly speaking when µ|δ|2 >> |log pi(θ)|, then E (Jpi(θ∗;x)) ≈ µ 12 |δ| and
E (Jpi(θ;x)) ≈ 0 for θ 6= θ∗. In this situation, the evidence of the experiment “overwhelms”
the evidence given by the prior distribution, and we are essentially considering the previous
scenario.
The interesting situation is therefore when µ|δ|2 and |log pi(θ)| are of roughly comparable
size. We consider how much data is needed to “overturn” an ordering of plaintext parameters
according to their prior probabilities. In this situation, the scoring function for the plaintext
parameter has means given by
E (Jpi(θ∗;x)) = µ
1
2 |δ|+ log pi(θ
∗)
µ
1
2 |δ|
and E (Jpi(θ;x)) =
log pi(θ)
µ
1
2 |δ|
for θ 6= θ∗.
Thus the scoring function for the correct plaintext parameter θ∗ is expected to exceed that
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of the plaintext parameter θ when E (Jpi(θ∗;x)) > E (Jpi(θ;x)), that is to say when
µ >
1
|δ|2 log
pi(θ)
pi(θ∗) or equivalently when N >
216
|δ|2 log
pi(θ)
pi(θ∗)
The interesting case is obviously when pi(θ) > pi(θ∗), that is to say when θ is a priori a
more likely plaintext parameter than θ∗. In this case, the above expression indicates how
many samples are likely to be required to be able to place an a posteriori rank θ∗ above
that for θ. Clearly, the answer depends on the specifics of the distribution pi.
5.4 Recovering Multiple Plaintext Bytes
We now extend the attacks and analysis presented in the previous section to consider
the situation where the target plaintext extends over multiple bytes. As in previous [10,
68, 76, 113, 115, 116] and concurrent [148] works, this is important in building practical
attacks targeting HTTP cookies and passwords. We are particularly interested in attack
algorithms that output lists of candidates rather than single candidates, since in many
practical situations, many suggested candidates can be tried one after another, as was first
suggested in [10]. Throughout, we let W denote the byte-length of the target plaintext.
This problem was already addressed in [10] and [113] for attacks exploiting Fluhrer-McGrew
and Mantin biases, respectively. Although not explicit in [10], the algorithm used there
is a Viterbi algorithm and is guaranteed to output the best plaintext candidate on W
bytes according to an approximate log likelihood metric; roughly 233 – 234 ciphertexts
were needed to recover a 16-byte plaintext with high success rate. The algorithm in [113]
proceeds on a byte-by-byte basis and the success probability of it recovering the correct
plaintext is the product of success rates for single bytes. This, unfortunately, means that
the success rate drops rapidly as a function of W . For example, with N = 232 ciphertexts
and T = 66 known plaintext bytes, the algorithm of [113] achieves a success rate of 0.7656
for a single byte, but this would be reduced to (0.7656)16 = 0.014 for W = 16 bytes.
123
5.4 Recovering Multiple Plaintext Bytes
5.4.1 A Likelihood Analysis for Multiple Plaintext Bytes
As before, we assume plaintext bytes p1, . . . , pT are known. Our task now is to recover
the W unknown bytes θ = (PT+1, . . . , PT+W ). We let θw denote (PT+w, PT+w+1) for
1 ≤ w ≤W −1. Using the methods of Section 5.3, we can form W −1 ranked lists of values
for L(θw;x), where as before x denotes the collection of N data vectors x1, . . . , xN derived
from known plaintext-ciphertext bytes. Note here that when w ≥ 2, these log-likelihoods
will be computed using progressively weaker Mantin biases with G ≥ 1.
To evaluate the overall log-likelihood L(θ;x), we will replace this quantity with the sum:
W−1∑
w=1
L(θw;x) (5.2)
of log-likelihoods for the byte pairs θi.
This replacement is formally justified as follows. Consider the probability mass function of a
data vector xi given the unknown byte pairs θ = (θ1, . . . , θW−1). This can be approximated
as
f(xi; θ1, . . . , θW−1) ≈
 2
−16(1 + δG+w−1) xi,G = θw
2−16 otherwise.
Here, the nature of the approximation is similar to that made in our analysis in Section 5.3:
it assumes that at most one low probability event xi,G = θw occurs for each i.
However, the probability mass function of a data vector xi given a single unknown byte
pair θw can be approximated as
f(xi; θw) ≈
 2
−16(1 + δG+w−1) xi,G = θw
2−16 otherwise,
so the product of all such probability mass functions can be approximated as
W−1∏
w=1
f(xi; θw) ≈
 2
−16(W−2) 2−16(1 + δG+w−1) xi,G = θw
2−16(W−2) 2−16 otherwise.
This enables us to give an approximate proportionality relationship between the the proba-
bility mass function of a data vector xi given the unknown byte pairs θ = (θ1, . . . , θW−1)
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and the probability mass functions of a data vector xi given single unknown byte pairs θw
since we now see that
f(xi; θ1, . . . , θW−1) ∝
W−1∏
w=1
f(xi; θw).
This can be re-formulated in terms of likelihood functions as
L(θ;xi) = L(θ1, . . . , θW−1;xi) ∝
W−1∏
w=1
L(θw;xi).
The likelihood function of the byte pairs θ = (θ1, . . . , θW−1) given all the data vectors
x = (x1, . . . , xN ) is therefore proportional (to a good approximation) to a product of
individual likelihood functions, that is to say
L(θ;x) ∝
N∏
i=1
(
W−1∏
w=1
L(θw;xi)
)
=
W−1∏
w=1
(
N∏
i=1
L(θw;xi)
)
=
W−1∏
w=1
L(θw;x),
which can be expressed in log-likelihood terms (for some constant C) as
L(θ;x) ≈ C +
W−1∑
w=1
L(θw;x).
Thus maximising the overall log-likelihood L(θ;x) can be achieved (to a good approximation)
by maximising the sum ∑W−1w=1 L(θw;x) of individual log-likelihoods.
5.4.2 Algorithms for Recovering Multiple Plaintext Bytes
It follows from the above analysis that, to find high log-likelihood candidates for θ, we
need to find sequences of overlapping byte pairs θw for which the sums in (5.2) are large,
given the W − 1 lists L(θw;x). This is a classic problem in dynamic programming that can
be solved by a number of different approaches. We consider two such standard approaches:
List Viterbi. Recall that in its general form the list Viterbi algorithm finds the L lowest
cost state sequences through a complete trellis of some width W on some state space,
given an initial state and a final state and where each state transition in the trellis has
an associated cost. The algorithm is easily adapted to the problem at hand by setting
the edge weights to be the log-likelihood values L(θw;x) and interpreting the states as
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byte values.2 The algorithm is relatively memory intensive and somewhat slow, requiring
roughly 256 ·W times as much storage as the beam search algorithm to return a final list
of L candidates. However, the algorithm has the advantage that it guarantees to return
the L best plaintext candidates on W bytes, that is the top L candidates according to the
metric represented by (5.2).
Beam Search. In the beam search algorithm, we generate a list of L candidates on j
positions T+1, . . . , T+j, each candidate being accompanied by a partial sum∑j−1w=1 L(θw;x).
We then expand the list to include all 256 · L candidates that are 1-byte extensions of
candidates on the list, computing a new sum ∑jw=1 L(θw;x) for each candidate by adding
a term L(θw;x). We then prune the list back to L candidates again, by keeping just the
top L candidates, but now on w + 1 positions. The process is initialised using the top
L values for L(θ1;x) on the first two unknown plaintext bytes. The process is finalised
when w = W − 1, and the list need not be pruned at the final step, though we do so in
our implementation to provide a fair comparison with the list Viterbi algorithm. The
algorithm is deemed successful if the correct plaintext (PT+1, . . . , PT+W ) appears on the
final pruned list of L candidates. In a further enhancement, we may assume the first and
last byte of the plaintext are known, and force the candidate plaintexts to begin and end
with those known bytes. The beam search algorithm is fast and memory-efficient, but does
not provide any guarantees about the quality of its outputs (that is to say, we do not know
if it will successfully include the highest log-likelihood plaintext on its output list).
Note that both algorithms extend smoothly to the double-sided case where some plaintext
bytes are known on both sides of the W unknown bytes; the only modification is to the
computation of the log likelihoods L(θw;x) that are input to the algorithms. Again we will
be forced to use Mantin biases starting with non-zero values of G in computing the values
L(θw;x), because of the presence of a run of unknown plaintext bytes before reaching
the known plaintext bytes. Both algorithms also generalise easily to the case where the
plaintext space is constrained in some way, simply by considering only restricted sets of
plaintext bytes when extending candidates (in beam search) or traversing the trellis (in
the list Viterbi case).
2Several additional notational and conceptual changes are needed compared to the original description
in [145]. In particular, the initialisation process described in [145] contains a small error, and we wish to
maximise rather than minimise the cost of state sequences. The basic algorithm also requires the first and
last bytes of plaintext, PT+1 and PT+W to be known.
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5.5 Simulation Results
We performed experiments with the beam search and list Viterbi algorithms, for a variety
of attack parameters.
5.5.1 Methodology
We focus on recovering 16 unknown plaintext bytes, a length typical of HTTP cookies,
and on attacks using single-sided and double-sided biases with, respectively, T = 66 and
130 known plaintext bytes – in the case of List Viterbi, we require a trellis of width 18
as the first and last plaintext bytes need to be known, and for beam search we assume
known plaintext bytes, one on either side of the 16 unknown target plaintext bytes. We
are most interested in how the attack performance varies with N , the number of available
ciphertexts, and L, the pruned list size/output list size in the two algorithms. Further
experiments to explore how performance changes with T and W , and for the case of a
constrained plaintext space, would be of interest, but we did not have the computing
resources available to perform these. Notably, target plaintexts such as cookies often have
symbols coming from a much reduced plaintext space, a fact exploited in [148] to reduce
their attack’s ciphertext requirements.
Our experiments ran in two phases: in phase 1, we generated 212 keystream groups, each
group containing N = 227 blocks of keystream bytes. On the fly, for each group, we
computed and stored the single-sided and double-sided log-likelihood measures L(θw;x)
for each of the 216 possible values of θw for each of 17 overlapping pairs of positions,
yielding log-likelihood information for 18 consecutive unknown plaintext bytes. Then,
in phase 2, we collated the measures coming from different groups to create measures
for groups corresponding to progressively larger sets of blocks. This enabled us to carry
out 128 plaintext recovery attacks on up to N = 232 ciphertexts each, using our beam
search and list-Viterbi algorithms. We ran each of these algorithms with L = 216 and
computed the success rate across different values of N (typical values of N are n · 227 where
n ∈ {8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 28, 32}).
All computations were performed on the Google Compute Engine (GCE), and we optimised
various parameters internal to our code for this platform. Each list Viterbi execution with
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L = 216 on a trellis of width 18 took around 2 hours on a single GCE core; by contrast,
the execution of the beam search algorithm completed in a only a couple of minutes for
the same parameter L. This favourable running time inspired us to conduct further beam
search experiments for higher values of L. For L = 217 each beam search experiment took
about 20 minutes, and for L = 218, the running time was roughly 2.5 hours per experiment.
We attribute this unfortunate scaling in the running time to an increasing number of cache
misses as L grows. In total we used around 6,200 GCE core-hours of computation for the
experiments.
5.5.2 Results
We present our results for the attack simulations starting with those for the list Viterbi
algorithm. We then discuss a number of results for the beam search algorithm and conclude
this section with a comparison of the two algorithms.
List Viterbi. Figure 5.3 shows how the success rate varies with N , the number of
ciphertexts available, for the list Viterbi algorithm with double-sided biases (130 known
plaintext bytes split either side of 16 unknown bytes, with 2 of the known bytes being
used in the list Viterbi algorithm and the remaining 128 being used for computing log
likelihoods). Each curve represents a different value of L. It can be seen that, for fixed N ,
the success rate increases steadily with L and that a threshold phenomenon is observable,
where above roughly 230 ciphertexts, the success rate takes off rapidly. For example, with
N = 231 we see a success rate 86% for L = 216. We are confident that the success rate
would continue to improve with increasing L and with a larger number of known plaintext
bytes, bringing our results into contention with those of [148] (which used 256 known
bytes instead of our 130, the significantly larger L = 223 in the list Viterbi algorithm, and
an undisclosed reduced plaintext space to achieve a success rate of 94% for recovering a
16-byte plaintext with 9 · 227 ciphertexts, a little over 230 ciphertexts).
Figure 5.4 compares the performance of the single-sided and double-sided version of the
attacks. Not surprisingly, the use of double-sided biases significantly improves the attack
performance.
Beam Search. Unless otherwise stated, we use the enhancement of assuming the bytes
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Figure 5.3: Success rate of list Viterbi algorithm in recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext
for different numbers of ciphertexts, N and different list sizes L, using double-sided biases,
and 130 known plaintext bytes. The x-axis shows the number of ciphertexts divided by
227.
directly adjacent to the 16 target plaintext bytes to be known, and we force our respective
18-byte candidates to start and end with these bytes. Figure 5.5 shows the performance of
the beam search algorithm for varying numbers of ciphertexts, N , and for L = 216, 217 and
218. As expected, we do see an improvement in success rates as L grows. For example, with
N = 231 we see a success rate increase of 3% in going from L = 216 to L = 218. Significant
gains, however, are likely to be made with larger values of L, say L = 220.
In order to determine the extent to which assuming adjacent bytes to be known improves
attack performance, we ran the following two sets of experiments: We assumed the first
byte adjacent to the 16 target plaintext bytes to be known and used the single-sided biases
to recover 17-byte candidates (in other words, W = 17 with PT+1 known). We then used
the single-sided biases to recover 16 unknown target bytes (W = 16 and PT+1 unknown).3
Figure 5.6 shows that there is a small advantage to using this enhancement. For instance,
with N = 232 we see the success rate increase by 3%.
In a further enhancement, we did not prune the list of plaintext candidates in the final
stage of the beam search algorithm. In other words, we retained 28 · L candidates in the
last step of the process and declared success if the correct plaintext appeared on this larger
3Using the generated double-sided biases with W = 18 for the recovery of 16-byte plaintexts would have
resulted in us not being able to use some of the strongest biases for plaintext recovery; targeting bytes
PT+2 to PT+17 would mean not using biases when G = 0, and targeting bytes PT+1 to PT+16 would mean
not using biases for each G between 0 and 2 in the recovery of PT+15 and PT+16.
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Figure 5.4: Success rate of list Viterbi algorithm in recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext
for different numbers of ciphertexts, using single-sided and double-sided biases (with 66
and 130 known plaintext bytes, respectively) and L = 216. The x-axis shows the number
of ciphertexts divided by 227.
list of candidates. Figure 5.7 shows the performance of the beam search algorithm using
this enhancement in comparison to the case in which this enhancement is not used. We
see a very slight improvement in attack performance as a result of this enhancement.
Comparing List Viterbi and Beam Search. Figure 5.8 compares the performance of
list Viterbi and beam search algorithms with L set to 216 in both cases. It can be seen
that the beam search algorithm performs very well, close to the optimal attack that is
represented by list Viterbi. It may make for an attractive alternative in practice, especially
for such large values of L where the memory consumption of the list Viterbi algorithm
becomes prohibitive.
5.6 Conclusion
Exploiting the Mantin biases that are present in the RC4 keystream, we have developed a
statistical framework that enables us to make accurate predictions about the performance of
plaintext recovery attacks targeting adjacent pairs of plaintext bytes. A particular novelty
is the introduction of order statistics, enabling the expected rank of the true plaintext
amongst all possible candidates to be computed. We extended our 2-byte attacks to the
situation of multiple unknown plaintext bytes, and provided an experimental evaluation of
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two different attacks for this setting, using the list Viterbi and beam search algorithms,
respectively.
Our attacks target unknown bytes of plaintext that are located close to sequences of known
plaintext bytes, a situation that is commonplace in practice when RC4 is used in TLS. Our
experiments have shown that we can successfully recover 16-byte plaintexts, such as TLS
session cookies, with an 80% success rate using 231 ciphertexts. This is an improvement
over the preferred cookie-recovery attack of AlFardan et al. [10].
Although this work has undoubtedly contributed to the body of work responsible for
bringing the use of RC4 in TLS to its knees (and thereby highlighting the folly of allowing
the use of flawed primitives in TLS 1.2 and below), it is its potential for predictive power
that makes it a valuable contribution to the RC4 attack space. This is especially true
given recent attempts at making the use of RC4 viable in TLS, such as the TLS Scramble
and MCookies techniques of Levillain et al. [94]. Using techniques introduced by the work
presented in this chapter, Paterson and Schuldt [118] show that the techniques put forth
in [94] only moderately increase the security of RC4 in TLS. In the case of TLS Scramble,
the authors of [118] were able to adapt the techniques developed in our work to perform
a theoretical evaluation of the number of ciphertexts needed to guarantee the success of
their cookie-recovery attack with high probability.
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Figure 5.5: Success rate of beam search algorithm in recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext
for different numbers of ciphertexts, N , and different sizes of L, using double-sided biases
and 130 known plaintext bytes. The x-axis shows the number of ciphertexts divided by
227.
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Figure 5.6: Success rate of the beam search algorithm in recovering a 17-byte plaintext
(first byte known) using single sided-biases with 65 known plaintext bytes compared to
recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext using single-sided biases with 64 known plaintext
bytes, for different numbers of ciphertexts, N , and for L = 216. The x-axis shows the
number of ciphertexts divided by 227.
132
5.6 Conclusion
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 20 24 28 32
beam search (not truncated)
beam search (truncated)
Figure 5.7: Success rate of beam search algorithm without final list pruning compared to
use of final list pruning in recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext for different numbers of
ciphertexts, N , using double-sided biases and 130 known plaintext bytes, and for L = 216.
The x-axis shows the number of ciphertexts divided by 227.
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Figure 5.8: Success rate of list Viterbi algorithm compared to beam search algorithm in
recovering a 16-byte unknown plaintext for different numbers of ciphertexts, N , using
double-sided biases, L = 216, and 130 known plaintext bytes. The x-axis shows the number
of ciphertexts divided by 227.
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Chapter 6
Automated Analysis and Verification
of draft-10
This chapter covers our symbolic analysis of the TLS 1.3 draft specification using the
Tamarin prover. We introduce the symbolic setting and cover the necessary Tamarin
fundamentals. We formally model draft-10 of the specification and encode the desired
security properties, as laid out in the draft, using the Tamarin specification language. We
use a mixture of automated inspection and manual interaction with the tool to analyse
these properties. We also extend this model to include the post-handshake authentication
mechanism as suggested for draft-11. Our results represent some of the first supporting
evidence of the security of several handshake mode interactions in TLS 1.3.
6.1 Introduction
Since its emergence in the Spring of 2014, the TLS 1.3 specification has been subject
to much analysis and refinement, as described in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The flaws
identified in TLS 1.2 and below, of which the preceding two chapters serve as testament,
prompted the TLS WG into taking a different approach to the design of TLS 1.3, this time
incorporating input from the academic community, and analysing the protocol thoroughly
prior to deployment. A notable departure from the TLS 1.2 design is marked by the
influence of the OPTLS protocol [91] of Krywczyk and Wee – this protocol was designed
to offer a zero Round-Trip Time (0-RTT) exchange and to ensure perfect forward secrecy,
meeting important designs goals for TLS 1.3. Its simple structure lends itself to analysis
via manual and automated means, a benefit that was deemed desirable for TLS 1.3, but
its influence introduced complexity into the protocol via the addition of new handshake
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components, including the 0-RTT functionality and a new resumption mechanism based on
Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs). Ensuring the security of TLS 1.3 in the face of this complexity
is a vital task if attacks exploiting the interaction of differing handshake modes, such as
the Triple Handshake attack against TLS 1.2 [29], are to be avoided.
Our work on draft-10 of the TLS 1.3 specification tackles this task: We formally analyse
the interaction of the various draft-10 handshake modes, showing the absence of an attack
against the draft-10 specification.1 Prior to our work on draft-10, the most up-to-date
analysis pertaining to TLS 1.3 was the analysis of OPTLS by its designers [91]. In this
work, the authors noted that their analysis was not intended to cover the full TLS 1.3
specification. In particular, they only considered the different handshake modes in isolation,
and the work did not cover client authentication or resumption.
Our analysis complements the work from [91] and previous works [54,85] by covering the
following aspects:
(i) The security, and secure interaction, of the following handshake modes: regular
(EC)DHE mode, PSK mode, PSK-DHE mode and 0-RTT mode.
(ii) The PSK-resumption handshake when composed with any acceptable initial hand-
shake, namely, an (EC)DHE handshake, a PSK handshake, a PSK-DHE handshake
or a 0-RTT handshake.
We go on to extend our draft-10 model to incorporate the post-handshake authentication
mechanism suggested for draft-11 on the TLS WG mailing list [123], and hence a third
aspect covered by our work includes:
(iii) The security of the proposed draft-11 post-handshake authentication mechanism in
the context of all previous modes.
For our analysis, we use the Tamarin prover [6], a state-of-the-art tool for the symbolic
analysis of security protocols. The Tamarin framework enables us to specify and analyse
the secrecy and authentication properties of the various handshake modes. Furthermore,
1We note that since the release of draft-10, the TLS 1.3 protocol has undergone many changes. The
work presented in the next chapter of this thesis analyses draft-21, a near-final version of the protocol.
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Tamarin’s multiset-rewriting semantics are well-suited for modelling the complex transition
system implied by the TLS 1.3 specification; the tool allows for the analysis of the interaction
of the assorted handshake modes and the resulting infinite loops that may occur, as well
as an unbounded number of concurrent TLS sessions. We note here that this thesis
will not delve into the tool’s theoretical foundations; we employ the tool as a means of
analysing the TLS 1.3 protocol and hence only provide as much detail as is necessary for the
understanding of this analysis. A formal treatment of Tamarin’s theoretical foundations
can be found in [141], [107] and [142].
Our analysis considers a Dolev-Yao adversary: an adversary that is able to observe network
messages, alter and drop these messages, and possibly inject their own messages into the
network, i.e., an adversary that has complete control of the network. Our adversary is
also capable of revealing the long-term private keys of honest protocol participants. Our
Tamarin model includes both the client authentication mechanism as well as session
resumption. The OPTLS analysis did not include these components so our property
specifications go well beyond the basic session key secrecy considered in [91].
We find that draft-10 achieves the standard goals of authenticated key exchange. In
particular, we show that a client has assurances regarding the secrecy of the established
session key, as well as assurances regarding the identity of the server with whom it has
established this key. The server obtains equivalent assurances when authenticating the
client in the standard way, i.e., as part of an initial handshake, and when using the newly
introduced 0-RTT mechanism. Our analysis confirms perfect forward secrecy of session keys
and also covers the properties of handshake integrity (transcript agreement) and secrecy
of early data keys. We verify these desirable properties in the presence of composable
handshake modes and for an unbounded number of concurrent TLS sessions, something
which had not been done in previous TLS 1.3 analyses.
Our exploration of the initial proposal for a post-handshake client authentication mechanism
[123] resulted in the discovery of an attack. Specifically, an adversary is able to impersonate a
client when communicating with a server owing to a vulnerability in the client authentication
mechanism of the PSK-resumption handshake. Our attack highlights the strict necessity of
creating a binding between consecutive TLS 1.3 handshakes.
Related Work. The 0-RTT mechanism of OPTLS, and hence of TLS 1.3, is similar to
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that of Google’s Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC) protocol [93]. Lychev et al.
introduce a security model for what they term Quick Connections (QC) protocols and
analyse QUIC within this framework [98]. Although they do not focus on TLS 1.3, they do
point out that the 0-RTT mode of TLS 1.3, as described in draft-10, fits the definition of
a QC protocol. Fischlin and Gu¨nther also provide an analysis of QUIC [60] by developing
a Bellare-Rogaway style model [23] for multi-stage key exchange protocols.
The TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol can be viewed as a multi-stage key exchange protocol
because the communicating parties establish multiple session keys during an exchange,
potentially using one key to derive another. In work by Dowling et al. [54], two TLS 1.3
drafts, specifically draft-05 and draft-dh are analysed using the multi-stage framework.
Although the authors showed that keys output by the Handshake Protocol could be securely
used by the Record Protocol, at the time of writing, the TLS drafts did not include a
0-RTT mode and resumption had not yet been merged with the PSK mode. Kohlweiss et
al. also produced an analysis of draft-05 using a constructive-cryptography approach [85].
Although there were changes including a reduction in handshake latency, removal of
renegotiation and a switch to AEAD ciphers in the earlier drafts of TLS 1.3, it is not until
draft-07, with the encroaching influence of OPTLS, that we see a shift in the design of
the protocol away from TLS 1.2. Hence, the results described above do not easily transfer
to later drafts.
In concurrent work to ours, Li et al. analyse draft-10 in the computational setting using
their multi-level&stage security model which examines the composition of the various
TLS 1.3 handshake modes [95]. Their work, however, does not include the proposed
post-handshake authentication mechanism (not surprising as this was not part of the
draft-10 specification). In an update on their previous computational analysis, Dowling
et al. released results on draft-10 at a similar time to our work [55]. Their work shows
the initial (EC)DHE handshake to be secure in the multi-stage key exchange model. To
our knowledge, ours is the first published work examining TLS 1.3 in the symbolic setting,
and indeed the first to consider the full interaction of the various components of TLS 1.3.2
2Work relating to later drafts of TLS 1.3 will be covered in Chapter 7.
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We now present the notation, concepts and definitions used throughout this chapter,
including a description of symbolic analysis as well as an introduction to the Tamarin
prover [6], covering the fundamentals necessary for the understanding of our TLS 1.3
analysis.
6.2.1 Symbolic Analysis
Symbolic analysis is one means by which to analyse critical security protocols such as
TLS. Other methods include inspecting concrete implementations of the protocol (program
verification), or producing what are traditionally thought of as “pen and paper security
proofs” via computational analysis. In the symbolic model, introduced by Needham and
Schroeder [112] and Dolev and Yao [53], cryptographic primitives are represented as function
symbols, and messages are represented by abstract terms on these symbols (as opposed to
bitstrings). For instance, a symmetric encryption primitive could be represented by the
two function symbols enc and dec, and encryption and decryption of a message m under a
key k is modelled using the following equality:
dec(enc(m,k), k) = m.
All cryptographic primitives are modelled in this fashion, using the appropriate function
symbols and specifying the necessary equations. A consequence of this approach is that
all primitives are considered to be perfect, meaning that the only operations possible are
those that satisfy the specified primitive equations, as in the encryption example above.
An adversary would not be able to learn anything about the length of the message being
encrypted, for instance. We expound more on this notion of perfect cryptography in Section
6.2.2.
In the symbolic model, all honest protocol participants, as well as the adversary, only have
access to the primitives (and equations) which have been specified. This is in contrast
to the popular computational model in which primitives are modelled as functions from
bitstrings to bitstrings, and where all network actors may invoke equalities which have not
been explicitly specified. We do not go into detail here concerning the differences between
the symbolic model and the computational model – a more considered treatment of the
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differences between these two models is given in [36].
As pointed out in [36], security properties generally fall into one of two categories, namely,
trace properties and equivalence properties. Trace properties are properties that can be
defined for each possible run of the protocol; a trace property is satisfied when it holds
for each applicable run of the protocol. Equivalence properties capture the ability of
an adversary to distinguish between two processes, or two instantiations of a protocol.3
Symbolic analysis typically concerns itself with trace properties, making it well-suited to
automation, and indeed, many automated symbolic analysis tools have come to the fore in
recent years, including the Scyther [5], ProVerif [4] and Tamarin [6] tools. We note
that automated tools are also available for the computational setting, see CryptoVerif [1]
for instance, but these are not the focus of this chapter.
We elaborate on the concepts described above and make them more concrete by introducing
the Tamarin tool.
6.2.2 Tamarin Fundamentals
The Tamarin specification language facilitates the construction of highly detailed models
of security protocols, their security requirements, and powerful Dolev-Yao-style attackers.
The Tamarin prover takes as input the security protocol model, a specification of the
adversary, and a specification of the protocol’s desired properties. It then attempts to
construct a proof showing that the protocol meets the specified properties in the presence
of the specified attacker, even when arbitrarily many interleaved protocol executions are
instantiated.
The steps required for analysing a protocol with the Tamarin prover include: (i) building an
abstract model of the protocol using the tool’s specification language, including modelling
honest protocol participants, as well as the network-controlling adversary, (ii) encoding the
desired protocol security properties, also using the Tamarin specification language, and
(iii) constructing proofs for the specified properties within the Tamarin framework.
As a precursor to our TLS 1.3 analysis, we introduce the Tamarin specification language
3This is what is known as indistinguishability in the computational model.
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and discuss these three steps by first considering a simpler network protocol, namely the
Basic Station-to-Station (STS) protocol introduced by Diffie, van Oorschot and Wiener [52],
depicted in Figure 6.1.
C S
gx
gy, {sigS(gy, gx)}
{sigC(gx, gy)}
Figure 6.1: The Basic Station-to-Station (STS) Protocol. Brackets of the type {} indicate
encryption under a key, k, which is shared by C and S.
We assume that entities make use of known, system-wide Diffie-Hellman parameters p and
g. The parameter p is a large prime and g is a generator of the multiplicative group of
integers modulo p. We also assume that entities have access to the public keys of peers via
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The client, C, generates a Diffie-Hellman exponent,
x, and sends its key share, gx, to the server, S. Upon receipt of the client’s key share,
the server generates a Diffie-Hellman exponent, y, as well as its key share, gy. The server
computes a shared key, k, from the value (gx)y and signs (gy, gx) using its private key.
The server sends this signature to the client encrypted under k, along with its key share,
gy. Upon receipt of the server’s key share, the client computes k from (gy)x and decrypts
the signature sent by the server. The client then uses the server’s public key to verify the
server’s signature on (gy, gx). The client signs (gx, gy) using its public key and encrypts
this signature using k. Upon receipt of this message from the client, the server decrypts
and verifies the client signature.
The STS protocol was constructed to overcome the well-known Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attack against Diffie-Hellman key agreement [52]. In addition to providing secrecy of the
shared key k, or any other session key derived from (gx)y, the protocol provides mutual
authentication of the communicating entities. This thwarts the attack against the classic
Diffie-Hellman protocol in which an adversary exploits the lack of entity authentication to
establish distinct session keys with C and S, respectively, with both parties being none the
wiser.
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We now explain how the STS protocol can be analysed within the Tamarin framework,
describing how we (i) build a model, (ii) encode security properties and (iii) construct
proofs to verify these properties. We introduce all of the necessary Tamarin concepts for
the execution of each of these steps prior to describing the STS example.
6.2.2.1 Modelling
A Tamarin model defines a labelled transition system whose state space comprises a
multiset or “bag” of facts, representing the adversary’s knowledge, messages on the network,
and the state of protocol participants, respectively. The permissible state transitions
are specified by Tamarin rules which encode the behaviour of protocol participants, as
well as adversarial capabilities. A sequence of state transitions within the model gives
rise to a trace – the sequence of labels produced upon instantiation of the model rules.
Rules and facts make up the basic ingredients necessary for building an abstract model in
Tamarin, along with terms and equational theories. The role of each of these elements in
the modelling process will be made clear in the subsections to follow:
Facts and Rules. The concept of terms in symbolic analysis was introduced above in
Section 6.2.1 – these are how we model cryptographic messages and quantities. Facts are
of the form F(t1,t2,...,tn) where F is a fact symbol and the ti are terms. Facts are
fundamental to the concept of Tamarin rules, which we introduce by considering the
Fresh rule:
rule Fresh:
[ ]--[ ]->[ Fr(˜x) ]
Tamarin rules consist of three respective parts: a left-hand side ([ ]), actions ([ ]), and
a right-hand side ([ Fr(˜x) ]). The rules are used to define a transition system, whose
global state is maintained as a multiset of facts. The initial state of the transition system
is the empty multiset. A rule can only be executed if all the facts on its left-hand side are
available in the current state. When a rule is executed, it will consume the facts on the
left, i.e., remove them from the global state, and produce facts on the right, i.e., add them
to the global state. This “rewriting” of the state sometimes leads us to refer to Tamarin
rules as rewrite rules. Facts are either linear or persistent. While linear facts model limited
resources that cannot be consumed more times than they are produced, persistent facts
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model unlimited resources, which can be consumed any number of times once they have
been produced. In the Fresh rule above there are no premises (left-hand side facts) or
actions, and every execution of the rule produces a single linear Fr(˜x) fact. Only the
Fresh rule can produce Fr facts and each of these facts will be unique and will represent a
discrete value within the Tamarin framework. Use of the ∼ symbol denotes a variable
of the type Fresh. Other variable types include Public, denoted by $, and Temporal,
denoted by #.
Actions do not influence transitions but are “logged” when rules are triggered as a means
of incrementally constructing observable labels for use in traces, which in turn represent
a record of a specific execution. Actions are used to express security properties, thereby
forming the glue between the defined transition system and the specified protocol properties.
In Tamarin there are three special types of facts: Fr facts, as described above, In facts
and Out facts. Whereas Fr facts model the generation of unique, fresh values, In facts
and Out facts model interaction with an untrusted network. An In fact models a protocol
participant receiving a message from the untrusted network, a message that has potentially
been manipulated by a network-controlling (Dolev-Yao) adversary. An Out fact models a
protocol participant sending a message to the untrusted network, where it could potentially
be manipulated by a Dolev-Yao adversary. In facts can only be present on the left-hand
side of Tamarin rewrite rules, and Out facts can only occur on the right-hand side of
Tamarin rewrite rules. The Fresh rule described above is a built-in Tamarin rule, and
the tool also contains sets of adversary rules which consume Out facts and produce In
facts, modelling how an adversary may interact with, and manipulate, network messages.
Cryptographic Primitives. The ability to model cryptographic protocols requires the
representation of cryptographic primitives. In the symbolic setting, we model cryptographic
functionality using functions and sets of equations that describe the relationship between
these functions. In Tamarin, symmetric encryption, for instance, is modelled using two
binary functions, senc and sdec, and an equation of the form
sdec(senc(m, k), k) = m
where k is a shared secret key and m is a message. Hence, symbolically, the term senc(m, k)
can be combined with k to recover m. Without explicitly defining a rule that allows the
adversary to obtain the shared secret k, there is no way for the adversary to learn k and
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rule Gen_keypair:
[ Fr(˜ltkA) ]--[ GenLtk($A, ˜ltkA)
]->
[ !Ltk($A, ˜ltkA), !Pk($A, pk(˜ltkA))]
rule Reveal_Ltk:
[ !Ltk($A, ˜ltkA) ] --[ RevLtk($A) ]-> [ Out(˜ltkA) ]
Figure 6.2: Tamarin PKI rules for the STS protocol.
recover m. In other words, as is to be expected, the symmetric encryption equational theory
does not allow for the adversarial extraction of k from senc(m,k) – there is no defined
equation describing this type of extraction.
As certain primitives are used repeatedly across many cryptographic protocols, there
are built-in definitions for them. The Tamarin built-ins include equational theories for
Diffie-Hellman group operations, asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption, digital
signatures and hashing.
Perfect Cryptography. The use of Tamarin built-ins results in the abstraction that
cryptographic primitives are perfect, as is to be expected in the symbolic model. For
example, the encryption mechanism reveals nothing about the underlying plaintext since all
cryptographic inputs and outputs are considered to be abstract quantities, without being
sampled with a specific length or from a specified distribution. Similarly, signatures are
unforgeable, hash functions act as random oracles (with zero collision probability), MACs
are unforgeable, and all parties generate truly random values. The assumption of perfect
cryptography is common in the symbolic setting, however, it is indeed possible to model
weak primitives. We could, for example, introduce rules which let the adversary create
signature forgeries, or MAC forgeries, but all weaknesses and flaws need to be explicitly
defined.
We present the rules necessary for modelling the STS protocol in Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
Our first client rule generates a fresh Diffie-Hellman exponent (Fr[˜a]), logs actions
Start(˜a, $C, ’client’) and DH($C, ˜a), and sends the client’s key share out to the
network (Out(<$C,’g’ˆ˜a>)). The rules to follow become somewhat more complex as long-
term keys are retrieved from the PKI rules, and as data items are encrypted and signed using
the Tamarin builtins – see senc{sign{<’g’ˆ˜b, ckeyshare>}˜ltkS}k in the Server_1
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rule Client_1:
[ Fr(˜a)
]
--[ C1(˜a)
, Start(˜a, $C, ’client’)
, DH($C, ˜a)
]->
[ Client_1($C, ˜a)
, Out(<$C,’g’ˆ˜a>)
]
rule Client_2:
let
k = skeyshareˆ˜a
in
[ Client_1($C, ˜a)
, !Ltk($C, ˜ltkC)
, !Pk(S, pk(˜ltkS))
, In(<S, skeyshare, s_encryptedsignature>)
]
--[ C2(˜a)
, Neq(S, $C)
, Eq(verify(sdec{s_encryptedsignature}k, <skeyshare, ’g’ˆ˜a>,
pk(˜ltkS)), true)
, SessionKey($C, S, k, ’authenticated’)
, SignC(’g’ˆ˜a, skeyshare)
, Running($C, S, ’client’, ’g’ˆ˜a, skeyshare)
, Commit($C, S, ’client’, ’g’ˆ˜a, skeyshare)
]->
[ Client_2($C, S, ˜a, skeyshare, k)
, Out(senc{sign{<’g’ˆ˜a, skeyshare>}˜ltkS}k)
]
Figure 6.3: Tamarin client rules for the STS protocol.
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rule Server_1:
let
k = ckeyshareˆ˜b
in
[ Fr(˜b)
, !Ltk($S, ˜ltkS)
, In(<C,ckeyshare>)
]
--[ S1(˜b)
, Start(˜b, $S, ’server’)
, UseSessionKey(C,k)
, Neq($S, C)
, SignS(’g’ˆ˜b, ckeyshare)
, Running($S, C, ’server’, ’g’ˆ˜b, ckeyshare)
]->
[ Server_1($S, C, ˜b, ckeyshare, k)
, Out(<$S,’g’ˆ˜b, senc{sign{<’g’ˆ˜b, ckeyshare>}˜ltkS}k>)
]
rule Server_2:
[ Server_1($S, C, ˜b, ckeyshare, k)
, !Pk(C, pk(˜ltkC))
, In(c_encryptedsignature)
]
--[ S2(˜b)
, Eq(verify(sdec{c_encryptedsignature}k, <ckeyshare, ’g’ˆ˜b>,
pk(˜ltkC)), true)
, SessionKey($S, C, k,’authenticated’)
, Commit($S, C, ’server’, ’g’ˆ˜b, ckeyshare)
]->
[ Server_2($S, C, ˜b, ckeyshare, k)
]
Figure 6.4: Tamarin server rules for the STS protocol.
146
6.2 Preliminaries
rule, for instance. The senc and sign constructs use the keys k and ˜ltkS to encrypt and
sign data items, respectively. Decryption and subsequent verfication of the encrypted signa-
tures occur by applying the sdec function, and by checking that the signature verification re-
turns a true result (Eq(verify(sdec{c_encryptedsignature}k, <ckeyshare, ’g’ˆ˜b>,
pk(˜ltkC)), true)). State transitions within the model occur via the production and
subsequent consumption of state facts. The Client_1 rule produces the Client_1($C, ˜a)
state fact. In order for the next client rule, Client_2, to fire, this fact needs to be consumed
by the left-hand side of the second client rule, which indeed it is. This ‘passing’ of state
facts within the model gives rise to the model transition system. The rule actions serve as
labels for the state transitions, thereby creating a labelled transition system.
6.2.2.2 Encoding Security Properties
In order to prove security properties within the Tamarin framework, properties need
to be encoded using the Tamarin specification language. In Tamarin, this is done by
constructing what are known as Tamarin lemmas. These lemmas are specified in a guarded
fragment of first-order logic, allowing for quantification over messages and timepoints, and
the resultant logic formulae are considered across applicable traces.
As pointed out in Section 6.2.1, properties fall into one of two categories: trace or equivalence
properties. A trace property is satisfied when it holds for all applicable execution traces
of the protocol. Equivalence properties allow for the encoding of more nuanced security
properties since these capture the ability of an adversary to distinguish between two
processes, or two instantiations of the protocol. Symbolic tools, in general, focus on proving
trace properties as the automation of equivalence properties is more difficult to achieve.4
Tamarin also offers a mechanism for restricting the traces considered. We discuss these
restrictions shortly.
Lemmas. Since Tamarin formulae are specified in a fragment of first-order logic they
offer the usual connectives (where & and | denote and and or, respectively), quantifiers All
and Ex, and timepoint ordering <. In formulae, the prefix # denotes that the variable to
follow is of type timepoint. The expression Action(args)@t denotes that Action(args)
is logged in the action trace at point t, resulting from an instantiation of a rule.
4This is true for the Tamarinprover, however, recent work [20] has extended the tool to accommodate
the proving of equivalence properties.
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We use the Tamarin property language to encode different kinds of properties as Tamarin
lemmas. These can include, for example, basic state reachability tests as well as security
properties. Constructing state reachability lemmas is an important part of the symbolic
analysis process – ensuring that each state within the model is reachable ensures that
property lemmas will indeed be considered across all applicable traces, and we are also
provided with some assurances regarding the correctness of our model. The successful
execution of state reachability tests instils confidence in the model’s state machine, which
in turn serves as a valuable resource when it comes to proving protocol properties. In order
to perform state reachability tests, it is convenient to temporarily remove the network-
controlling adversary from the model. In other words, we would like to ensure the existence
of a secure channel between honest protocol participants. We do this by replacing In
and Out facts with AuthMessage facts. For instance, AuthMessage($A, $B, m) represents
sending message m from $A to $B in a secure fashion as the AuthMessage facts will only
be passed from honest party rule to honest party rule and will never become adversary
knowledge since In and Out facts are never consumed or produced.
Restrictions. The Tamarin tool also allows for the specification of restrictions. These
restrict the set of traces considered during analysis. For example, the following restriction
instructs the Tamarin tool to only consider traces where the specified equality check
succeeds:
restriction Equality_Check_Succeeds:
"All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @ i ==> x = y"
We typically use restrictions to avoid traces where protocol participants initiate sessions
with themselves, or where large numbers of key pairs are generated for a single protocol
participant as this may make it difficult to isolate the correct key pair for the protocol
thread under analysis.
In order to check correctness of our STS Tamarin model, we replace the In(m) and Out(m)
facts with AuthMessage($C, $S, m) to construct reachability lemmas. When checking
reachability we employ the following restriction, where ACTOR can be C or S, respectively,
and * represents the state label (i.e., 1 or 2):
restriction At_most_1_of_ACTOR*:
"All #i #j tid1 tid2. ACTOR*(tid1)@#i & ACTOR*(tid)@#j ==> #i = #j"
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This ensures that we only ever instantiate one client and one server. We can then write
simple reachability lemmas of the form:
lemma exists_ACTOR*:
exists-trace
"Ex tid #i. ACTOR*(tid)@i"
This lemma simply checks whether or not the action ACTOR*(tid) is triggered (for a
particular thread identifier, tid), which corresponds to the protocol participant ACTOR
reaching state *. Our STS model gives rise to the simple state machine presented in Figure
6.5. We check the above lemma for all states so as to confirm that all states in our state
machine are reachable. The verification of lemmas in Tamarin will be discussed in the
next section, Section 6.2.2.3.
C0start
C1
C2
S0start
S1
S2
Client 1 Server 1
Client 2 Server 2
Figure 6.5: Simple state diagram for the STS protocol, as encoded in our STS Tamarin
model.
The trace properties typically considered in the analysis of Authenticated Key Exchange
(AKE) protocols include secrecy and authentication. In the case of the STS protocol, we
would like to show that the shared key k, is known only to the honest protocol participants.
We encode this secrecy property in the following lemma:
lemma session_key_secrecy:
(1) "All actor peer k #i.
(2) SessionKey(actor, peer, k,’authenticated’)@i
(3) & not ((Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r & #r < #i)
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(actor)@r & #r < #i))
(4) ==> not Ex #j. K(k)@j"
This lemma requires that for all protocol behaviours, and for all variables listed in (1), if
an authenticated session key is accepted (encoded in the SessionKey action) (2), and the
adversary has not revealed the long-term keys of honest protocol participants (3), then the
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adversary does not the know the key, k (4) (adversarial knowledge is encoded via the K()
construct). Typically, secrecy is represented as the adversary not having knowledge of a
data item, which is in this case the shared session key.
We would also like to show that the protocol participants have some guarantees regarding
the identity of their communication partners. Although this general notion of entity
authentication provides an intuitive understanding of the property, it is more instructive
to consider Lowe’s more granular set of definitions for authentication [97]. Lowe constructs
a hierarchy of authentication properties, starting with basic aliveness, running all the way
through to full agreement. The weakest authentication property, aliveness, captures the
notion that at some point, protocol participants were engaged in a run of the protocol. The
strongest authentication property, full agreement, captures the notion that both protocol
participants agree on all possible data items that could have been exchanged, or created
as a result of the exchange, during a run of the protocol, and that there is a one-to-one
relationship between the protocol runs, i.e., every protocol run of the initiator corresponds
to a unique run of the protocol by the responder. Prior to reaching full agreement in the
hierarchy, we encounter Lowe’s notions of agreement and injective agreement. Agreement
guarantees that protocol participants agree on a set of data items (not necessarily all
possible data items), and injective agreement, whilst also providing agreement, additionally
incorporates the one-to-one protocol run condition. Hence, full agreement is injective
agreement expanded to cover all possible data items. Each of Lowe’s authentication
properties can be strengthened by incorporating a notion of recentness – this incorporates
the additional requirement that protocol participants are currently running the protocol.
This is achieved by participants agreeing on fresh values, such as nonces, timestamps or
sequence numbers.
These agreement-style notions are typically used for capturing authentication properties
in symbolic analysis, and in our STS example, an authentication lemma (encoded as an
agreement-style property) may look like this:
lemma entity_authentication:
(1) "All actor peer keyshare1 keyshare2 #i.
(2) Commit(actor, peer, ’server’, keyshare1, keyshare2)@i
(3) & not ((Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r) | (Ex #r. RevLtk(actor)@r))
(4) ==> (Ex #j. Running(peer, actor, ’client’, keyshare2, keyshare1)@j
(5) & #j < #i)"
This lemma requires that for all protocol behaviours, and for all variables listed on the
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first line (1), that when a server logs that it has observed certain key shares (2), and the
long-term key of neither party has been revealed (3), then there existed a thread of the
peer, running as the client, that agreed on these key shares at an earlier point in time (5).
This corresponds to Lowe’s notion of agreement.
6.2.2.3 Constructing Proofs
The Tamarin verification algorithm is based on constraint solving and multiset-rewriting
techniques. A proof for a property, encoded as a guarded first-order logic formula, is
constructed using a backwards search over applicable traces to check satisfiability of the
formula. This is done by considering the negation of the encoded property as a constraint
solving problem. If the constraints cannot be met, the property cannot be negated, and
hence the property holds. If the constraints can be met, then we have a counterexample,
which typically constitutes an attack. In other words, a proof consists of showing that the
logic statement holds across all applicable traces.
In proving our secrecy lemma for the STS protocol, the Tamarin tool attempts to find a
contradiction – a state in which SessionKey(...)@i and K(k)@j hold, without the long-
term keys of honest participants having been revealed. The tool starts by considering all
states in which the SessionKey(...) action occurs. This action may be present in multiple
states. Using the process outlined above, the Tamarin prover then works backwards
through applicable traces until either a contradiction is found, or the applicable traces
are shown to be contradiction-free. In more detail, Tamarin’s proof state is a collection
of constraints that represent partial information concerning a set of traces in which the
negated property may indeed hold. The tool uses constraint solving techniques and case
distinctions in an attempt to collect enough information to either establish that the set is
empty, or to construct a member of set, i.e., a counterexample. It is also possible for the
tool to make use of previously proven properties (lemmas) whilst trying to prove the current
property; the backwards search may trigger a previously proven property and conclude that
the current property holds. This behaviour is extremely advantageous when attempting
to prove properties for complicated protocols. Being able to prove, and subsequently use,
auxiliary lemmas allows for a modular approach to proving security properties within the
Tamarin framework.
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Figure 6.6: Tamarin verification of the STS secrecy lemma via the tool’s command line
option.
Tamarin also allows for the construction of proofs via induction5 – instead of employing
backwards reasoning, i.e., deriving information about earlier states by starting with later
states, the tool is able to reason forwards by making assumptions about earlier states to
derive information about later states. We do not describe the specialised mechanism by
which this is achieved in Tamarin, a thorough treatment of the topic is provided in [107].
Invoking Tamarin’s support for inductive proofs is remarkably useful when trying to prove
properties about protocols which may exhibit looping behaviour (such as TLS).
In Tamarin a proof can be obtained in one of two ways: First, Tamarin has a fully
automated mode that performs the proof search. If the automated proof search terminates,
then the tool either returns a proof of correctness or a counter-example, demonstrating an
attack against the property in question. However, as the correctness of security protocols is
an undecidable problem,6 the tool may not terminate for a given verification problem. In this
case, users have the second option of turning to Tamarin’s interactive mode, comprising an
extensive graphical user interface that enables the visualisation and interactive construction
of proofs. Manually guiding the tool through its backwards search employs the user’s
intimate knowledge of the modelled protocol to verify a property more efficiently than
would be done via the Tamarin heuristics employed in the tool’s automated mode. This
greatly improves the likelihood of termination.
Using Tamarin’s automated proof search for the STS secrecy lemma results in verification
of the lemma in 47 steps, as displayed when calling the Tamarin prover from the command
line. This result is depicted in Figure 6.6. Using the graphical interface allows for interaction
with Tamarin graphs, as depicted in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. In these graphs, green boxes
represent model rules, with premises (left-hand side facts) and conclusions (right-hand side
facts) on the top and the bottom, respectively. Grey arrows represent premise sources, and
5Tamarin supports a limited form of inductive reasoning. Induction can be performed over actions
arising from user-defined rules, and not over built-in adversary rules.
6A problem is undecidable if it is impossible to construct an algorithm that consistently returns a correct
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the problem.
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Figure 6.7: Partial Tamarin graph for the STS secrecy lemma. The adversary will attempt
to construct the In fact of the Client 2 rule from information that it might learn from
the network.
grey bubbles represent adversary goals. We note that the graphs presented in Figures 6.7
and 6.8 were constructed during an early phase of the lemma proof process, and hence
they are not populated with many elements. Graphs such as these are generated by
user-selection of which goal (typically a premise source or an adversary goal) should be
solved by the tool.
Figure 6.8: Excerpt from a partial Tamarin graph for the STS secrecy lemma. Red
arrows represent the adversary obtaining information from the network, and then possibly
being able to use this information to construct future rule premises, represented by dashed
arrows.
The full STS Tamarin security protocol theory (.spthy) file is given in Appendix A. The
authentication lemmas given in the file are also auto-provable.7
7It is possible to capture simple protocols and their properties in Tamarin with a few rules and lemmas.
More complex protocols, such as TLS, require vastly more rules, and many more lemmas.
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6.2.2.4 Tamarin for TLS
The Tamarin prover inherently supports non-monotonic state, i.e., a state which need not
necessarily grow after each rule is executed, and is thus ideal for the analysis of complex
protocols exhibiting branches and loops. Monotonic state provers, such as the ProVerif
tool [4], struggle with loops because all facts are persistent and therefore once added
to the state space, cannot be removed or overwritten, a feature which complicates the
representation of looping as this necessitates the overwriting of facts. Also, since facts
cannot be removed in monotonic state provers, support for ephemeral values is limited.
This is not the case in Tamarin. Non-monotonic state, together with Tamarin’s multiset-
rewriting semantics provides the tool’s support for branching. Moreover, the Tamarin
prover offers state-of-the-art symbolic Diffie-Hellman support, making it very useful in the
analysis of Diffie-Hellman-based protocols such as TLS. An in-depth explanation of the
tool’s support for Diffie-Hellman key exchange can be found in [142].
6.3 draft-10 Analysis
Using the Tamarin framework, we build a formal model of the Handshake and Record
protocols of draft-10 of TLS 1.3. The Tamarin tool is well-suited for the analysis
of TLS 1.3 for several reasons: First, Tamarin’s multiset-rewriting semantics enable
a direct specification of the complex state machines of TLS 1.3, including the complex
interactions between all of the handshake modes. Second, its state-of-the-art support for
Diffie-Hellman allows for a high degree of precision in modelling the protocol. Third, its
property specification language lets us model the TLS 1.3 security properties intuitively
and accurately.
Our aim is to verify the properties of TLS 1.3 as an AKE protocol. Details concerning the
various TLS 1.3 handshake modes, as well as the protocol’s desired security properties, are
given in Chapter 2; for ease of readability, we repeat these details here (see Figure 6.9 for
handshake modes).
The TLS 1.3 draft-10 security properties include:
154
6.3 draft-10 Analysis
C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
HelloRetryRequest
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare,
{EncryptedExtensions}, {ServerConfiguration*},
{Certificate}, {CertificateRequest*},
{CertificateVerify}, {Finished}
{Certificate*}, {CertificateVerify*}, {Finished}
[Application data]
(a) draft-10 (EC)DHE handshake
C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare, EarlyDataIndication,
(EncryptedExtensions), (Certificate*),
(Certificate Verify*), (ApplicationData)
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare, EarlyDataIndication,
{EncryptedExtensions}, {ServerConfiguration*},
{Certificate}, {CertificateRequest*},
{CertificateVerify}, {Finished}
{Finished}
[Application data]
(b) draft-10 0-RTT handshake
C S
Initial handshake (see Figure 2.4)
[NewSessionTicket]
[Application data]
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare, PreSharedKeyExtension
ServerHello, PreSharedKeyExtension,
{EncryptedExtensions}, {Finished}
{Finished}
[Application data]
(c) draft-10 PSK resumption handshake
Figure 6.9: Handshake modes for draft-10.
155
6.3 draft-10 Analysis
1. Secrecy of Session Keys. Upon completion of the handshake, the client and the
server should have established a set of session keys which are known to the client
and the server only.
2. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). In the case of compromise of either party’s
long-term key material, sessions completed before the compromise should remain
secure. This property is not claimed to hold in the PSK-only handshake mode, nor
in the 0-RTT handshake mode.
In a PSK-only handshake, if compromised, the PSK could be used to decrypt all
messages previously protected by the PSK. In the 0-RTT case, the client is the only
party to have provided freshness, therefore early data messages may be replayed. In
addition, the security of the early data depends on the semi-static (elliptic curve)
Diffie-Hellman share, which may have a considerable validity period, and therefore
a large attack window. For these reasons, early data cannot be considered to be
forward secure.
3. Peer (Entity) Authentication. In the case of unilateral authentication, upon
completion of the handshake, if a client C believes it is communicating with a server S,
then it is indeed S who is in the server role. An analogous property for the server also
holds in the mutual authentication case. Authentication of the server is mandatory
in all handshake modes. Mutual authentication, i.e., additional authentication of the
client, is optional.
4. Integrity of Handshake Messages. An active attacker should not be able to
successfully tamper with the handshake messages, potentially causing the client and
the server to adopt weak cipher suites.
Specifically, we would like to show that TLS 1.3 meets the listed properties in the presence
of a Dolev-Yao adversary, and that all of the desired security properties hold when the
interaction of all of the TLS 1.3 components is considered.
As with the STS protocol, we analyse the TLS 1.3 protocol using the Tamarin tool by (i)
building an abstract model of the protocol, (ii) encoding the desired security properties
as Tamarin lemmas, and (iii) constructing proofs for the specified properties using the
Tamarin verification algorithm.
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6.3.1 Building the Model
6.3.1.1 Constructing Model Rules
Modelling TLS 1.3 in Tamarin involves depicting the protocol as sequence of Tamarin
rules, which capture client, server and adversary actions alike. In the case of legitimate
clients and servers, our constructed model rules generally correspond to all processing
actions associated with respective flights of messages. For instance, our first client rule
captures a client generating and sending all necessary parameters as part of the first flight
of an (EC)DHE handshake, as well as transitioning to the next client state within the model.
In Figure 6.10, the let...in block allows us to perform basic variable substitutions. In
practice, this is useful for enforcing the type of variables, such as C = $C, or for keeping the
rule computations logically separated. We use the variable tid to name the newly created
client thread. The action DH(C,˜a) allows us to map the private Diffie-Hellman exponent
˜a to the client C. The Start(tid, C, ’client’) action signifies the instantiation of the
client C in the role of ’client’ and the Running(C, S, ’client’, nc) action indicates
that the client C has initiated a run of the protocol with the server S, using the fresh value
nc as the client_random value as specified in TLS 1.3. The C1 action simply marks the
occurrence of the C_1 rule with its associated tid. The St_C_1_init fact encodes the
local state of thread tid, which doubles as a program counter by allowing the client to
recall sending the first message in thread tid. The Out fact represents sending the first
client message to the network, after which it becomes adversarial knowledge.8
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 capture all relevant model rules and represent the union of all the
options that a client and a server have in a single execution. We explain the client-side
behaviour and map it to the corresponding transitions while briefly mentioning the intended
server interaction: The client can initiate three types of handshake, namely, an (EC)DHE
handshake (C_1), a PSK handshake (C_1_PSK) and a 0-RTT handshake (C_1_KC); we
use KC (an abbreviation for Known Configuration) to denote 0-RTT handshakes. In the
(EC)DHE handshake, the server may reject the client parameters due to a possible mismatch,
whereafter the client needs to provide new parameters (C_1_retry). Additionally, the
client may optionally authenticate in the 0-RTT case (C_1_KC_Auth). While the (EC)DHE
and 0-RTT handshakes only have a single continuation (respectively C_2 and C_2_KC),
8The increase in complexity in comparison to the first client rule of the STS example is an inevitable
consequence of modelling a much more complex protocol.
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rule C_1:
let
// Default C1 values
tid = ˜nc
// Client Hello
C = $C
nc = ˜nc
pc = $pc
S = $S
$
// Client Key Share
ga = ’g’ˆ˜a
messages = <nc, pc, ga>
in
[ Fr(nc)
, Fr(˜a)
]
--[ C1(tid)
, Start(tid, C, ’client’)
, Running(C, S, ’client’, nc)
, DH(C, ˜a)
]->
[ St_C_1_init(tid, C, nc, pc, S, ˜a, messages, ’no_auth’)
, Out(<C, nc, pc, ga>)
]
Figure 6.10: Rule C 1 in our Tamarin model of TLS 1.3 draft-10.
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c0start
c1−dhe
c1−psk
c1−kc
c2a c2 c3
ClientHello Receive Server-
Hello/Finished +
Send ClientFinished
Client
authentication
C 1
C 1 PSK
C 1 KC
C 2 PSK
C 2 PSK DHE
C 1 KC Auth
C 1 retry
C 2
C 2
KC
C 2 NoAuth
C 2 Auth C 3
C 3 NST
C send
C recv
Figure 6.11: Partial client state machine for draft-10 as modelled in our Tamarin analysis.
The diagram represents the union of all the options for a client in a single execution. Not
depicted are the additional transitions representing a client starting a new handshake using
either a PSK established by C_3_NST or a ServerConfiguration for a 0-RTT handshake.
Note that the C_1_KC_Auth edge may only occur once per handshake.
s0start
s1a−psk
s1a
s1 s2 s3
S 1
S 1 KC
S
1 KC
RecvAuth
S 1
PS
K
S
1
PS
K
DH
E S 1
PSK
AuthS 1 PSK
NoAuth
S 1
No
Au
thS
1 A
uth
Re
q
S 1 retry
S 2
S 2 RecvAuth
S 2 Auth
S 3
S 3 NST
S send
S recv
Process ClientHello +
Send ServerHello
Update authen-
tication state
Receive ClientFinished
(with authentication)
Update authen-
tication status
Figure 6.12: Partial server state machine for draft-10 as modelled in our Tamarin
analysis. The diagram represents the union of all the options for a server in a single
execution. Not depicted are the additional transitions representing a server starting a
new handshake using either a PSK established by S_3_NST or a ServerConfiguration
for a 0-RTT handshake. Note that the S_2_Auth edge may only occur at most once per
handshake.
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the PSK handshake has two different modes: plain PSK (C_2_PSK) and PSK with DHE
(C_2_PSK_DHE). The latter is used to obtain PFS guarantees by means of adding an
ephemeral (elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman value to the applicable key derivations.
We model the server as always requesting client authentication, but allow traces to capture
when the server accepts and both rejects authentication of the client. If the client decides to
authenticate, it sends the authentication messages along with the client Finished message
(C_2_Auth). Otherwise, only the Finished message is transmitted (C_2_NoAuth). The
handshake concludes with the client either receiving a new session ticket (C_3_NST), which
can be used for resumption in a later PSK handshake, or doing nothing (C_3). The client
can then proceed to send (C_Send) and receive (C_Recv) any finite number of application
data messages.
We note that the Figure 6.11 represents a ‘snapshot’ in time beyond the initial establishment
of a connection. Consequently, it lacks certain states and transitions in which the client,
or the server, responds to an established connection. We list the omissions here as rules
that can follow a previously executed rule, i.e., the rule given on the right-hand side of the
arrow can follow the rule given on the left-hand side of the arrow:
C_2→C_1_KC
C_2_KC→C_1_KC
S_1→S_1_KC
S_1_KC→S_1_KC
S_1→S_1_KC_RecvAuth
S_1_KC→S_1_KC_Recvauth
C_3_NST→C_1_PSK
S_3_NST→S_1_PSK
S_3_NST→S_1_PSK_DHE.
Configuration Parameters. We note that we simplify our model by treating certain
parameters as abstract quantities within the model. For example, the EncryptedExten-
sions message of a client in the 0-RTT handshake will be logically bundled together with
all other messages of this kind and represented by the single public value exts. However,
since these components comprise part of the handshake transcript, we establish whether
the client and the server agree on these values by the end of the handshake through the
transcript integrity property.
Alert Messages. We also do not explicitly model the TLS 1.3 alert protocol; our model
does not capture errors arising from deviations in the protocol that would result in the
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immediate termination of a connection (fatal alerts), or acknowledgements of a graceful
shutdown (closure alerts). From the perspective of our model, and the security properties
we are capturing, an alert and subsequent connection closure is equivalent to a trace which
simply does not have any subsequent actions beyond the point at which the connection
terminated.
Over-approximations. In certain situations, we assume that the client, or server, will
send the maximal message load. For example, the client will always send 0-RTT data in the
0-RTT case. Similarly, we model the server as always including a CertificateRequest
message in the first flight. However, the client does not always send authentication
parameters, and the server does not necessarily accept these parameters if sent. Therefore,
the possible traces we observe are equivalent to those in which the server optionally sends
the certificate request.
6.3.1.2 Managing Model Complexity
The complexity of TLS 1.3 presents an interesting challenge for automated symbolic analysis.
As Figures 6.11 and 6.12 demonstrate, the many handshake modes make for a large number
of state transitions. In software engineering, conditional branches are a fairly mundane part
of code. For example, the code might perform the check: “if received client authentication
then verify signature and set client status to authenticated else do nothing”. However, in
Tamarin we require two distinct state transitions representing these two possibilities. The
TLS 1.3 handshake exhibits such conditional branching. Ideally, branches in the protocol
would be represented by as few rules as possible, which can be done by merging some of the
resulting states into one. For example, by the end of the server’s first phase, the state needs
to contain a transcript of the received messages, the computed values of ss and es, and
the authentication status of the client. While all four handshake modes will compute these
values in a different way, from that point of computation onwards the server’s behaviour
does not depend on the handshake mode. Therefore these can be merged into the resulting
s1 state. With this approach, we can create simple rules that ensure the composability
of the various protocol modes and closely follow the original specification. For example,
the numbering of states (c1, c2, etc.) corresponds to message flights. In some cases, we
require two rules to construct a single message flight, e.g., C_2 and C_2_Auth, wherein a
client optionally adds a signature to its final handshake message.
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6.3.1.3 Examples of Complex Interactions
By defining the client and server rules as outlined above, we now have the ability to model
the interaction of an unbounded number of interleaved handshakes. That is, while we
express properties in terms of a specific client and a specific server, there may exist an
unbounded number of other interacting agents, which the adversary may additionally
compromise through possibly revealing their long-term keys. The adversary can then
impersonate these agents, leading to an increase in the number of possible interactions.
Also, consider the following scenario: a client and a server have derived session keys after
agreeing to use a PSK. We know that at some point the client must have authenticated
the server (assuming the PSK is not from the out-of-band mechanism). However, we
potentially need to resolve an unbounded number of handshakes before we arrive at the
initial handshake in which the client verified the server’s signature. The Tamarin prover
allows us to reason inductively about such scenarios, facilitating the verification of important
security properties that are typically out of reach of backwards unfolding.
Our full Tamarin model is available for inspection at [44].9
6.3.2 Encoding Security Properties
We now describe our threat model, and how we formally model the required TLS 1.3
security properties in Tamarin.
6.3.2.1 General Approach and Threat Model
Our aim is to analyse the core security properties of the TLS 1.3 protocol. Our work also
considers all of the possible complex interactions between the various handshake modes.
For these interactions, we prove both secrecy and authentication properties. Prior to our
analysis, the work on TLS 1.3 generally considered handshake modes in isolation.
The threat model that we consider in our analysis is an active network adversary that can
9This is a stable URL containing links to our draft-10 and draft-21 source code, as well as supple-
mentary material.
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compromise the long-term keys of agents. In particular, we consider adversaries that can
compromise the long-term keys of all agents after the thread under attack ends (to capture
PFS) as well as the long-term keys of agents that are not the actor or the intended peer of
the attacked thread, at any time (to capture Lowe-style MITM attacks and to contain the
consequences of long-term key compromise).
Similarly to standard AKE models, our threat model has two components: the Tamarin
rule that encodes the full capability (i.e., the ability to compromise an agent’s long-term
private key) and a restriction on the relevant security notion that prevents the adversary
from compromising all the keys (corresponding to the fresh or clean predicates in AKE
models [41]). We present the Reveal_Ltk rule here, and return to the restrictions when
we describe the specific properties:
rule Reveal_Ltk:
[ !Ltk($A, ˜ltkA) ] --[ RevLtk($A) ]-> [ Out(˜ltkA) ]
This rule can be triggered if a long-term private key ˜ltkA was previously generated
for the agent $A. The right-hand side of the rule encodes that ˜ltkA is sent on the
network, effectively adding it to the adversary’s knowledge. Additionally, we log the action
RevLtk($A), which enables us to restrict this capability in the property specifications.
Our model describes the behaviour of the TLS 1.3 protocol in the presence of an active
network adversary, and makes use of the standard perfect cryptography abstraction, as
outlined in Section 6.2.2.1. This view simplifies the proofs and enables the analysis of
many different security contexts. In the following two sections, we model and verify the
required secrecy and authentication properties.
6.3.2.2 Secrecy Properties
We formally model and analyse two main secrecy properties. The first is the secrecy of
session keys, implying perfect forward secrecy in the presence of an active adversary. The
formal property we wish to verify is given in the secret session keys lemma.
Intuitively, the property requires that for all protocol behaviours and for all possible values
of the variables on the first line (All) (1): if an authenticated session key k is accepted
(encoded by the occurrence of the SessionKey action) (2), and the adversary has not
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lemma secret_session_keys:
(1) "All actor peer role k #i.
(2) SessionKey(actor, peer, role, <k, ’authenticated’>)@i
(3) & not ((Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r & #r < #i)
|(Ex #r. RevLtk(actor)@r & #r < #i))
(4) ==> not Ex #j. KU(k)@j"
revealed the long-term private keys of the actor or the peer before the session key is
accepted (3), then the adversary cannot derive the key k (4).10
Our modelling of this property is very flexible: In the unilateral authentication mode,
only the client establishes a session key with the flag authenticated. In the mutual
authentication mode, both roles log this action. As we will see later, these actions are also
suitable for the more flexible post-handshake client authentication modes that will be part
of the final TLS 1.3 specification.
The second property that we prove is that the client’s early data keys are secure as long as
the long-term private key of the server is not revealed.
lemma secret_early_data_keys:
(1) "All actor peer k #i.
(2) EarlyDataKey(actor, peer, ’client’, k)@i
(3) & not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r)
(4) ==> not Ex #j. KU(k)@j"
In particular, each time (1) that a client logs production of an early data key (2) and the
peer’s long-term private keys are not compromised (3), the adversary does not know the
early data key (4).
6.3.2.3 Authentication Properties
We model authentication properties as agreement on certain values, such as agent identities
and nonces. As discussed previously, this is a standard way of defining authentication [97].
The first property that we model is that when a client assumes there is a peer with whom
it shares nonces, then this is actually the case:
10Our draft-10 lemmas employ KU to denote adversary knowledge. Although functional, technically, this
syntax is internal to Tamarin; the more suitable K should be used in externally exposed lemmas.
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lemma entity_authentication:
(1) "All actor peer nonces #i.
(2) CommitNonces(actor, peer, ’client’, nonces)@i
(3) & not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r)
(4) ==> (Ex #j peer2.
(5) RunningNonces(peer, peer2, ’server’, nonces)@j
(6) & #j < #i)"
In detail, this formula specifies that when the client logs that it has observed certain nonces
at the end of its thread and believes it is communicating with a specific peer (1,2), and the
long-term private key of this peer was not compromised (3), then there existed a thread
(4) of that peer in the server role that agrees on the nonces (5) at an earlier point in time
(6). Note that we would like to perhaps verify that peer2 is equal to actor, but in the
unilaterally authenticated mode, no such guarantee can be obtained.
The second property encodes that not only do the actor and the peer agree on the nonces
and who the server is, they in fact agree on the complete transcript:
lemma transcript_agreement:
"All actor peer transcript #i.
CommitTranscript(actor, peer, ’client’, transcript)@i
& not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r)
==> (Ex #j peer2.
RunningTranscript(peer, peer2, ’server’, transcript)@j
& #j < #i)"
The above two properties only provide guarantees for the client, as in the main use case
for TLS, where only the server is authenticated.
We now turn to the (optional) server guarantees. We have equivalent properties in the mu-
tual authentication case, however, since both parties authenticate each other, we can achieve
a stronger notion of authentication but with the restriction that the adversary cannot reveal
either long-term key. The third property, encoded in the mutual_entity_authentication
lemma, represents the authentication guarantee for the server, which can be obtained if the
server performs the mutually authenticated handshake or requests client authentication
(perhaps at a later time, as proposed for post-handshake client authentication).
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lemma mutual_entity_authentication:
"All actor peer nonces #i.
CommitNonces(actor, peer, ’server’, nonces)@i
& not ((Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r)
|(Ex #r. RevLtk(actor)@r))
==> (Ex #j.
RunningNonces(peer, actor, ’client’, nonces)@j
& #j < #i)"
The fourth property is analogous to the second, and ensures that the server obtains a
guarantee on the agreement on the transcript with the client, after it has been authenticated.
lemma mutual_transcript_agreement:
"All actor peer transcript #i.
CommitTranscript(actor, peer, ’server’, transcript)@i
& not ((Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r)
|(Ex #r. RevLtk(actor)@r))
==> (Ex #j.
RunningTranscript(peer, actor, ’client’, transcript)@j
& #j < #i)"
We note that all of the properties specified in our lemmas are trace properties, as is fairly
typical in symbolic analysis.
6.3.3 Analysis and Results
6.3.3.1 Positive Results
Our model from Section 6.3.1 covers the many possible, complex interactions between
the various handshake modes of TLS 1.3 for an unbounded number of sessions. When
combined with the security properties in the preceding section, this gives rise to complex
verification problems. Nevertheless, we successfully prove the main properties of TLS 1.3
(as given in Chapter 2, and above) and our results imply the absence of a large class of
attacks, many of which are not covered by other analysis methods, i.e., attacks exploiting
the interaction between various handshake modes. This is a very encouraging result, since
it shows that the core design underlying draft-10 is sound.
166
6.3 draft-10 Analysis
6.3.3.2 Proof Approach in Tamarin
Many of the security properties of TLS 1.3 stem from the secrecy of the shared secrets,
i.e., the ephemeral secret (es) and the static secret (ss). Proving the secrecy of these
components may seem simple; at its core, the main TLS 1.3 mechanism includes an
authenticated Diffie–Hellman exchange and hence secrecy results should simply rely on
standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions. However, complications arise due to the interactions
between different handshake modes in an unbounded number of sessions and connections,
and the possibility of powerful adversarial interference.
As a first step, it is necessary to prove a few fundamental invariant properties. These
include properties which remain unchanged as the protocol progresses from one state to the
next. A simple example of an invariant property in our model is captured by the following
lemma:
lemma static_dh_invariant [reuse, use_induction]:
(1) "All actor x #i.
(2) UseServerDH(actor, x)@i
(3) ==> Ex #j. GenServerDH(actor, x)@j
(4) & #j < #i"
This lemma states that when an actor (which will be the server in our model) uses a
semi-static Diffie-Hellman exponent as part of a semi-static server key share (1,2), then a
corresponding generation of this semi-static exponent (3) took place prior to the exponent
being used. Such properties help all future proofs by either reducing the number of
contradictory dead-ends which the prover would otherwise explore, or by ‘shortcutting’
the proof by skipping a number of common intermediate steps. The property above, for
instance, helps Tamarin to easily, and quickly, reason back to the source of the semi-static
Diffie-Hellman exponent. The use_induction flag indicates to the Tamarin tool that it
should use induction as its method of proof and the reuse flag indicates that this result
may be used in the proving of all other lemmas going forward. In other words, the lemma
is assumed to hold going forward.
In addition to simple lemmas such as these, the application of some inductive proofs is
essential so as to avoid falling into the many infinite loops present. An example of an
infinite loop in TLS 1.3 is the PSK-resumption loop – after an initial handshake has
completed, a client may infinitely resume the established connection and the Tamarin
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prover could get stuck in rolling backwards through this loop. We address this by proving
lemmas, via induction, that ensure that a PSK-resumption handshake has its roots in an
initial handshake, i.e., we enable Tamarin to quickly, and easily, find its origin.
Once problems such as looping have been resolved, simple auxiliary lemmas can be
constructed. These lemmas help in piecing together more complicated proofs in a modular
fashion. The auxiliary lemmas are sufficiently small, as well as sufficiently incremental, that
they can be proved using Tamarin’s fully automated functionality. Since each describes
a small property which is likely to remain consistent throughout model changes, these
auxiliary lemmas can be used to quickly check changes and reproduce proofs. The proofs
for secrecy of ss and es follow from the auxiliary lemmas in a more manageable way
than would otherwise be the case. For example, a common deduction uses the fact that
knowledge of the resumption PSK implies that the adversary must also have knowledge of
some (ss, es) pair from a previous handshake. This is captured in an auxiliary lemma,
proven in Tamarin, and subsequently used in proving the secrecy of ss and es for the
PSK-resumption case. The main burden of proof is, for all handshake modes, to unravel the
client and server states to a point where either the adversary needs to break the standard
Diffie-Hellman assumptions, or else secrecy follows from inductive reasoning.
Finally, the proof of session key secrecy then follows from the secrecy proofs for the ss
and es values, which are both used as key derivation inputs. Using this approach, we
successfully verify properties in Tamarin for the full interaction of the various handshake
modes.
We note that the construction of the auxiliary lemmas and the proving of the secrecy of
ss and es requires an intimate knowledge of TLS 1.3 and this part of the analysis is not a
straightforward application of the Tamarin tool – considerable interaction with the tool
is required so as to correctly guide it through the proof trees of the respective ss and es
lemmas.
In total, our Tamarin analysis effort required roughly 6 person-months worth of work,
including constructing the model, writing the lemmas, and subsequently proving the
lemmas. We used a quad-core machine with 16GB of RAM. Of the lemmas which were
auto-provable, the most complicated required approximately 20 minutes to complete. As a
point of comparison, the STS lemmas prove in a matter of seconds.
168
6.3 draft-10 Analysis
6.3.3.3 Separation of Properties
One of the decisions made when specifying the security properties was to separate the
secrecy and authentication requirements. Note that we could have equally combined both
into a single property, as commonly defined in AKE models. The benefit of our approach
is twofold: First of all, separating the properties results in a richer understanding of the
security of the protocol. For instance, the structure of the proof confirms the intuition that
the secrecy of session keys depends largely on the use of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The
second benefit of this approach is that it provides a better foundation for future analysis.
While our draft-10 model considers the security of all handshake modes equally, there
are some discrepancies in the guarantees provided by the various handshake modes. For
example, if we were to allow adversarial compromise of semi-static secrets such as PSKs
and server semi-static Diffie-Hellman exponents, we would discover that the secrecy of the
static secret ss is not immediate in all handshake modes. Choosing to keep the properties
separate allows for the development of a more nuanced security model, as will be shown to
be the case in Chapter 7.
6.3.3.4 Implicit Authentication
In building the series of lemmas which lead to the final security properties, the most
problematic areas coincided with the PSK handshake modes. In particular, the security of
the PSK handshake relies on knowing that the resumption secret can only be known by a
previous communication partner. This is an implicit authentication property. While we
were able to overcome this challenge (by writing auxiliary lemmas to establish the source
of the resumption secret) and eventually prove that this property holds, it does identify a
potentially troublesome component to analyse. As we will see in the next section, the PSK
mode certainly requires close attention.
6.3.4 Attacking Post-handshake Client Authentication
While draft-10 does not permit certificate-based client authentication in PSK mode (and
in particular in resumption using a PSK), we extended our model as specified in one
of the proposals for this intended functionality [123]. By enabling client authentication
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with a post-handshake signature over the most recent handshake hash (as dictated by
the proposal), our Tamarin analysis finds an attack. The result is a violation of client
authentication, as the adversary can impersonate a client when communicating with a
server.
6.3.4.1 The Attack
Our inability to prove the mutual authentication lemma in the post-handshake authen-
tication case alerted us to a problem with this mechanism. After careful examination of
the lemma sub-case, i.e., the proof search sub-tree, in which the property did not hold, we
confirmed the attack.
Our attack is depicted in Figure 6.13 and we describe it in more detail here: Alice plays
the role of the victim client, and Bob the role of the targeted server. Charlie is an active
MITM adversary, whom Alice believes to be a legitimate server. In the interest of clarity,
we have omitted message components and computations which are not relevant to the
attack.
The attack proceeds in three main steps, each involving different TLS 1.3 mechanisms:
Step 1: Establish Legitimate PSKs. In the first stage of the attack, Alice starts a
connection with Charlie, and Charlie starts a connection with Bob. In both connections, a
PSK is established. At this point, both handshakes are computed honestly. Alice shares a
PSK, denoted PSK1, with Charlie, and Charlie shares a PSK, denoted PSK2, with Bob.
Note that Charlie ensures the session ticket (psk id) is the same across both connections
by replaying the psk id value obtained from Bob.
Step 2: Resumption with Matching Freshness. In the next step, Alice wishes to
resume a connection with Charlie using PSK1. As usual, Alice generates a random nonce
nc, and sends it to Charlie together with the PSK identifier, psk id.
Charlie re-uses the value nc to initiate a PSK-resumption handshake with Bob, using the
same identifier, psk id. Bob responds with a random nonce ns, and the server Finished
message computed using PSK2.
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Client Alice Charlie
(As server Charlie) (As client Alice)
Server Bob
Reuse psk idInitial handshake 1
Client not authenticated, PSK1 exchanged
Initial handshake 2
Client not authenticated, PSK2 exchanged
Generate nc
Start PSK1 resumption Start PSK2 resumptionReuse nc, psk id
client random = nc
session ticket = psk id
client random = nc
session ticket = psk id
Generate ns
Accept PSK2 resumptionAccept PSK1 resumption Recompute Finished
Reuse ns server random = nsserver random = ns
PSK1 resumption done PSK2 resumption doneRecompute Finished
Compute session
keys based on
PSK1
Compute session
keys based on
PSK1, PSK2
Compute session
keys based on
PSK2
Client authentication requestClient authentication request Re-encrypt
Client authentication Client authenticationRe-encrypt
Certificate = CertAlice
CertificateVerify =
sign(nc, ns, psk id,CertAlice, . . .)
Certificate = CertAlice
CertificateVerify =
sign(nc, ns, psk id,CertAlice, . . .)
Alice is in a session with me (Bob).
Only Alice knows the session keys.
Application data exchange
Charlie impersonates Alice
Figure 6.13: Client impersonation attack on TLS 1.3 if post-handshake client authentication
is allowed in PSK mode (draft-10+). The attack exploits an initial handshake, a PSK-
resumption handshake, and a post-handshake client authentication request.
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Charlie now re-uses the nonce ns, and recomputes the server Finished message using
PSK1. Alice returns her Finished message to Charlie, who recomputes it using PSK2.
At this point, Alice and Charlie share session keys (i.e., application traffic keys) derived
from PSK1, and Charlie and Bob share session keys derived from PSK2. Note that the
keys that Charlie shares with Alice and with Bob respectively, are distinct.
Step 3: Post-handshake Client Authentication. Following the resumption hand-
shake, Charlie attempts to make a request to Bob over their established TLS channel.
The request calls for client authentication, so Charlie is subsequently prompted for his
certificate and verification.11 Charlie re-encrypts this request for Alice.
In order to compute the verification signature, Alice uses the session_hash value, which is
defined as the hash of all handshake messages excluding Finished messages. In particular,
the session hash will contain nc, ns, and the session ticket psk id.
Notice that this session hash will match the one of Charlie and Bob. Therefore, this
signature will also be accepted by Bob. Hence, Charlie re-encrypts the signature for Bob,
who accepts Alice’s certificate and verification as valid authentication for Charlie.
Charlie has therefore successfully impersonated Alice to Bob, and has full knowledge of
the session keys for both connections. This enables Charlie to impersonate Alice in future
communication with Bob, allowing him to fake messages or to access confidential resources,
and to violate the secrecy of messages that Bob tries to send to Alice. Thus, the attack
completely breaks client authentication.
6.3.4.2 Underlying Cause and Mitigation
The above attack is possible due to the absence of a strong binding between the client
signature and the connection for which it is intended. Therefore, the attacker is able to
reuse the signature it receives to impersonate the client to a server on another connection.
The second component of the attack is that the attacker is able to force the two resumption
sessions to have matching transcripts.
11This is one of the main use cases for the post-handshake client authentication mechanism [123].
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This suggests several potential ways to mitigate the attack. The most direct approach
involves including the server certificate in the handshake hash. A similar mechanism is used
in the 0-RTT case, where the server certificate is bound to the semi-static Diffie-Hellman
share. However, this is not ideal because it complicates the out-of-band mechanism.
Another potential option includes implementing an explicit authentication step as part of
the PSK mechanism.
In parallel to our analysis, the TLS WG proposed several modifications to draft-10 in the
move towards draft-11. One of these proposals, PR#316 [133] (which takes a different
approach to [123]), explicitly allows client authentication in the context that we analyse
and redefines the client signature based on a new HandshakeContext value, which includes
the server Finished message. Intuitively, this definition appears to address the attack
because the adversary will need to force the Finished messages to match across the two
sessions – a complicated, if not impossible, task as the Finished message is bound to the
PSK, which is derived from a previously authenticated session (whether using certificates
or out-of band mechanisms).
Discussions with members of the TLS WG revealed that the WG was previously not aware
of the possibility of our attack, and the resulting strict necessity for a stronger binding
between the client certificate and the security context that emerges from combining the
PSK mode with post-handshake client authentication.
6.4 Conclusion
Even though symbolic analysis traditionally allows for the verification of less fine-grained
security properties in comparison to computational analysis (i.e., trace vs equivalence
properties), we argue that it is still of great benefit to the analysis of real-world protocols
such as TLS 1.3.12 Symbolic analysis tools such as the Tamarin prover allow for the
automated verification of security properties, reducing burden on the proof process. This
automated functionality also accommodates protocol changes more readily than compu-
tational analysis, allowing for the quicker checking of security properties after changes
have been effected. A major strength of symbolic analysis tools is their ability to verify
properties in the presence of protocol mode compositions, thereby offering an avenue
12And with ongoing work on enhancing observational equivalence proofs [20], this gap is closing.
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for discovery of attacks exploiting the interaction of protocol components, as is clearly
exhibited in the attack described in Section 6.3.4.
Tamarin’s many features make it a good fit for the modelling and in-depth analysis of
highly complex protocols such as TLS 1.3. In our analysis, the support for branching
allowed us to model decisions that the protocol participants could make during execution,
the looping support was instrumental in covering repeated resumptions within a single
session, and the main security aspects of TLS 1.3 critically depend on Diffie-Hellman
key exchange, meaning that we could leverage the excellent support for Diffie-Hellman
in Tamarin. Also, the visualisations of attacks found by Tamarin provided us with a
means of rapidly identifying potential problems, with either the protocol or our model –
the graphical user interface proved a valuable asset in guiding our TLS 1.3 analysis.
The work presented in this chapter meaningfully contributes to the ‘analysis-prior-to-
deployment’ design process adopted by the IETF in the development of TLS 1.3, and serves
as an excellent example of the benefits of a pre-deployment analysis design paradigm. Our
attack highlighted a flaw in the protocol prior to its official release, giving the TLS WG
time to implement a fix for the problem before the flaw could be exploited by malicious
agents in the wild. Also, our work brought into existence a symbolic model for TLS 1.3,
meaning that changes to the protocol can be checked fairly quickly, a clear advantage for
a rapidly moving target such as the TLS 1.3 design specification. In fact, our draft-10
model serves as the basis for the work on draft-21 described in the next chapter.
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Automated Analysis and Verification
of draft-21
In this chapter we model and analyse draft-21 of the TLS 1.3 specification, reforming
our draft-10 model to incorporate the changes made to the specification since draft-10.
Our work on draft-21 establishes the security of several handshake mode interactions in
TLS 1.3 for a near-final version of the protocol.
7.1 Introduction
As has been discussed at length in the preceding chapters, there have been substantial
efforts from the academic community in the areas of program verification – analysing
implementations of TLS 1.3 [32, 47], the development of computational models – analysing
TLS within Bellare-Rogaway style frameworks [54, 55, 61, 85, 91], and the use of formal
methods tools such as ProVerif [4] and Tamarin [6], i.e., the work presented in Chapter 6,
to analyse symbolic models of TLS [14,27,46,75]. All of these endeavours have helped to
both find weaknesses in the protocol and confirm and guide the design decisions of the
TLS WG, as was displayed in the previous chapter.
The TLS 1.3 draft specification, however, has been a rapidly moving target, with large
changes being effected in a fairly regular fashion. This has often rendered much of the
analysis work outdated within the space of a few months, as large changes to the specification
effectively result in a new protocol, requiring a new wave of analysis.
In this chapter we present a tool-supported, symbolic verification of a near-final draft
of TLS 1.3, adding to the large effort by the TLS community to ensure that TLS 1.3 is
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free of the many weaknesses affecting earlier versions, and that it is imbued with security
guarantees befitting such a critical protocol. As of draft-21, many of the cryptographic
mechanisms of TLS 1.3 have reached a stable state, and at the time of our analysis, we did
not expect substantial changes to be implemented in subsequent drafts. And indeed, the
current version of the specification, draft-261, does not incorporate any changes that affect
the cryptographic logic of the protocol – the changes are largely implementation-specific.
Our main contributions in this chapter are as follows:
(i) Using our draft-10 model as a foundation, we develop a symbolic model of draft-
21 of the TLS 1.3 specification that considers all the possible interactions of the
available handshake modes, including the Pre-Shared Key (PSK)-based resumption
and zero-Round Trip Time (0-RTT) exchanges. Its fine-grained, modular structure
greatly extends and refines the coverage of our previous symbolic model. Our model
effectively captures a new TLS 1.3 protocol, incorporating the many changes that
have been made to the protocol since the development of our previous model.
(ii) We prove the majority of the specified security requirements of TLS 1.3, including
the secrecy of session keys, perfect forward secrecy of session keys (where applicable),
peer (entity) authentication, and Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) resistance.
We also show that after a successful handshake the client and server agree on identical
session keys and that session keys are unique across handshakes.
(iii) We uncover a strange authentication behaviour that may lead to security compli-
cations in applications that assume that TLS 1.3 provides strong authentication
guarantees. More specifically, we show that a client and a server may not agree
on the authentication status of the client after the post-handshake authentication
mechanism has been applied.
Related Work. As mentioned, there has been a great deal of work conducted in the
complementary analysis spheres pertinent to TLS 1.3. Of most interest to this work are
the symbolic analyses presented in [14], [27], and the previous chapter.
Since our draft-10 analysis, there have been multiple changes made to the TLS 1.3
specification – 11 drafts-worth of changes to be precise. These updates have included
1Released on March 4th, 2018.
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major revisions of the 0-RTT mechanism and the key derivation schedule. In draft-10,
the sending of early data required a client to possess a semi-static (EC)DH value of the
server. This particular handshake mode was removed and replaced by a PSK-based 0-RTT
handshake mode – in draft-21 early data can only be encrypted using a PSK. In fact, the
PSK mechanism has been greatly enhanced since draft-10, with new PSK variants and
binding values being incorporated into the specification. Post-handshake authentication
was officially incorporated from draft-11 onwards and a few drafts later, post-handshake
authentication was enabled to operate within the PSK handshake mode. Another change
to be incorporated after draft-10 was the inclusion of 0.5-RTT data – the server being
able to send fully protected application data as part of its first flight of messages.
All of these changes have resulted in what is effectively a very different TLS 1.3 protocol,
particularly from a symbolic perspective. As a Tamarin model aims to consider the
interaction of all possible handshake modes and variants, changes to these modes, as well
as the inclusion of new post-handshake combinations, results in a very different set of
traces to be considered when proving security properties. Hence, this work presents a
substantially different model to the model presented in Chapter 6, with differences between
the two models being highlighted in Section 7.3.1, and in addition to developing a new
model, we follow a far more fine-grained and flexible approach to modelling TLS 1.3.
The work in [14] is an analysis of TLS 1.3 by the Cryptographic protocol Evaluation
towards Long-Lived Outstanding Security (CELLOS) Consortium using the ProVerif
tool. Announced on the TLS WG mailing list at the start of 2016, it showed the initial
(EC)DHE handshake of draft-11 to be secure in the symbolic setting. In comparison to
our work, this analysis covers only one handshake mode of a draft that is now somewhat
outdated.
The ProVerif models of draft-18 presented by Bhargavan et al. in [27] include most
TLS 1.3 modes, and cover rich threat models by considering downgrade attacks (both
with weak cryptographic mechanisms and downgrade to TLS 1.2). However, unlike our
work, they do not consider all modes, as they do not consider the post-handshake client
authentication mode. While they cover relatively strong authentication guarantees (which
led to the discovery of an unknown key-share attack2), their analysis did not uncover the
2In their attack, Bhargavan et al. show that a dishonest server, M , can convince a client, C, that it is
connected to M , when indeed it is connected to a server S.
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potential mismatch between the client and server views that we describe in Section 7.3.3.3.
7.2 Preliminaries
All of the preliminary material presented in Chapter 6, Section 6.2, is relevant here. We
do, however, make shrewder use of the Tamarin tool. In our draft-21 analysis, we
make better use of what are known as typing lemmas. Tamarin’s backwards search relies
on the ability to identify the sources of rule premises, i.e., where facts on the left-hand
side of rules come from. Typing lemmas greatly help to refine the origins of facts, aiding
Tamarin’s verification algorithm.3 As with induction and reusable lemmas, typing lemmas
are annotated with an instruction label, namely, typing. Further theoretical details
concerning typing lemmas can be found in [107].
7.3 draft-21 Analysis
Using Tamarin’s modelling framework we construct a comprehensive symbolic model of
draft-21 of TLS 1.3, capturing the specified protocol behaviours, as well as unexpected
behaviours that might arise from the complex interaction of an unbounded number of
sessions. Our model captures these behaviours in the presence of a powerful Dolev-Yao
attacker.
Our aim is to verify the claimed security properties of TLS 1.3, as laid out in the draft-21
specification. Details concerning the various handshake modes for draft-21, as well as
the desired security properties, are given in Chapter 2; for ease of reference, we repeat the
draft-21 handshake diagrams (see Figure 7.1), as well as the security property descriptions,
here:
The TLS 1.3 draft-21 security properties include:
1. Establishing Identical Session Keys. Upon completion of the handshake, the
client and the server should have established a set of session keys on which they both
3In the latest version of Tamarin, typing lemmas are more aptly named sources lemmas.
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C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
HelloRetryRequest
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare,
{EncryptedExtensions}, {CertificateRequest*},
{Certificate}, {CertificateVerify},
{Finished}, [Application data*]
{Certificate*}, {CertificateVerify*}, {Finished}
[Application data]
(a) draft-21 (EC)DHE handshake
C S
[NewSessionTicket] (at some point prior)
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare*, PreSharedKeyExtension
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare*
PreSharedKeyExtension, {EncryptedExtensions},
{Finished}, [Application data*]
{Finished}
[Application data]
(b) draft-21 PSK resumption handshake
C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare*,
PreSharedKeyExtension, (Application data)
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare*
PreSharedKeyExtension, {EncryptedExtensions},
{Finished}, [Application data*]
{Finished}
[Application data]
(c) draft-21 0-RTT handshake
Figure 7.1: Handshake modes for draft-21.
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agree.
2. Secrecy of Session Keys. Upon completion of the handshake, the client and the
server should have established a set of session keys which are known to the client
and the server only.
3. Peer (Entity) Authentication. In the unilateral case, upon completion of the
handshake, if a client C believes it is communicating with a server S, then it is indeed
S who is executing the server role. An analogous property for the server also holds
in the mutual authentication case. Authentication of the server is mandatory and
mutual authentication is optional.
4. Uniqueness of Session Keys. Each run of the protocol should produce distinct,
independent session keys.
5. Downgrade Protection. An active attacker should not be able to force the client
and the server to employ weak cipher suites, or older versions of the TLS protocol.
6. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). In the case of compromise of either party’s
long-term key material, sessions completed before the compromise should remain
secure. This property is not claimed to hold in the PSK key exchange mode.
7. Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resistance. Should an attacker com-
promise the long-term key material of party A, the attacker should not be able to use
this key material to impersonate an uncompromised party in communication with A.
8. Protection of Endpoint Identities. The identity of the server cannot be revealed
by a passive attacker that observes the handshake, and the identity of the client
cannot be revealed even by an active attacker that is capable of tampering with the
communication.
In comparison to our draft-10 analysis, the changes to the TLS 1.3 specification which
most affect our modelling effort include:
(i) New post-handshake mechanisms. In draft-21, new session tickets can be sent at
any time. In draft-10 a new session ticket could only be sent after a full (EC)DHE
handshake. draft-21 also includes a key update mechanism which can be employed
at any time. As read and write keys differ, either party can immediately update
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their write key after requesting a key update. This mechanism had not been finalised
in draft-10. The post-handshake client authentication mechanism, with a fix to
combat the weakness we uncovered, was officially included in the TLS 1.3 specification
from draft-11 onwards and has remained in place.
(ii) A new 0-RTT mechanism. Our previous analysis considered a dedicated 0-RTT
mechanism. In draft-21, the 0-RTT functionality has been rolled into a PSK
handshake, i.e., early data can be sent by a client using a PSK. The use of a
semi-static server key share is no longer an option.
(iii) PSK binders. The draft-10 specification did not include PSK binder values. These
values bind PSKs to the handshake in which they are being used, as well as the
handshake in which they were generated.
(iv) A new key schedule. In comparison to draft-10, draft-21 includes a key derivation
schedule that is more streamlined and better suited to implementation. The differences
between the respective key derivation schedules are detailed in Chapter 2.
As with our previous work, we analyse draft-21 of the TLS 1.3 specification using the
Tamarin tool. Specifically, we (i) build an abstract model of the protocol, (ii) encode
the desired security properties (as listed in the draft-21 specification), and (iii) construct
proofs for the specified properties using the Tamarin verification algorithm.
Many TLS 1.3 analyses consider the constituent parts of TLS 1.3 in isolation, viewing
these as separate protocols, and then proceed to tie the individual proofs together with a
composability result. For instance, [27] considers the resumption mechanism as a separate
protocol in which both the client and the server take as input a symmetric value – the
PSK. If the PSK remains unknown to the attacker in every execution of the resumption
protocol, a gap remains to be filled before concluding that the full series of handshakes
always completes without the attacker knowing the PSK. This gap is filled by a manual
composability proof. In our work, there is no need for such manual proofs; composition is
automatically guaranteed by our comprehensive model, as Tamarin considers all possible
component interactions in the proving of each property.
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7.3.1 Building the Model
Although our model undoubtedly draws from the Tamarin model described in Chapter
6 of this thesis, here we opt to model TLS 1.3 with a significant increase in fidelity to
the draft specification. Such an approach results in an improved ability to capture the
full functionality of TLS 1.3, and hence broader coverage of realistic attacks, including
complicated interaction attacks, such as the post-handshake client authentication attack
discussed in Chapter 6. Additionally, by closely matching our model to the specification
and allowing for an almost line-per-line comparison, we achieve full transparency regarding
which parts of the specification we abstract away from, and the assumptions upon which
our modelling process relies.
Not only is our model more comprehensive than the Tamarin model described in the
previous chapter, it also incorporates the many changes to the TLS 1.3 specification that
have materialised since the development of the draft-10 model. In what follows, we
describe the modelling process for draft-21 and point out enhancements over the previous
model.
7.3.1.1 Constructing Model Rules
As with our draft-10 model, we employ the use of Tamarin rules to model state transitions
within the TLS 1.3 protocol. However, our state transitions are far more fine-grained and
modular in comparison to the model discussed in the previous chapter – we model the
effective change in state as a result of transmission, receipt and processing of cryptographic
parameters. For instance, a basic, initial TLS 1.3 handshake invokes up to 21 different
rules and the associated state transitions before post-handshake operations can commence.
Our draft-10 model only invokes a maximum of 5 rules in transitioning through an initial
handshake.
The draft-21 initial handshake state transitions are depicted in Figure 7.2, and correspond
to messages sent and the resultant cryptographic processing performed, as displayed in
Figure 7.3. In comparison to the depiction of the basic, initial handshake in Figure 7.1a, the
handshake displayed in Figure 7.3 represents message flows in a far more modular fashion,
effectively breaking up the server’s first message flight into three smaller ‘sub-flights’.
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C0Client
C1
C2a
C2b
C2c
C2d
C3
C4
S0Server
S1
S2a
S2b
S2c
S2d
S3
S4
client hello
recv server hello
recv server auth
client gen keys
recv encrypted extensions
recv cert request OR
skip recv cert request
client auth OR
client auth cert
recv client hello
server hello
server auth
server gen keys
encrypted extensions
cert request OR
skip cert request
recv client auth OR
recv client auth cert
ClientHello
+Extensions
ServerHello
+Extensions
EncryptedExtensions
CertRequest
Cert CertVerify
Finished
Cert CertVerify
Finished
Figure 7.2: Partial state diagram for full TLS 1.3 handshake. Tamarin rules are indicated
in blue. The messages exchanged between entities are given in green.
Building our model according to this intended deconstruction of message flights allows for
a more granular and flexible Tamarin model.
In Figure 7.2, the transition from the the starting state, C0, is invoked by the firing of the first
client rule, client_hello. This rule does not require any previous rule to trigger and moves
the client into state C1, from which the next client rule, recv_server_hello can be trig-
gered. In addition to the client needing to be in the correct state, the recv_server_hello
rule also requires inputs (facts) that have been generated by the server_hello rule (this
is marked in green in the diagram). Both server and client continue to transition according
to the rules and message flights depicted in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 until such time as the initial
handshake completes. We note that rule options that transition from C2c/S2c to C2d/S2d
and from C3/S3 to C4/S4, respectively, capture the modelling of unilateral versus mutual
authentication; the server may request the client to authenticate in the initial handshake
(cert_request), and the client should respond to this request (client_auth_cert). In
the unilateral authentication case, the skip_cert_request and client_auth fire instead.
As an example of a model rule, we present our first client rule, client_hello, in Figure 7.4.
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C S
ClientHello, ClientKeyShare
ServerHello, ServerKeyShare
{EncryptedExtensions}, {CertificateRequest*}
{Certificate}, {CertificateVerify}, {Finished}
[Application data]
{Certificate*}, {CertificateVerify*}, {Finished}
[Application data]
Figure 7.3: Full (EC)DHE handshake for draft-21, represented in sub-flights. The
messages associated with a Hello Retry Request (HRR) have been omitted for the sake of
simplicity.
As before, the let...in block allows for basic variable substitutions, and again we use the
tid to name the newly created client thread (which we tie to the client nonce in the model).
The C0(tid) action marks the occurrence of the C0 state as a result of the client_hello
rule being triggered, with its associated tid. The Start(tid, C, ’client’) action
signifies the instantiation of the client, C, in the role of ’client’, and the running_client
action indicates that client has initiated a run of the protocol. The DH(tid, C, X) action
indicates the mapping of the private Diffie-Hellman exponent, x, to the client C. The
State(C1, tid, ...) fact captures the local state of the thread tid, and is a rule output
which will be consumed by the next applicable client rule, thereby transitioning the client
thread to the next state, C1. The DHExp fact exists for consumption by adversary rules,
if applicable.4 The Out fact represents sending the ClientHello message to the network,
after which it may become known to the adversary.5
We note the extensive use of macros in our model, enabled by the m4 preprocessor, which
allows us to cover most of the specification, whilst syntactically keeping our model close to
it. For example, our ClientHello message is a macro that expands to:
4The need for this output fact will become clear in the discussion of our threat model in Section 7.3.2.1.
5The HonestUse actions now exist as an artefact in our model. They were constructed to help ensure
that the intended Diffie-Hellman parameters were used as Diffie-Helman parameters only, and not misused
by an adversary as nonces, or other message values.
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rule client_hello:
let
// Initialise state variables to zero.
init_state()
// Abstract client identity - does not currently correspond to
// anything concrete.
C = $C
// Server identity - can be interpreted as the hostname.
S = $S
// Client nonce
nc = ˜nc
// Reuse the client nonce to be a thread identifier.
tid = nc
// Group, DH exponent, key share
g1 = $g1
g2 = $g2
sg = <g1, g2>
client_sg = <g1, g2>
g = g1
x = ˜x
gx = gˆx
messages = <messages, ClientHello>
es = EarlySecret
in
[ Fr(nc),
Fr(x)
]
--[ C0(tid),
Start(tid, C, ’client’),
running_client(Identity, C),
Neq(g1, g2),
DH(tid, C, x),
HonestUse(˜x),
HonestUse(gx)
]->
[
State(C1, tid, C, S, ClientState),
DHExp(x, tid, C),
Out(ClientHello)
]
Figure 7.4: First client rule, client hello
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handshake_record(’1’,
ProtocolVersion,
ClientRandom,
’0’, // legacy_session_id
$cipher_suites,
’0’, // legacy_compression_methods
ClientHelloExtensions)
which reflects almost exactly how this message is presented in the draft-21 specifica-
tion.6 ClientRandom is itself a macro, defined to be the value of the client nonce nc.
ClientHelloExtensions is yet another macro which expands according to the following:
define(<!ClientHelloExtensions!>, <!<SupportedVersions,
NamedGroupList, SignatureSchemeList, KeyShareCH >!>),
again reflecting our intention of modelling the draft-21 specification as closely as possible,
allowing for a direct syntactic comparison between our model and the specification. Our
previous Tamarin model also employs macros, but the connection to the specification is
much less evident. For instance, in the draft-10 model, ClientHello is defined to be the
pair of values nc,pc, representing the client’s nonce and ‘parameters’, which serves as a
placeholder for handshake values that are abstracted away.
In our model we have tried to define cryptographic components in a way that is reminiscent
of imperative programming. As in the specification, we compute the handshake secret by
computing the function HKDF-Extract(gxy,es), and the handshake keys are computed
by applying a Derive-Secret (HKDF-Expand) function to this value. This is not strictly
necessary due to the assumption of perfect cryptography – we could ignore the HKDF
computations and focus solely on the secrets involved – but this makes it easier to connect
our model to the specification.
The full state machine diagram of our draft-21 model can be viewed in Figures 7.5
and 7.6. Both figures display the post-handshake mechanisms discussed previously,
i.e., new session tickets (new_session_ticket, recv_new_session_ticket), key updates
(update_req_server, update_recv_client, update_fin_server and the corresponding
client-initiated key update rules), and post-handshake authentication (certificate_request
_post, recv_certificate_request_post, client_auth_post, recv_client_auth_post).
We note that the post-handshake rules effectively loop back into the C4 and S4 states – for
ease of representation, we represent these rules vertically in Figure 7.6.
6In Tamarin’s syntax, constants are enclosed by single quotes.
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C0start
C1
C2a
C2b
C2c
C2d
C3
C4
S0start
S1
S2a
S2b
S2c
S2d
S3
S4
ClientPSK ServerPSK
S4C4
C4 S4
C4 S4
S4C4
C4 S4
S4
recv hello retry request
client gen keys
recv encrypted extensions
recv certificate request OR
skip recv certificate request
client auth OR
client auth certcert req ctxt 6= ‘0’
cert req ctxt = ‘0’
hello retry request
server gen keys
encrypted extensions
certificate request OR
skip certificate request
cert req ctxt 6= ‘0’
recv client auth OR
recv client auth cert
cert req ctxt = ‘0’
ClientHello
+Extensions
ServerHello
+Extensions
EncryptedExtensions
CertificateRequest
Certificate
CertificateVerify
Finished
Certificate
CertificateVerify
Finished
Finished
recv new session ticket new session ticket
NewSessionTicket
client hello OR
client hello psk
recv client hello OR
recv client hello psk
server hello OR
server hello psk OR
server hello psk dhe
ke mode =
〈 ‘psk dhe ke’, ‘psk ke’ 〉
recv server hello OR
recv server hello psk OR
recv server hello psk dhe
ke mode =
〈 ‘psk dhe ke’, ‘psk ke’ 〉
recv server auth OR
recv server auth pskauth mode = ‘psk auth’
auth mode ∈
{‘psk sign auth’, ‘0’} server auth OR
server auth psk
auth mode = ‘psk auth’
Finished
certificate request postrecv certificate request post
CertificateRequest
client auth post recv client auth post
Certificate
CertificateVerify
Finished
update req serverupdate recv client
KeyUpdate
update fin server
KeyUpdate
Figure 7.5: Part 1 of the full state diagram for our Tamarin model, showing all rules
covered in the initial handshake (excluding rules dealing with the record layer).
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C0start
C1
C2a
C2b
C2c
C2d
C3
C4
S0start
S1
S2a
S2b
S2c
S2d
S3
S4
ClientPSK ServerPSK
S4C4
C4 S4
C4 S4
S4C4
C4 S4
S4C4
C4 S4
S4C4
C4
recv hello retry request
client gen keys
recv encrypted extensions
recv certificate request OR
skip recv certificate request
client auth OR
client auth certcert req ctxt 6= ‘0’
cert req ctxt = ‘0’
hello retry request
server gen keys
encrypted extensions
certificate request OR
skip certificate request
cert req ctxt 6= ‘0’
recv client auth OR
recv client auth cert
cert req ctxt = ‘0’
ClientHello
+Extensions
ServerHello
+Extensions
EncryptedExtensions
CertificateRequest
Certificate
CertificateVerify
Finished
Certificate
CertificateVerify
Finished
Finished
recv new session ticket new session ticket
NewSessionTicket
client hello OR
client hello psk
recv client hello OR
recv client hello psk
server hello OR
server hello psk OR
server hello psk dhe
ke mode =
〈 ‘psk dhe ke’, ‘psk ke’ 〉
recv server hello OR
recv server hello psk OR
recv server hello psk dhe
ke mode =
〈 ‘psk dhe ke’, ‘psk ke’ 〉
recv server auth OR
recv server auth pskauth mode = ‘psk auth’
auth mode ∈
{‘psk sign auth’, ‘0’} server auth OR
server auth psk
auth mode = ‘psk auth’
Finished
certificate request postrecv certificate request post
CertificateRequest
client auth post recv client auth post
Certificate
CertificateVerify
Finished
update req serverupdate recv client
KeyUpdate
update fin server
KeyUpdate
update req client update recv server
KeyUpdate
update fin client
Key
Upd
ate
Figure 7.6: Part 2 of the full state diagram for our Tamarin model, showing all post-
handshake rules covered.
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For ease of readability, our state machine diagrams do not convey our modelling of the
Record Protocol. In comparison to our draft-10 model, we model the Record Protocol
more accurately in that we separate the Record Protocol rules from the Handshake
Protocol rules, effectively modelling two different protocols, in accordance with the TLS 1.3
specification. Previously, we modelled the application data send and receive rules as looping
back into Handshake Protocol states (see Figure 6.11 in Chapter 6). Whilst not incorrect,
a more accurate approach would call for separation of the respective protocol states, and
in our draft-21 model, we create Record Protocol states and applicable rules, which exist
alongside the Handshake Protocol states and rules. This can be viewed in Figure 7.7. Note
that this still allows for the Handshake Protocol to run over the Record Protocol, as is most
definitely the case for the post-handshake messages as these are encrypted with record
layer keys. One can imagine overlaying Figure 7.7 on top of Figures 7.5 and 7.6 to get a
sense of our complete draft-21 model.
C2c
C2d
C3
C4
S2c
S2d
S3
S4
SendRecv
RecvSend
recv send
send recv
Application Data
Post-handshake
Messages
Application Data
Post-handshake
Messages
cert req ctxt 6= ‘0’
cert req ctxt = ‘0’
auth mode = ‘psk auth’
auth mode ∈
{‘psk sign auth’, ‘0’} auth mode = ‘psk auth’
Figure 7.7: Record layer state diagram for TLS 1.3 draft-21. Record layer rules are
indicated in blue. The messages exchanged between the client and the server, using distinct
upstream and downstream traffic keys, are given in green.
7.3.1.2 Advanced Features
In our model we capture a number of complicated interactions and logic flows inherent to
the TLS 1.3 handshake, greatly improving on our preceding model, adding features to the
model which we consider to be ‘advanced’.
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Group Negotiation. We model the client and the server as having the ability, albeit
limited, to negotiate the group used in the Diffie–Hellman key exchange. In Tamarin’s
syntax, variables that are always instantiated with public values are prefixed by $. In
our model, the client starts with a pair of public values $g1,$g2 that represent two
supported groups, and offers these to the server along with a corresponding key share for
$g1. Similarly, the server starts with a supported group $g. The model allows the server
to return a HelloRetryRequest to the client, enforcing that $g is not equal to $g1, and
expects the client to return instead a key share that matches $g2.
This interaction enables a much greater coverage of Diffie-Hellman key exchange with
respect to our draft-10 model. Previously, a HelloRetryRequest would only enable a
client to pick a new Diffie-Hellman exponent for use with the same $g; we did not model
negotiation of the Diffie-Hellman group.
Handshake Flows. One of the most complex elements inherent to modelling TLS 1.3 is
the vast number of possible state machine transitions. After a session resumption, the server
can choose between using the PSK only, or using the PSK along with a Diffie-Hellman key
share. Alternatively, the server might reject the PSK entirely, and fall back to a regular
(initial) handshake, or request that the client use a different group for the Diffie-Hellman
exchange. Additionally, as discussed, there are several complex messages that can be sent
in the post-handshake state: client authentication requests, new session tickets, and key
update requests.
Since all of the above interactions can happen asynchronously, the resulting model becomes
very complex and requires sophisticated handling logic. A number of complicated protocol
flows, involving any number of sequential handshake modes and post-handshake extensions
can, and will, transpire and we deal with this eventuality via our very modular approach
to modelling, employing this strategy for all possible handshake modes.
Our full model is available at [44].7
7This is a stable URL containing links to our draft-10 and draft-21 source code, as well as supple-
mentary material.
190
7.3 draft-21 Analysis
7.3.2 Encoding Security Properties
We describe our threat model and our formal modelling of the desired TLS 1.3 security
properties within the Tamarin framework.
7.3.2.1 Threat Model
We consider an extension of the Dolev-Yao adversary as our threat model. As described in
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2.1, the Dolev-Yao adversary has complete control of the network,
and can intercept, send, replay, and delete any message. In order to construct a new message,
the adversary can combine any information previously obtained but our assumption of
perfect cryptography implies that the adversary cannot encrypt, decrypt or sign messages
without knowledge of the appropriate keys. In the previous chapter, we consider a Dolev-
Yao adversary that has the ability to compromise the long-term keys of protocol participants.
In order to consider different types of compromise, in this chapter, we additionally allow the
adversary to compromise the PSKs of protocol participants (whether created out-of-band
or through a new session ticket (NST)), as well as their Diffie-Hellman exponents. We
model these additional adversary capabilities using the following Tamarin rules:
rule Reveal_PSK:
[ SecretPSK($A, res_psk)]--[ RevealPSK($A, res_psk) ]->[Out(res_psk)]
rule Reveal_DHExp:
[ DHExp(˜x, ˜tid, $A) ]--[ RevDHExp(˜tid, $A, ˜x) ]->[ Out(˜x), DHExp(˜x,
˜tid, $A)]
The PSK_Reveal rule can be triggered if a PSK (represented by res_psk) is generated for
the agent $A. The right-hand side of the rule encodes that res_psk is sent out on the
network, at which point it becomes adversary knowledge. The Reveal_DHExp rule can
be triggered when a Diffie-Hellman exponent is generated for the agent $A, as is done in
the client_hello rule in Section 7.3.1.1; the DHExp(˜x, ˜tid, $A) is produced by the
client_hello rule and can thus be consumed by the Reveal_DHExp rule.
Our Reveal_Ltk lemma remains unchanged:
rule Reveal_Ltk:
[ !Ltk($A, ˜ltkA) ] --[ RevLtk($A) ]-> [ Out(˜ltkA) ]
191
7.3 draft-21 Analysis
TLS 1.3 is not intended to be secure under the full combination of all of the types of
compromise listed above. For example, session key secrecy can be broken by an adversary
who eavesdrops on the communication and compromises the Diffie-Hellman values of a
single protocol participant. A natural approach when encoding security properties is to
weaken the attacker model by adding realistic constraints until either the claimed security
goals of the protocol are achieved, or the corresponding attackers become weaker than the
ones we expect to face in practice (in which case proving the property in question would
amount to nothing meaningful). Hence, this approach requires us to express exactly what
needs to be protected, and when each of the claimed TLS 1.3 security properties can be
expected to hold.
We now present our Tamarin encodings of the TLS 1.3 security properties as given in the
draft-21 specification (and as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4, and repeated in this
chapter). In comparison to draft-10, the draft-21 specification has a more developed
overview of the desired TLS 1.3 security properties (see Appendix E of [128]). Hence, in
addition to secrecy and authentication properties, we cover the other properties listed in
the specification, namely, uniqueness of session keys, identical session key establishment,
downgrade protection, and Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) resistance.
7.3.2.2 Secrecy Properties
We now discuss the secrecy of session keys as well as perfect forward secrecy with respect
to long-term keys:
Secrecy of Session Keys. Our secret_session_keys lemma, given below, is our
encoding of property 2., the secret session keys property, given earlier.
lemma secret_session_keys:
(1) "All tid actor peer write_key read_key auth_status #i.
(2) SessionKey(tid, actor, peer, <auth_status, ’auth’>, <write_key, read_key>)@i &
(3) not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r & #r < #i) &
(4) not (Ex tid3 x #r. RevDHExp(tid3, peer, x)@r & #r < #i) &
(5) not (Ex tid4 y #r. RevDHExp(tid4, actor, y)@r & #r < #i) &
(6) not (Ex resumption_master_secret #r. RevealPSK(actor, resumption_master_secret)@r) &
(7) not (Ex resumption_master_secret #r. RevealPSK(peer, resumption_master_secret)@r)
(8) ==> not Ex #j. K(read_key)@j"
The intuition for this lemma is that if an actor believes it has established a session key
with an authenticated peer (2), then the attacker does not know the key (8). However,
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given the capabilities of the attacker, this will not hold without imposing some restrictions.
This is why the additional clauses are required, (3) – (7).
The five adversary conditions stated in the depicted lemma are generally repeated across all
lemmas, and encapsulate the basic assumptions we make about our attacker. We describe
them in more detail here. The first imposes the restriction that the long-term signing key
of the peer is not compromised. This restriction can additionally be understood to signify
that the actor is communicating with an honest peer, since the attacker can effectively
impersonate a party when in possession of its long-term key. Furthermore, it should be
noted that the attacker is still allowed to compromise the peer’s long-term key (LTK) after
the session key is established. Hence we show that the session keys achieve perfect forward
secrecy (PFS) with respect to the LTK.
The second and third clauses bar the attacker from revealing any Diffie-Hellman exponents
generated by the client or the server, respectively, before the session key is established.
The attacker may reveal exponents that are generated after the session key is established.
The last two clauses specify that the attacker cannot compromise a PSK associated with
either the actor or the peer. Note that the attacker is restricted from revealing these PSKs
at any time, i.e., before or after the session key has been established, which corresponds to
the proviso in the specification that the PSK-only exchange mode does not provide PFS.
We note that the PSK and Diffie-Hellman restrictions are necessary when considering the
secrecy of session keys as the key derivation schedule (Section 2.5.1) employs both of these
secrets, in the applicable handshake modes, to establish session keys.
Forward Secrecy with Respect to Long-term Keys. The PFS property is briefly
touched upon above in the context of the long-term signing keys and the secrecy of session
keys. However, in those cases, we do not cover the requirement for forward secrecy with
regards to the PSK coupled with a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In this instance, forward
secrecy should be achieved, whereas with a PSK-only handshake, this is not guaranteed.
We have an additional lemma, secret_session_keys_pfs, which captures that, in either
a full DHE or PSK-DHE handshake, the secrecy of the session keys does not depend on
the PSK remaining secret after the session is concluded.
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In order to achieve this, we modify the secret_session_keys lemma depicted above
by adding a condition for the key-exchange mode, not psk_ke_mode = psk_ke (i.e., not
a PSK-only handshake), and loosening the restrictions on the attacker such that the
RevealPSK action is only forbidden for any time point #r < #i. In proving this lemma we
show that the session keys are forward secure after a Diffie-Hellman exchange.
7.3.2.3 Authentication Properties
Peer (Entity) Authentication. The specification defines this property, somewhat
informally, as a form of authentication whereby both parties should agree on the identity of
their peer. Again, looking at this more formally through the lens of Lowe’s authentication
hierarchy [97], this definition corresponds to weak agreement, i.e., the protocol guarantees
to the client that when it completes a run of the protocol, apparently with the server, then
the server was previously running the protocol, apparently with the client. In particular,
we note that this property does not imply recentness – the requirement that the peer is
currently running the protocol – nor does it specify whether any other values should be
agreed upon.
We model entity authentication in two parts so as to capture the distinction between the
mutual and unilateral authentication cases. Authentication in the unilateral case means
that if a client completes a TLS handshake, apparently with a server, then the server
previously performed a TLS handshake with the client, and they both agree on certain data
values of the handshake, including the identity of the server and the nonces used. Note that
this is already a stronger property than is stipulated in the specification. Here we also prove
non-injective agreement8 on the nonces, which additionally provides recentness since both
parties contribute a fresh nonce to the handshake. The unilateral entity authentication
lemma we aim to prove is the following:
lemma entity_authentication [use_induction, reuse]:
(1) "All tid actor peer nonces client_auth_status #i.
(2) CommitNonces(tid, actor, ’client’, nonces)@i &
(3) CommitIdentity(tid, actor, ’client’, peer, <client_auth_status, ’auth’>)@i &
(4) not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r & #r < #i) &
(5) not (Ex tid3 x #r. RevDHExp(tid3, peer, x)@r & #r < #i) &
(6) not (Ex tid4 y #r. RevDHExp(tid4, actor, y)@r & #r < #i) &
(7) not (Ex resumption_master_secret #r. RevealPSK(actor, resumption_master_secret)@r & #r < #i) &
(8) not (Ex resumption_master_secret #r. RevealPSK(peer, resumption_master_secret)@r & #r < #i)
(9) ==> (Ex tid2 #j. RunningNonces(tid2, peer, ’server’, nonces)@j & #j < #i)"
8The client and the server agree on the nonces but there is no guarantee that there is a one-to-one
relationship between the protocol runs of the client and the protocol runs of the server.
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The intuition for this lemma is that if a client believes it has agreed on a pair of nonces
with a server, (2) and (3), then the server was, at some point prior, engaged in a run of the
protocol using these nonces (9). We again impose the necessary restrictions on the attacker
to achieve this property, (4) – (8). The property can only hold if the attacker does not
acquire any of the secrets prior to the client agreeing on nonces. While one might expect
that only the legitimacy of the signing key is necessary for authentication, if the attacker
is able to obtain the PSK then the attacker is able to resume a session and impersonate
the peer.
We encode mutual entity authentication with an additional lemma that is almost identical
to the entity authentication lemma given above – it is written with the server as the
actor, i.e., all ’client’ instances are replaced with ’server’ instances. The two lemmas
individually capture authentication of the server and the client, respectively, and together
capture mutual entity authentication.
In addition to entity authentication, we consider a transcript agreement property, where
the value agreed upon is a hash of the session transcript. This provides us with near-full
agreement9 – there are a couple of notable omissions. Firstly, the Handshake Protocol
continues after the initial exchange of messages in the handshake, although none of these
delayed, post-handshake messages are included in the session transcript. Secondly, we
observe that the actors do not necessarily agree on the current authentication status of the
handshake, an oddity we cover in more detail in Section 7.3.3.3.
Finally, we also aim to prove an injective variant of mutual transcript agreement (which
TLS should naturally achieve by agreeing on fresh nonces). Hence, we aim to show that
TLS achieves a relatively strong authentication notion: mutual agreement on a significant
portion of the state with recentness.
7.3.2.4 Additional Properties
We now discuss our encoding of the remaining TLS 1.3 properties listed in Chapter 2, and
repeated above.
9We recall that full agreement captures the notion that both protocol participants agree on all possible
data items that could have been exchanged, or created as a result of the exchange, during a run of the
protocol, and that there is a one-to-one relationship between the protocol runs.
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Identical Session Keys. The definition of this property as given in Section 2.5.4 (and
above) is taken from [41], where it is referred to as a consistency property. However,
there is ambiguity in the circumstances that are necessary and sufficient for two protocol
participants to establish the same keys. An answer to this question is typically given
through the well-established practice of defining session partnering [23,41,92]. One possible
way to do so is to assign session identifiers in terms of a value (or pair of values) on which
the two parties agree. We opted for the least restrictive session identifier, namely the pair
of nonces generated by the client and the server. Therefore, if a partnered client and server
complete the handshake, then they must agree on session keys.
We consider this property with respect to an attacker that can compromise all session
keys except for those of the test session, i.e., the session in which the attacker attempts
to obtain information about the key [41, 92]. This property is captured by our lemma
session_key_agreement:
lemma session_key_agreement:
(1) "All tid tid2 actor peer actor2 peer2 nonces keys keys2 cas as2 #i #j #k #l.
(2) SessionKey(tid, actor, peer2, <cas, ’auth’>, keys)@i &
(3) running(Nonces, actor, ’client’, nonces)@j &
(4) SessionKey(tid2, peer, actor2, as2, keys2)@k &
(5) running2(Nonces, peer, ’server’, nonces)@l &
(6) not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r & #r < #i & #r < #k) &
(7) not (Ex tid3 x #r. RevDHExp(tid3, peer, x)@r & #r < #i & #r < #k) &
(8) not (Ex tid4 y #r. RevDHExp(tid4, actor, y)@r & #r < #i & #r < #k) &
(9) not (Ex rms #r. RevealPSK(actor, rms)@r & #r < #i & #r < #k) &
(10)not (Ex rms #r. RevealPSK(peer, rms)@r & #r < #i & #r < #k)
(11)==> keys = keys2"
Intuitively, this lemma states that if two actors have partnered with the same nonces, (3)
and (5), then they have established identical session keys (11).
Uniqueness of Session Keys. In order to capture the uniqueness of session keys, we aim
to prove that any two matching session keys generated must be from the same session, and
indeed from the same TLS connection. In other words, each run of the protocol produces
distinct session keys. This should hold without any restriction on the attacker, since it
is a straightforward consequence of an actor generating a fresh nonce for each session
(since nonces are included in the computation of traffic keys). The property as listed in
the draft-21 specification also mentions that session keys should be independent. We
do not aim to prove anything about the independence of session keys, or whether or not
two session keys are related, since this trivially follows from our assumption of perfect
cryptography. We capture the uniqueness property in our Unique_session_keys lemma:
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lemma unique_session_keys:
"All tid tid2 actor peer peer2 kr kw as as2 #i #j.
SessionKey(tid, actor, peer, as, <kr, kw>)@i &
SessionKey(tid2, actor, peer2, as2, <kr, kw>)@j
==> #i = #j"
Downgrade Protection. The draft-21 specification cites the work by Bhargavan et
al. [28] for a definition of downgrade protection, as given in Section 2.5.4 and above. This
definition is not directly equivalent to any of Lowe’s classical agreement definitions; it only
requires that both parties negotiate the same configuration parameters as would be the
case without the presence of an attacker. Specifically, we observe that agreeing on the
configuration parameters (in the sense of non-injective agreement) is sufficient to achieve
this, but not necessary. Therefore, within our model we capture downgrade protection
through our authentication lemmas. However, we note that this does not accurately capture
the spirit of downgrade protection owing to the fact that we assume all cryptographic
primitives to be perfect, and given that we do not model previous versions of TLS. The
weakening of primitives, as well as the modelling of previous versions of TLS in Tamarin,
would make for interesting future work.
Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resistance. The only restriction we place
on compromising long-term keys is that the peer’s LTK must not be compromised. None
of our security properties rely on the actor’s LTK being hidden from the attacker.10 This
fact coupled with our authentication properties additionally captures the KCI resistance
property as laid out in Section 2.5.4 (and above).
7.3.2.5 Parameter Negotiation
The security of a TLS session critically depends on the integrity of the parameters negotiated
during the corresponding TLS handshakes in the initial and subsequent connections in the
session. In TLS these parameters include the protocol version, the cipher suite, and the
signature algorithm. Depending on the negotiated protocol version, additional values may
or must be negotiated, such as the handshake mode, the Diffie-Hellman group, and/or the
PSK to be used.
10A minor exception to this is that the adversary cannot use the actor’s long-term key to impersonate
the actor to itself since in this case, the actor is also the peer.
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For Diffie-Hellman group negotiation, we model the client sending a list of two symbolic
groups from which the server may choose. This feature allows us to provide a limited
coverage of the Hello Retry Request (HRR) functionality of the protocol. We also provide
support for PSKs but limit the number of PSKs offered to one per handshake.
With our transcript agreement lemmas, we capture the client and the server agreeing on
the transcript of the protocol and hence on the values selected during negotiation. This
means that an adversary should not be able to force the client or the server to accept a
value that they did not initially offer.
There are two main classes of parameter negotiation attacks: forcing the use of bad cipher
suites [8, 34] or bad signature algorithms [26], and forcing the use of older and insecure
versions of SSL/TLS [16,110]. As mentioned, because we model perfect cryptography and
cover TLS 1.3 only, these attacks are not captured by our analysis.
7.3.3 Analysis and Results
We now provide a detailed description of our analysis, including a discussion of our results
and an exploration of an authentication anomaly uncovered by our work.
7.3.3.1 Positive Results
In general, we find that TLS 1.3 meets the properties outlined in the draft-21 specification,
those that our modelling process was able to capture at least. We show that TLS 1.3 enables
a client and a server to agree on secret session keys and that these session keys are unique
across, as well as within, handshake instances. Our analysis shows that PFS of session keys
holds in the expected situations, i.e., in the (EC)DHE and PSK+(EC)DHE handshake
modes. We also show that TLS 1.3, by and large, provides the desired authentication
guarantees in both the unilateral and mutual authentication cases. The situation in which
this is not the case is covered in Section 7.3.3.3.
We present our results in Table 7.1. For each property discussed in Section 2.5.4 (and
above), we indicate our findings. We use ∗ to indicate that the property holds in most
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situations. As mentioned, we discuss cases in which the property does not hold to the
expected degree in sections to follow. We also list our applicable Tamarin lemma(s) in
Table 7.1.
Property Proven Lemma(s)
(1) Secret session keys secret_session_keys
(2) Perfect forward secrecy secret_session_keys_pfs
(3) Peer authentication∗ entity_authenticationmutual_entity_authentication
(4) Identical session keys session_key_agreement
(5) Unique session keys unique_session_keys
(7)
Key Compromise
Impersonation (KCI)
resistance
entity_authentication
mutual_entity_authentication
Table 7.1: TLS 1.3 draft-21 Tamarin results
We recall that our model does not truly cover downgrade protection. A treatment of
downgrade protection across TLS protocol versions would require modelling the earlier
versions of TLS in a way that is consistent with the TLS 1.3 model as developed here.
In order to consider the downgrade protection of cipher suites, we would need to relax
our current assumption of perfect cryptography through rules that, for instance, allow an
attacker to learn the payload of encrypted messages without knowing the key. In spite of
the fact that these additional considerations would substantially complicate the model and
the proof process, our model is well-suited to their inclusion and could form the basis of
future work.
7.3.3.2 Proof Approach in Tamarin
For models as complex as those needed to capture TLS 1.3, proving lemmas in Tamarin
is a multi-stage process, and proving complex lemmas directly is often infeasible as proof
trees can become very large. Tamarin provides a number of features that allow complex
proofs to be broken down into more manageable sections. Writing auxiliary lemmas, or
sub-lemmas, provides hints to the Tamarin constraint solving algorithm, allowing it to
solve complex sections of a larger proof directly, making the overall proof more manageable.
For our draft-21 model, we use several types of lemmas: Helper lemmas are used to
quickly solve repetitive subsections of a larger proof without repeatedly unrolling the entire
sub-tree (corresponding to the repetitive subsection), and typing lemmas provide hints to
the Tamarin engine about the potential sources of messages, reducing the branching of
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a proof tree. Inductive lemmas instruct Tamarin to prove lemmas inductively, allowing
us to break out of loops in the protocol, which otherwise can produce infinite proof trees.
Proving the main properties of draft-21 required many auxiliary lemmas, of all of these
kinds.
The Tamarin engine can also use heuristics to automate the proving of lemmas, which
proved invaluable in quickly re-proving large sections of properties after making changes
to the model. By investing time in writing auto-provable sub-lemmas, we could easily
incorporate changes made to the specification without having to restart our analysis from
scratch.
The more complex lemmas used in our analysis of draft-21, however, required manual
proving in the Tamarin interactive prover. We note that by manual proving in this context
we mean manually guiding the Tamarin prover through a proof by using the Tamarin
graphical user interface.
In order to give an indication of the number of auxiliary lemmas required, and the
relationship between all of our lemmas, we have constructed a lemma map, displayed in
Figure 7.8. The map also indicates which lemmas were auto-proved by Tamarin, and
which ones needed manual guidance for Tamarin to be able to prove them.
In total, the analysis effort represents approximately 3 person-months worth of work.
However, the vast majority of that time can be allocated to the process of writing lemmas
to break down the overall proving effort into smaller, auto-provable chunks. With these
lemmas in place, proving the entire model takes about a week, and significant computing
resources. We made use of a 48-core machine with 512GB of RAM. The model itself takes
over 10GB RAM to load, and can easily consume 100GB RAM in the course of a proof.
The underlying language on which Tamarin is built, Haskell11, automaticially detects the
number of cores available on a machine and employs as many threads, using multi-treading
to speed up the proof search. Once produced, our proofs can be verified within the space
of a day, still requiring vast amounts of RAM.
11See https://www.haskell.org/.
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uniqueness
one_s_per_tid
*s in {ALL STATES}
S1_vs_S1_PSK_DHE
S1_PSK_vs_S1_PSK_DHE
S1_PSK_vs_S1
C1_vs_C1_PSK_DHE
C1_PSK_vs_C1
C1_PSK_vs_C1_PSK_DHE
s_vs_s_cert
*s in {C3,S3}
s_vs_s_PSK
*s in {C2a,S2a,C2d,S2d}
DH chal
dh_chal_dual
DH injectivity
dh_exp_invariant(i)
one_dh_per_x
rev_dh_ordering(i)
rev_dh_before_hs
invariants
tid_invariant(i)
one_start_per_tid(i)
cert_req_origin(t)
nst_source(t)
secret helpers
ku_extract(i)
ku_expand(i)
ku_hs
ku_ltk
ku_fresh_psk
hsms_derive
posths_rms_weak(i)
posths_rms(i)
matching_transcripts_posths
matching_rms_posths
matching_rms_actors
sig_origin
invariant_post_hs
matching_sessions(i)
auth_psk
matching_hsms
post_master_secret
invariant_post_hs(i)
handshake_secret(i)
handshake_secret_pfs(i)
auth helpers
matching_nonces
consistent_nonces
invariant_nonces
matching_rms_nonces
Properties
secret_session_keys
secret_session_keys_pfs
unique_session_keys
session_key_agreement
entity_authentication(i)
transcript_agreement
mut_entity_authentication(i)
mut_transcript_agreement
injective_mut_entity_auth
Figure 7.8: Lemma Map. Lemma names with a purple background indicate where manual
interaction via the Tamarin visual interface was required. The remaining lemmas were
automatically proven by Tamarin, without manual interaction. An arrow from one
category to another implies that the proof of the latter depends on the former, and (i)
and (t) indicate inductive and typing lemmas, respectively. The Properties box contains
the main TLS 1.3 properties.
7.3.3.3 Authentication Mismatch
During the development of our draft-21 model, and in particular the analysis of the
post-handshake client authentication, we encountered a possible behaviour that suggested
that TLS 1.3 fails to meet certain strong authentication guarantees. While there are many
definitions of authentication, the common thread among strong authentication guarantees
is that both parties share a common view of the session, i.e., that they agree on exchanged
and computed data. During our analysis of the post-handshake client authentication
mechanism, it became apparent that the client does not receive any explicit confirmation
that the server has successfully received the client’s response. Due to the asynchronous
nature of this post-handshake client authentication, the client may keep receiving data from
the server, and will not be able to determine if the server has received its authentication
message. As a consequence, the client cannot be sure as to whether or not the server has
sent subsequent data under the assumption that the client has been authenticated.
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In concurrent work by Bhargavan et al. [27], a similar issue was uncovered for the 0.5-
RTT case. A discussion with the TLS WG on draft-21 revealed that an equivalent
problem also exists within the main (initial) handshake. During the main handshake, the
server can request a client certificate, and may decide to reject it (for example because it
violates certain domain-specific policies), but still continue with the connection as if the
certificate was accepted. Therefore, the client cannot be sure (after what appears to be
a main handshake with mutual authentication) that the server considers the client to be
authenticated. Thus, this phenomenon leaves the client uncertain as to whether or not the
server considers it to be authenticated, even though (i) the server asked for a certificate,
and (ii) the client supplied it and the corresponding authentication signature.
In order to see why this may become a problem at the application level, consider the
following application: Assume a TLS 1.3 enabled client and server pair where the server
implements the policy that any data received over a mutually authenticated connection
are stored in a secure database; all data received over connections where the client is not
authenticated are stored in an insecure log. The client connects to the server, the server
requests a certificate (and the corresponding authentication signature), which the client
duly provides, but the server rejects the client’s certificate (and hence the authentication
signature) and continues regardless. Since the server rejected the client’s certificate,
it continues to store incoming messages in the insecure log. However, the client may
assume it has been authenticated, and therefore may start sending sensitive data, which is
consequently stored in the insecure log, rather than in the secure database as the client
may expect.
The TLS WG has decided not to fix this behaviour for TLS 1.3, meaning that this remains
true for all subsequent TLS 1.3 drafts, and has not introduced any mechanism that informs
the client of the server’s view of the client’s authentication status. If a client wants to
be certain that the server considers it to be authenticated, this confirmation needs to
be supplied at the application layer. We anticipate that some client applications will
incorrectly assume that sending a client certificate (with the associated authentication
information) and obtaining further server messages indeed guarantees that the server
considers the connection to be mutually authenticated. As stated, this is not the case in
general, and may lead to serious security issues despite there being no direct violation of
the specified TLS 1.3 security requirements.
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7.4 Conclusion
In this work we modelled draft-21 of the TLS 1.3 specification within the symbolic
analysis framework of the Tamarin prover, and used the tool to verify the majority of the
security guarantees that TLS 1.3 claims to offer.
We focus on ruling out complex interaction attacks by considering an unbounded number of
concurrent connections, and all of the TLS 1.3 handshake modes. We cover both unilateral
and mutual authentication, as well as session key secrecy in all of the TLS 1.3 handshake
modes with respect to a Dolev-Yao attacker. We also capture more advanced security
properties such as perfect forward secrecy and Key Compromise Impersonation resistance.
Our draft-21 Tamarin modelling effort embraces a far more modular approach, accurately
capturing the draft specification.
Besides verifying that draft-21 of the TLS 1.3 specification meets the claimed security
properties in most of the handshake modes and variants, we also discover an unexpected
authentication behaviour which may have serious security implications for implementations
of TLS 1.3. This unexpected behaviour, at a high level, implies that TLS 1.3 provides no
direct means for a client to determine its authentication status from the perspective of
a given server. As a server may treat authenticated data differently to unauthenticated
data, the client may end up in a position in which its sensitive data gets processed as
non-sensitive data by the server.
The work presented in this chapter again contributes to the newer, proactive TLS 1.3 design
approach, confirming the TLS WG’s design choices, as well as pointing out weaknesses in
the protocol which may lead to complications in the future.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this chapter we conclude and briefly mention avenues for future work.
In the development of the latest version of TLS, namely TLS 1.3, the IETF has embraced
a more collaborative and proactive design process, welcoming analyses of the protocol by
the academic community prior to the protocol’s official release with a view to catch and
remedy flaws before the protocol is finalised. This thesis has examined the reasons for
the IETF’s decision to adopt a new development process, and has presented work that
supports this design shift.
In Chapter 3 we presented an account of TLS standardisation, starting with the early
versions of TLS, right up until TLS 1.3, which is, at the time of writing, nearing completion.
We described how the process for TLS 1.2 and below fits the design-release-break-patch cycle
of standards development, and how a shift in the process has resulted in the standardisation
of TLS 1.3 conforming to the design-break-fix-release development cycle. We commented
on the factors that have influenced the change in the TLS WG’s design methodology,
namely, the protocol analysis tools available, the levels of involvement from the research
community, and the incentives driving the relevant stakeholders.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we presented work that attacks the use of RC4 in TLS 1.2 and
below, showing that the Record Protocol does not meet its intended confidentiality goal.
In Chapter 4 we showed how to recover passwords when protected by RC4 in TLS, and in
Chapter 5 we attacked 16-byte plaintexts protected by RC4, introducing techniques that
enable predictions regarding the number of ciphertexts needed for the successful recovery of
target plaintexts. As mentioned in Chapter 4, avenues for future work include adapting our
password-recovery attacks to operate with an unknown password length, and examining
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the effect of dictionary choice on attack success rates in more detail.
The material presented in Chapters 4 and 5 adds to a large body of work that confirms the
need for a new version of TLS – a version that has undergone analysis prior to release. In
Chapters 6 and 7 we presented work that contributes towards this goal. We analysed two
drafts of TLS 1.3, namely draft-10 and draft-21, using the Tamarin prover . In Chapter
6 we showed that the draft-10 Handshake Protocol meets its desired security properties
but we found an attack against the post-handshake client authentication mechanism. This
attack informed the next revision of TLS 1.3 which indeed implemented a patch for this
attack. In Chapter 7 we showed that draft-21, by and large, meets its intended security
goals. We did, however, observe a strange authentication behaviour in the post-handshake
client authentication mechanism which could have security implications for real-world
systems. This behaviour was reported to the TLS WG.
Our symbolic analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 employed the use of perfect cryptography. One
possibility for extending our analyses is to weaken cryptographic primitives by introducing
rules which, for instance, allow an adversary to create hash function collisions, or signature
and MAC forgeries. Another area of future exploration includes incorporating Tamarin
models for TLS 1.2 and below so as to fully cover downgrade protection. This, however,
could prove to be computationally expensive.
The newer standardisation process followed for TLS 1.3 by the IETF exhibits benefits
over the process employed previously as it allows for the pre-emptive detection and fixing
of weaknesses, thus producing a potentially stronger protocol and reducing the need for
patches post-release. A proactive process such as this is truly befitting of a critical protocol
such as TLS.
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Appendix A
STS .spthy File
theory sts
begin
builtins: diffie-hellman, hashing, asymmetric-encryption, symmetric-encryption,
signing
/*
Modeling the Public Key Infrastructure
--------------------------------------
*/
// Registering a public key
rule Gen_keypair:
[ Fr(˜ltkA) ]--[ GenLtk($A, ˜ltkA)
]->
[ !Ltk($A, ˜ltkA), !Pk($A, pk(˜ltkA))]
// Revealing a long-term key
rule Reveal_Ltk:
[ !Ltk($A, ˜ltkA) ] --[ RevLtk($A) ]-> [ Out(˜ltkA) ]
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/*
Modeling the Protocol
----------------------
*/
rule Client_1:
[ Fr(˜a) // Choose fresh DH exponent.
]
--[ C1(˜a)
, Start(˜a, $C, ’client’) // Log a start action.
, DH($C, ˜a) // Log a DH action.
]->
[ Client_1($C, ˜a) // Store DH exponent for the next step.
, Out(<$C,’g’ˆ˜a>) // Send DH exponent to S.
]
rule Server_1:
let
k = ckeyshareˆ˜b
in
[ Fr(˜b) // Choose fresh DH exponent.
, !Ltk($S, ˜ltkS) // Retrieve server long-term key.
, In(<C,ckeyshare>) // Receive client key share.
]
--[ S1(˜b)
, Start(˜b, $S, ’server’) // Log a start action.
, UseSessionKey(C, k) // Log use of session key.
, Neq($S, C) // Avoiding trivial adversarial wins.
, SignS(’g’ˆ˜b, ckeyshare) // Log signature on the key shares.
, Running($S, C, ’server’, ’g’ˆ˜b, ckeyshare) // Log a running action.
]->
[ Server_1($S, C, ˜b, ckeyshare, k) // Store state.
, Out(<$S,’g’ˆ˜b, senc{sign{<’g’ˆ˜b, ckeyshare>}˜ltkS}k>) // Send key share
// and encrypted
// signature.
]
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rule Client_2:
let
k = skeyshareˆ˜a
in
[ Client_1($C, ˜a) // Retrieve DH exponent from previous
// step.
, !Ltk($C, ˜ltkC) // Retrieve client long-term key.
, !Pk(S, pk(˜ltkS)) // Retrieve public key.
, In(<S,skeyshare, s_encryptedsignature>) // Receive server key share and
// encrypted signature.
]
--[ C2(˜a)
, Neq(S, $C) // Avoiding trivial adversarial wins.
, Eq(verify(sdec{s_encryptedsignature}k, <skeyshare, ’g’ˆ˜a> , pk(˜ltkS)),
true) // Verify the server signature.
, SessionKey($C ,S ,k, ’authenticated’) // Log shared session key.
, SignC(’g’ˆ˜a, skeyshare) // Log signature on the key shares.
, Running($C, S, ’client’, ’g’ˆ˜a, skeyshare) // Log a running action.
, Commit($C, S, ’client’, ’g’ˆ˜a, skeyshare) // Log a commit action.
]->
[ Client_2($C, S, ˜a, skeyshare, k) // Store state.
, Out(senc{sign{<’g’ˆ˜a, skeyshare>}˜ltkS}k) // Send encrypted signature.
]
rule Server_2:
[ Server_1($S, C, ˜b, ckeyshare, k) // Retrieve DH exponent, client key
// share and shared key from previous
// step.
, !Pk(C, pk(˜ltkC)) // Retrieve client public key.
, In(c_encryptedsignature) // Receive server key share and
// encrypted signature.
]
--[ S2(˜b)
, Eq(verify(sdec{c_encryptedsignature}k, <ckeyshare, ’g’ˆ˜b> , pk(˜ltkC)),
true) // Verify the client signature.
, SessionKey($S,C,k,’authenticated’) // Log shared session key.
, Commit($S, C, ’server’, ’g’ˆ˜b, ckeyshare) // Log a commit action.
]->
[ Server_2($S, C, ˜b, ckeyshare, k) // Store state.
]
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/*
Encoding Properties
--------------------------------
*/
restriction Equality_Checks_Succeed:
"All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @ i ==> x = y"
restriction NEquality_Checks_Succeed:
"All x y #i. Neq(x, y)@i ==> not (x = y)"
restriction One_Ltk:
"All A x y #i #j. GenLtk(A, x)@i & GenLtk(A, y)@j ==> #i = #j"
restriction One_Role_Per_Actor:
"All actor tid1 tid2 role1 role2 #i #j. Start(tid1, actor, role1)@i
& Start(tid2, actor, role2)@j
==> role1 = role2"
/*
Reachability tests -- replace In and Out with AuthMessage when checking
reachability, and comment this section out when proving other security
properties.
*/
restriction At_most_1_of_C1:
"All #i #j tid1 tid2. C1(tid1)@i & C1(tid2)@j ==> #i = #j"
restriction At_most_1_of_S1:
"All #i #j tid1 tid2. S1(tid1)@i & S1(tid2)@j ==> #i = #j"
restriction At_most_1_of_C2:
"All #i #j tid1 tid2. C2(tid1)@i & C2(tid2)@j ==> #i = #j"
restriction At_most_1_of_S2:
"All #i #j tid1 tid2. S2(tid1)@i & S2(tid2)@j ==> #i = #j"
lemma exists_C1:
exists-trace
"Ex tid #i. C1(tid)@i"
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lemma exists_S1:
exists-trace
"Ex tid #i. S1(tid)@i"
lemma exists_C2:
exists-trace
"Ex tid #i. C2(tid)@i"
lemma exists_S2:
exists-trace
"Ex tid #i. S2(tid)@i"
/*
Encoding Security Properties
--------------------------------
*/
lemma entity_authentication[reuse]:
"All actor peer keyshare1 keyshare2 #i.
Commit(actor, peer, ’client’, keyshare1, keyshare2)@i
& not (Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r)
==> Ex #j peer2. Running(peer, peer2, ’server’, keyshare2, keyshare1)@j
& #j < #i"
lemma mutual_authentication[reuse]:
"All actor peer keyshare1 keyshare2 #i.
Commit(actor, peer, ’server’, keyshare1, keyshare2)@i
& not ((Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r) | (Ex #r. RevLtk(actor)@r))
==> (Ex #j. Running(peer, actor, ’client’, keyshare2, keyshare1)@j
& #j < #i)"
lemma session_key_secrecy:
"All actor peer k #i. SessionKey(actor, peer, k,’authenticated’)@i
& not ((Ex #r. RevLtk(peer)@r & #r < #i)
| (Ex #r. RevLtk(actor)@r & #r < #i))
==> not Ex #j. K(k)@j"
end
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